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INTRODUCTION: TERRI SCHIAVO AND THE POLITICS OF LIFE 
  
A Strange Witness 
On March 18, 2005 the U.S. House of Representative’s Committee on 
Government Reform issued subpoenas to Florida residents Michael and Terri Schiavo. 
The subpoenas summoned the Schiavos to “testify” on issues relevant to the Committee’s 
investigation into “treatment options provided to incapacitated patients to advance the[ir] 
quality of life.”1  In light of Mrs. Schiavo’s long and now well-known traumas, some 
observers noted a certain irony, if not obscenity, to the subpoena’s order for testimony. 
Having suffered severe anoxic brain damage as a result of a cardiac arrest in 1990, Terri 
Schiavo lived in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) for 15 years, unconscious and unable, 
among other things, to speak. Although the subpoenas asked that Terri testify about her 
incapacity, she was in fact incapable of testifying, at least in the traditional sense of 
providing oral or written statements.  
To be sure, the strange nature of the committee’s request was mediated, if not 
thoroughly overshadowed, by the strange circumstances and intent under which it was 
authored. The subpoenas sought Terri’s testimony in order to stall the March 18th removal 
of her life support, a PEG feeding tube that provided her nutrition and hydration. The 
removal date had come at the end of a nearly seven year legal battle over whether, given 
the devastating and irreversible nature of Terri’s brain damage, to maintain or withdraw 
                                                
1 U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on Government Reform. Subpoena (H.R. 1332). (S. 
539). March 18, 2005. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2005. 
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the tube’s life-prolonging assistance. From Michael Schiavo’s 1998 withdrawal petition, 
through a series of more and less credible appeals launched in Florida by her parents 
Robert and Mary Schindler, to a frenzy of attention from the national media and 
government—by March 2005, Terri Schiavo had become a flashpoint for negotiating 
“right to die” questions in medical, religious and political contexts centered on life. As 
the Committee on Government Reform issued its subpoenas, the media was ablaze with 
Terri Schiavo coverage, its commentary focused less on the prospect of her courtroom 
testimony than on then-Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist’s warning that the law “protects 
a witness from anyone who […] influences, obstructs, or impedes an inquiry or 
investigation by Congress.”2 
In spite of all the alarms sounded around the 10 page legal document, the 
committee’s extraordinary maneuver to earn Terri Schiavo witness protection lacked the 
jurisdiction to have any legal force or credibility. Terri’s feeding tubes were removed at 
1:30 p.m. on March 18th. Congressional and executive efforts to reinsert the tubes began 
almost immediately and each “save Terri” tactic that followed would prove more 
dramatic than the last. In one case, the “Act for the relief of the parents of Theresa Marie 
Schiavo” signed March 21, 2005, political leaders even flagrantly sacrificed the 
principles of judicial independence and the separation of powers in an effort to win the 
removal order’s overturning.3 That such lengths were undertaken to keep Terri Schiavo 
                                                
2 Arthur Caplan, James McCartney and Dominic Sisti. “Congressional Statements and Actions 
Related to the Schiavo Case.” In The Case of Terri Schiavo: Ethics at the End of Life. (Amherst, 
New York: Prometheus Books, 2006), 136. 
3 The Act ordered a district court to review of Terri Schiavo’s constitutional and federal claims 
but stipulated that the court “(2) shall not consider whether these claims were previously ‘raised, 
considered, or decided in State court proceedings;’ (3) shall not engage in ‘abstention in favor of 
State court proceedings;’ and (4) shall not decided the case on the basis of ‘whether remedies 
available in the State courts have been exhausted.” In short, the Act unduly dictated how the 
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alive is evidence of the massive political controversy brought to her bedside. In the 
absence of oral and written statements of her own, a din of pundit voices and a sea of 
editorial pages had testified on her behalf. By the time Terri Schiavo passed away on 
March 31, 2005 her life and death had taken on a medical, political and religious 
importance that few could have anticipated.  
One need not underestimate the difficulty of those questions posed through Terri 
Schiavo—questions regarding the limits of life and death, the “sanctity” or “quality” of 
the former and the “dignity” of the latter—in order to wonder how they gathered so 
saliently around a single woman at this particular historical moment. Thousands of 
families make the decision to withdraw life support every year. And of those unfortunate 
situations in which the courts become involved, In re Schiavo was a typical rather than 
exceptional case; for individuals in a persistent vegetative state without a written end-of-
life directive, the Florida adjudications were entirely consistent with established legal 
precedent and procedures. Set in contrast with the two most influential precedents in this 
body of cases, In re Quinlan (1976) and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of 
Health (1990), the extraordinary feature of the Schiavo case lies in the involvement of 
politicized religious forces in the family feud between Michael Schiavo and the 
Schindlers. These forces (most prominently, anti-abortion activist Randall Terry) 
deployed powerful rhetoric to link Terri’s personal fate with the fate of an American 
“culture of life” and Terri’s “voice” with those of the “unborn.” For many, the Schiavo 
cause became united with President George W. Bush’s call to “err on the side of life” 
                                                
judiciary should decide Terri’s case, thereby overstepping Congressional powers. Quoted in 
Joshua Perry, “Biblical Biopolitics: Judicial Process, Religious Rhetoric, and Beyond.” In Health 
Matrix 16 (2006): 607. 
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wherever there are “serious doubts,” namely, wherever the unborn or the undead are in 
question.4  
The striking influence of “culture of life” politics at Terri Schiavo’s bedside has 
garnered considerable scholarly attention.5 However, few authors situate these events 
within the broader “politics of life” that they betray and heuristically demand. Conflicts 
over the definition and value of life that divide Right and Left, religious and secular, must 
be reckoned with their condition of possibility—a politics that takes biological life not 
simply as its condition but as its principal concern. To do so promises a more elucidatory 
account of the Schiavo debate as well as philosophical provocations regarding the fate of 
“life” today. Historically, philosophers have distinguished between the bare biological 
fact of living and the way of life of individuals or groups in the polis. The Greeks, for 
their part, used two words to describe what is gathered in the single English word “life”: 
zoe and bios mark, respectively, biological and political life, their delineation hinging on 
the capacity for language. When Aristotle famously described humans as “political 
animals,” it was in virtue of their ability, unlike other animals, to speak of “the good” and 
participate in the polis.6 Whereas Greek political life presupposes biological life yet is 
defined by language and speech, Terri Schiavo’s existence suggests an alternative 
relation between zoe and bios, one in which politics does not simply presuppose, but is 
directed towards, life. For fifteen years, Schiavo’s existence had been both reduced to 
biological functioning and subjected to invasive politicization, the motion of her organs 
                                                
4 Daryn Kagan, Susan Candotti, Anderson Cooper and David Mattingly, “President George W. 
Bush Makes a Statement on Death of Terri Schiavo,” CNN Live Today, March 31, 2005, 
Transcript 033102CN.V75. 
5 See George Annas, “’Culture of Life’ Politics at the Bedside: The Case of Terri Schiavo” in The 
New England Journal of Medicine 16 (2006): 1710-1715. 
6 Aristotle, The Politics. (London: Penguin Books, 1992), 3. 
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persisting solely by virtue of legal decision and state intervention. At her bedside, 
biological and political life appear indistinct, a collapse that would be alien in, say, the 
poleis of Plato, Aristotle or their inheritors. 
Through the rich tensions of the Schiavo case, this chapter opens a set of 
questions to be explored throughout this dissertation; specifically, I introduce a 
philosophical query regarding the fate of zoe, bios and their traditional hinge of 
separation—language. Attending to the religious, medical and political practices at her 
bedside, I argue that the Terri Schiavo controversy betrays and must be understood within 
its “biopolitical” context. Here it is broadly established that, in the name of the health, 
safety or productivity of populations, contemporary Western politics operates at the level 
of life. Moreover, this demonstration returns its illuminations to Terri Schiavo, refiguring 
traditional “right to die” questions and positions. The politicization of life is conditioned 
by the possibility of transforming “life,” not only its trivial features, but also that which is 
held most “intrinsic” to existence. As a symbol of the shifting borders between life and 
death, Terri Schiavo starkly illustrates these possibilities, disrupting arguments for 
“sanctity” or “dignity” of life made on her behalf. Since the positions of both Right and 
Left rely on the outmoded distinction between biological and political existence, these 
interrogations are an effective opening onto this project’s larger objective, that of 
evaluating the “life” of biopolitics. 
Following the conceptual unsettlings of Terri Schiavo, this chapter introduces 
further questions about the fate of language in biopolitical contexts; in particular, I argue 
that the apparent eclipse of the zoe/bios distinction ambiguates also its conceptual hinge 
of separation—language. On the one hand, if Western political communities center their 
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labors on a form of life traditionally understood as speechless (i.e. zoe), the ability to 
speak of the good may no longer define political life; read as a specifically mute figure, 
Terri Schiavo would signal the expiration of Aristotle’s speaking “political animal,” the 
“without-voice” of a more bestial politics. On the other hand, if biopolitics subverts the 
distinction between zoe and bios, perhaps it also subverts that of “having” and “not-
having” language; Terri Schiavo might be read, not as mute, but as speaking otherwise, 
signaling the strange but by no means absent voice of biopolitics. In this chapter, I 
explore how Terri Schiavo is variously figured as a speaking or non-speaking being, and 
thereby, afforded or denied the protections of political life. Here this project’s more 
narrow focus on the language of biopolitics finds a rich introduction in the life of the 
woman subpoenaed by Congress on March 18, 2005. Asked to speak on her incapacity 
for speech, the voice of Terri Schiavo is a telling one, a voice understood in many cases 
as neither present nor absent but rather to come. This introduction closes with an outline 
of the philosophical voices to come in this dissertation, voices that provoke and enlighten 
my attention to the language of biopower⎯ Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben and Julia 
Kristeva. 
 
The Biopolitics of Life and Death 
 Given how deeply Terri Schiavo’s mortality rested on the activities and decisions 
of jurists, legislators, executives and activists alike it is perhaps not contentious to 
describe her life and death as “politicized.” To be clear and underscore this fact we 
should note that, prior to the federal maneuvers of March 2005, Terri’s feeding tubes had 
already been removed and re-inserted twice by way of political action. Two days after 
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their initial withdrawal on April 24, 2001, a judicial injunction compelled the tubes’ 
reinsertion so as to allow the Florida courts to investigate perjury allegations made 
against Michael Schiavo by Terri’s parents. The discrediting of these charges and the 
overturning of the Schindler’s appeal then developed into several years of state-level 
adjudication focused on whether Terri’s condition continued to qualify as “terminal” and 
irreversible. And, despite the consensus of nearly every advised judge on this final 
medical issue, the tube’s second withdrawal on October 15, 2003 was reversed by 
Governor Jeb Bush’s executive order on October 21, 2003. Bush’s action, the determined 
unconstitutionality of which spurred multifarious federal efforts like those of the 
Committee on Government Reform, was a strong reflection of the political weight 
wielded by grassroots conservative activists. Whether limiting the notion of 
“politicization” to the work of state institutions and actors or the work of partisan and 
ideological forces, the tumultuous and protracted course of Terri Schiavo’s PEG feeding 
tube’s removal and reinsertion confirms the very real political mediation of her death.  
To link Terri Schiavo’s life and death to biopolitics, in addition to specific 
sovereign, juridical or ideological actions, is to invoke a broader sense of politicization. 
“Biopolitics” marks, provisionally, a bios that is thoroughly oriented towards zoe, that is, 
a political community that elevates biological life to the status of a central political 
concern. This understanding of life’s politicization does not expire the relevance of state, 
legal or ideological forces; rather it suggests that each of these forces shape and are 
shaped by the eclipse of the zoe and bios distinction, an eclipse famously described in 
Michel Foucault’s The History of Sexuality as that of the “threshold of modernity”: 
What might be called a society’s ‘threshold of modernity’ has been 
reached when the life of the species is wagered on its own political 
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strategies. For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living 
animal with the additional capacity for political existence; modern man is 
an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in 
question.”7   
 
In this passage Foucault not only captures the distance between contemporary biopolitics 
and the Aristotelian polis, he also provides a description adequate to Terri Schiavo. As a 
“living being in question,” her life and death are far from natural, in the sense of pure zoe 
and its coming to pass, and are eminently biopolitical, in the sense of a bios centered on 
zoe.  
To illustrate note that the form of life lived by Schiavo—a persistent vegetative 
state (PVS)—did not exist prior to the advancement of life-support technologies and the 
very way of life that would facilitate those advancements. In the 20th Century, the 
development and coordination of artificial respiration, the management of circulation and 
body temperature, and the use of intravenous nutrition and hydration produced variations 
on the “classic” coma, each differing with respect to levels of cognitive and vegetative 
devastation.8 Medical descriptions of PVS date to the 1940s and the diagnosis itself 
earned a name only in 1972.9 As a new form of comatose life, the “persistent vegetative 
state” is distinguished by the maintenance of sleep-wake cycles in a permanently 
unconscious individual, more specifically, by the loss of cognitive functioning in the 
cerebral cortex concurrent with continued functioning of the brain stem.10 Although PVS 
                                                
7 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume One (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 
143. 
8 Some authors use the term “overcoma” to describe this spectrum of advanced comas. 
9 Bryan Jennett, The Vegetative State: Medical facts, ethical and legal dilemmas (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1. 
10 Ibid, 1-6; Ronald Crawford, “Diagnosing the Permanent Vegetative State.” In The Case of 
Terri Schiavo: Ethics at the End of Life. Ed. Arthur L. Caplan, James J. McCartney and Dominic 
Sisti. (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 2006), 67-68. 
 9 
patients possess no consciousness whatsoever, they open their eyes for periods of time. 
The state of “wakeful unawareness” is an uncanny thought today, but an unimaginable 
life to physicians of the 19th century.11 As Foucault put it once “we have become so good 
at keeping people alive that we’ve succeeded in keeping them alive when, in biological 
terms, they should have been dead long ago.”12  
Foucault’s (somewhat indelicate) comment points towards an obvious 
consequence of the emergence of advanced comas: in multiplying forms of life, death 
also undergoes redefinition. In the 1960s a special committee of the Harvard Medical 
School voted to redefine death as death of the brain, an interpretation endorsed by 
Congress in the 1981 “Uniform Definition of Death Act.”13 In “brain death,” the loss of 
all relational and vegetative functions follows from irreversible cessation of the function 
of the entire brain, including that which controls involuntary activity. In the case of organ 
donors, a mechanical ventilator continues the circulation of oxygenated blood throughout 
the body, maintaining the ”life” of tissue and organs to be harvested. 14  Although it is a 
widely applied definition in current Western legal and medical circles, the notion of brain 
death is not without ambiguity and is likely to undergo future revision. For instance, 
noting the contemporaneity of the development of transplant technology and life-support 
technology, Giorgio Agamben has persuasively argued that “brain death would, 
hypothetically speaking, cease to be death on the day on which the first brain transplant 
                                                
11 Cranford, 67.  
12 Michel Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended.” (New York: Picador, 2007), 248. 
13 European governments soon followed suit with similar legislation. Sharon R. Kaufman, …And 
A Time to Die: How American Hospitals Shape the End of Life. (New York: Scribner, 2006), 76. 
14 Ibid, 75. 
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were performed.”15 Since its definition hinges on the dramatic course of the medical 
sciences, death is, as Agamben puts it, “an epiphenomenon of transplant technology.”  
The 20th century emergence of PVS and brain death demonstrates that life and 
death have “fluid rather than static borders.”16 In effect, medical advancements belie the 
circularity of the classic definition of life and death as the continuation and cessation of 
vital functions. Peter Singer performs the circle: “How do we know whether a bodily 
fluid is a ‘vital’ one? By seeing if a being dies when it permanently stops flowing. But 
how do we know if the being has died? By seeing if its vital bodily fluids have stopped 
flowing.”17 Today, the engineering of vitality renders this circular reasoning more 
unwieldy but equally unmistakable. For instance, bioethicists and physicians often defend 
the definition of death as brain death by arguing that it “quickly leads to death,” as if the 
patient were not already, as brain dead, dead.18 “According to clear logical inconsistency, 
heart failure—which was just rejected as a valid criterion for death—reappears to prove 
the exactness of the criterion [i.e. brain death] that is to substitute for it.”19 Given the 
fluidity of vital borders, such logical inconsistencies are common and revealing: the 
definitions of life and death are not grounded in any physical or metaphysical essence. 
“Wagered on political strategies,” life and death are in fact “biopolitical rather 
than metaphysical boundaries.” That is, the definitional disruptions of PVS follow not 
only from respirators and feeding tubes, but from an entire way of life dedicated to 
                                                
15 Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1998), 163. 
16 Jeffrey Bishop, “Biopolitics, Terri Schiavo and the Sovereign Subject of Death.” Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy 22 (2009): 545. 
17 Peter Singer, Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics (New York: 
St. Martin’s Griffin, 1994), 21. 
18 Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 163.  
19 Ibid, 163. 
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extending, multiplying, protecting and advancing biological life. Prior to and 
conditioning the emergence of specific end-of-life technologies, a political strategy of 
“keeping people alive” realigned the relationship of life, medicine and the polis. From the 
18th century onwards, the jurisdiction of medicine has transformed and expanded. Probing 
deeper into bodies and across populations, medicine is no longer simply clinical but also 
regulatory, positive and preventive. Where it once attended to “accidents, illness and 
disease,” medicine is now invested in “the management of chronic illness and death, the 
administration of reproduction, the assessment and government of ‘risk,’ and the 
maintenance and optimization of the healthy body.”20 Moreover, the tasks of the 
physician and the politician change alongside one another as the new phenomenon of  
“public health” increasingly organizes political attentions. In the 18th and 19th century, 
this transformation can be found in the new political importance of managing birth and 
death rates, reducing the spread of disease, containing epidemics and sanitizing water and 
sewage systems. In the 20th and 21st centuries, the state can be identified with the 
“government of life,” manipulating the biological character of populations and 
reengineering, at the level of the gene, the very vital capacities of biology.21 In general, 
the desire to produce healthy, safe and more economically productive forms of life, 
created and partnered the government and sciences of life, dramatizing the description of 
“biopolitics” as a bios centered on zoe, a community that elevates biological existence to 
the status of a central political concern. 
Read in this biopolitical context, the arguments and stakes of the Terri Schiavo 
debate are transformed and refigured. For instance, arguments in favor of continuing 
                                                
20 Nikolas Rose, The Politics of Life Itself (Princeton University Press, 2007), 10. 
21 Ibid, 3. 
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Schiavo’s life support often appeal to the “sanctity” of human life. According John 
Kweon, “the principle of the sanctity of life, as traditionally understood, rules out the 
intentional killing of human beings because of the inalienable worth they possess in 
virtue not of any particularly physical or mental abilities they may be able to exercise but 
simply because of their humanity.”22  Richard Land, President of the Southern Baptist 
Convention’s Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission, invoked the notion of sanctity in 
his defense of Terri Schiavo’s “right to live:” 
The fight over Terri Schindler Schiavo’s right to live and our society’s 
reaction to that fight shows us just how deeply the sanctity-of-life ethic 
has been eroded in our culture […] The problem is that we have courts 
that have been infected with this quality of life ethic […We] have 
devalued and desanctified human life to the point that now a court can 
casually sentence a human being to die by malnutrition and dehydration.23  
 
For Land and others, life is “sacred” because biological life has intrinsic inviolable value 
above or beyond the tides of politics. However, the very existence of a life over which to 
make this claim follows not from biological sanctity but from thoroughgoing 
politicization. Without end-of-life technologies and the political strategies and shifts that 
yield them, Terri Schiavo would not have endured in a persistent vegetative state. She 
does not represent life’s intrinsic value but rather the capacity of the “intrinsic” to be 
revalued and transformed; In short, her life reflects rather than escapes political tides.  
Of course, Land also calls for his audience to sanctify life, suggesting that the 
essential value of life take hold prescriptively if not descriptively. Yet, while he and other 
conservative activists lament “how deeply the sanctity-of-life ethic has been eroded in 
                                                
22 John Keown, “Review: Life’s Dominion: An Argument about Abortion and Euthanasia” in 
L.Q. Review 110 (1994): 674. 
23 Quoted in Perry, “Biblical Biopolitics: Judicial Process, Religious Rhetoric, Terri Schiavo and 
Beyond,” 553. 
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our culture,” their efforts to bolster this ethic engage, at every turn, in life’s further 
politicization. Seeking to continue rather than conclude Schiavo’s entanglement in the 
biomedical government of life, “sanctity-of-life” ethicists procured executive orders and 
subpoenas and, when that failed, lobbied and enacted legislation on end-of-life decisions. 
The legislation itself is revealing. After Schiavo’s death, the National Right to Life 
Committee (NRLC) produced and promoted a “Model Act” on the “right to live.” The 
Act formed the basis of 23 bills filed in state legislatures and advances the assumption 
that “every person incompetent to make decisions affecting medical treatment desires 
[artificial nutrition and hydration] ‘to a degree that is sufficient to sustain life.’”24 Further, 
although the Act purports to respect desires expressed in advance directives, it leaves 
their applicability open to broad judicial interpretation. In the name of protecting the 
sanctity of life, the legislative labors of the NRLC actually deepen and expand state and 
judicial intervention into life to the extent that those powers might supercede the 
expressed desires of individuals themselves.  
Given the partnership of “right to live” and “right to life” agendas, the NRLC’s 
“Model Act” does not exhaust the conservative regulatory and politicizing goals 
connected to Terri Schiavo’s “sacred life.” With infamous anti-abortion activist and 
“Operation Rescue” founder Randall Terry acting as the Schindler’s spokesperson and a 
host of anti-abortion groups funding their legal efforts,25 the Terri Schiavo controversy 
has been described as a “proxy war” of the abortion battle, an opportunity for the 
                                                
24 Joshua Perry, “Biopolitics at the Bedside: Proxy Wars and Feeding Tubes.” In Journal of Legal 
Medicine 28 (2007): 184-185. Also, Kathy Cerminara, “Collateral Damage: The Aftermath of the 
Political Culture Wars in Schiavo.” Western New England Law Review 29.279 (2006-2007): 279-
308. 
25 For a detailed account of the “money trail” that connects the Schindler’s lawyers and anti-
abortion groups, see Jon Eisenberg, Using Terri: The Religious Right’s Conspiracy to Take Away 
Our Rights (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 2005), 94-109. 
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Religious Right “to rehearse arguments on the value of biologic but non-sentient human 
existence.”26 In the wake of the real and rhetorical events at Terri Schiavo’s bedside, the 
anti-abortion cause has shared in the momentum of her case. In 2006, Americans United 
for Life released and mobilized a 520-page report entitled Defending Life 2006: A State-
by-State Legal Guide to Abortion, Bioethics and the End of Life.27 Effectively a political 
“battle plan” for an American “culture of life,” the AUL’s call to protect the “sanctity of 
life” is, at the same time, a call to increase governmental intervention into bodies, 
particularly the bodies of women. Like the NRLC’S “Model Act,” Defending Life 2006 
betrays how attempts to “sanctify life” actually politicize it, intensifying and enlarging 
apparatuses of regulation and control.  
In opposition to Richard Land, Randall Terry and various proponents of the 
“sanctity of life” ethic, those “infected with a ‘quality of life’ ethic” argued for the 
removal of Terri Schiavo’s feeding tube. The “quality of life” position resituates the 
value of life, from the intrinsic sanctity of biological existence, to the value of human 
freedom and dignity. Referencing and responding to President George W. Bush’s call to 
“err on the side of life” wherever there are “serious doubts,” prominent bioethicist 
George Annas articulates this line of argument: 
“Erring on the side of life” in this context often results in violating a 
person’s body and human dignity in a way few would want for 
themselves. In such situations, erring on the side of liberty—specifically 
the patient’s right to decide on treatment—is more consistent with 
American values and our constitutional traditions.28 
 
                                                
26 R. Charo, “The Celestial Fire of Conscience—Refusing to Deliver Medical Care.” 352 New 
England Journal of Medicine (2005): 2472. Quoted in Joshua Perry, “Biopolitics at the Bedside,” 
190. 
27 Perry, “Biopolitics at the Bedside,” 191. 
28 George Annas’ “’Culture of Life’ Politics at the Bedside: The Case of Terri Schiavo,” 1714. 
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By emphasizing liberty instead of biology, Annas draws a distinction where Land draws 
an equation, between the “good life” and mere life. The protections of the polis should be 
distributed according to expressions of freedom and self-determination not, as the 
“sanctity-of-life” position would have it, according to the motion of organs and the 
endurance of biological functions. On Annas’ track, the decisions of the Florida judiciary 
can be affirmed because, in Joshua Perry’s words, the courts were equipped “to best 
determine Mrs. Schiavo’s beliefs regarding the notion of life’s sanctity and whether she 
would have personally determined to receive life-sustaining treatments that held no 
promise for restoring her to health or even consciousness.”29 Beyond the question of 
whether her condition was “terminal” and irreversible, the entirety of the Florida 
adjudications focused on “delineating and exercising Terri Schiavo’s personal autonomy 
rights.”30 
While Annas and Perry figure themselves as champions of freedom and American 
values, it is not clear whether “erring on the side of liberty” wholly respects bodily 
integrity and “human dignity.” For one thing, by limiting the “side of liberty” to the 
individual bedside, “quality of life” ethicists ignore and implicitly obscure broader threats 
to freedom, integrity and dignity. In biopolitical contexts these threats appear everywhere 
in evidence as the task of controlling and shaping biological existence dominates, if not 
defines, the ends of politics. Today, a life understood to be “free” and a body understood 
to have “integrity” are likely just as entangled in the regulatory government and sciences 
of life as Terri Schiavo. These apparatuses do not reflect the flourishing of individual 
self-determination and the integrity of bodily borders. Rather, they illustrate the “ubiquity 
                                                
29 Perry, “Biblical Biopolitics,” 628. 
30 Ibid, 628. 
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of dependence not only vertically, across a life span, but horizontally, across a 
population” as “an individual’s bodily boundaries overlap exactly and precisely with […] 
political boundaries”31 In light of these realities, the atomistic account of the individual 
and individual rights that underlies the “quality of life” position is problematic. As 
Wendy Parmet aptly puts it: 
[Talking] in terms of an individual’s right to choose to end treatment 
without any regard to the social factors that necessitated treatment 
implicitly reinforces a social and political culture that isolates individuals 
from populations and envisions their choices as not including steps that 
could meaningfully reduce the risks they actually face. From such a 
perspective arguments about a right to life and a right to die will inevitably 
be oblivious to the factors that help determine when and how we die.32 
 
By remaining oblivious to those conditions that determine “when and how we die,” 
Annas and Perry reinforce and obscure the broad and differential ways in which the 
“quality of life” is “in question,” and often in peril, beyond and before end-of-life 
decisions. 
The Terri Schiavo case itself provides dramatic illustration of social and 
(bio)political factors that precipitate death-bed scenarios. Although rarely discussed, 
Schiavo’s early-age cardiac arrest followed from a potassium imbalance associated with 
the eating disorder bulimia. Michael Schiavo could afford her long-term PVS treatment 
only after winning a 1992 malpractice lawsuit against Terri’s obstetrician for his failure 
to diagnose the condition that, at the time, affected one in every 200-250 women.33 In 
                                                
31 Wendy Parmet, “Terri and Katrina: A Population Based Perspective on the Constitutional Right 
to Reject Treatment.” In Northeastern Public Law and Theory Faculty Working Papers Series 1 
(2006): 19 (my emphasis) and Ruth Miller, “On Freedom and Feeding Tubes: Reviving Terri 
Schiavo and Trying Saddam Hussein.” Law & Literature 19.2 (2007): 162. 
32 Parmet, 26. 
33 Susan Bordo, Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture and the Body (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003), 139. 
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short, Terri Schiavo was a victim not only of medical malpractice but of societal 
pressures to be dangerously thin; She was a member of a “part of the population [whose] 
odds of coming close to death at an early age were not minimized.”34 The debate over 
how to belatedly recognize the worth of her life sets in relief the reality of unequal 
qualities of life today.35 For instance, during the final stages of the Schiavo controversy, 
drastic budget cuts endangered Tennessee’s low-income health care program and 
threatened to eliminate medical coverage for 323,000 of the state’s most vulnerable 
citizens. Ironically, as Tennessee Senator and then Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist 
worked through the night developing legislation to reinsert Terri Schiavo’s feeding tubes 
in March 2005, hundreds of thousands of patients in his home state faced the loss of 
fundamental health care coverage. Since hundreds of those patients relied on life-support 
technology such as ventilators to survive, the proposed TennCare cuts promised to 
produce a host of death-bed scenarios like that of Terri Schiavo.36 Although the right to 
reject treatment may be “vitally important for an individual as a final expression of [their] 
dignity or as a response to subjective experiences of pain,” it is, as Wendy Parmet again 
describes it, a “choice that can only be realized when the die has been cast and many 
critical choices, not about how to die but about how to live healthy lives, are gone.”37 
To be sure, both the “sanctity of life” and the “quality of life” positions fail to 
reckon their respective principles of “erring on the side of life” and “erring on the side of 
liberty” with issues before and beyond end-of-life decisions. In general, reading the Terri 
                                                
34 Parmet, 23. 
35 Gary Fox, one of Michael Schiavo’s lawyers, describes the threat of eating disorders as the 
“lost lesson of the Schiavo case. See “Schiavo case highlights eating disorders.” USA Today. 
February 25, 2005, Health and Behavior Edition, Final Edition. 
36 See Tim Chavez, “Death Bed Scenarios and TennCare.” Tennessean. May 4, 2005. 
37 Parmet, 22. 
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Schiavo case in its biopolitical context unsettles these opposing viewpoints by revealing 
their proximity, their shared, though often rhetorically veiled, commitment to a bios 
centered on zoe. As we have seen, “erring on the side of life” and “erring on the side of 
liberty” are principles that guide life’s regulation, not its inviolable sanctity or freedom. 
In the case of the NRLC’s “Model Act” or Wendy Parmet’s eventual call for a “right to 
public health,” the biopolitical character of these principles is clear. Where the rhetorics 
of “life” and “liberty” are more obfuscating, the ends they serve are nevertheless 
disclosive. Neither the “right to live” nor the “right to die” free individuals from the 
regulatory state; the exercise of each “enmeshes patients in a matrix of pervasive and 
invasive legal and medical regulation.”38 
Given this reading of the Schiavo debate, competing definitions of life can be said 
to reflect and shape conflicts over the course of the government and sciences of life. 
Wagering not only the borders of life and death but also the health of the most 
vulnerable, these conflicts draw attention to the differential ways that life is at stake in 
biopolitical contexts. While some populations, like those living perilously on the 
Tenncare rolls, are clearly abandoned by apparatuses that support biological existence, 
others, like Terri Schiavo, are abandoned to those same systems. Through the Terri 
Schiavo case we confront these features of the biopolitical turn, not only the impossibility 
of a natural life and death, but also the differential course of politicization. Judith Butler, 
for her part, provides a dramatic description of this biopolitical reality in her text 
Precarious Life: 
                                                
38 John T. Parry, “’Society Must Be [Regulated]’: Biopolitics and The Commerce Clause in 
Gonzales v. Raich.” Lewis & Clark Law Review 9.4 (2005): 874. 
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Lives are supported and maintained differently, and there are radically 
different ways in which […] physical vulnerability is distributed across the 
globe. Certain lives will be highly protected, and the abrogation of their 
claims to sanctity will be sufficient to mobilize the forces of war. Other 
lives will not find such fast and furious support and will not even qualify 
as ‘grievable.39 
 
To reckon with why and how “lives are supported and maintained differently” we should 
explore the hinge that has historically distinguished zoe and bios, determining which lives 
are afforded and denied the protections of political life⎯ language.   
 
The Language/s of Terri Schiavo 
 In the Fall of 2002, as Florida courts convened to hear testimony from 
neurological experts regarding the status of her medical condition and treatment options, 
video clips of a comatose Terri Schiavo were posted to the website www.terrisfight.org. 
Over the next three years the clips would circulate widely and act as an important catalyst 
in the conservative grassroots effort to maintain Schiavo’s life support. In one video, the 
voice of a doctor off-camera repeats: “Terri, open your eyes. Open your eyes Terri.” 
Schiavo’s eyes flutter as if gaining strength and then open widely. In another video, Mary 
Schindler approaches the bed asking “Hi baby! How are you? How is your cold?,” 
repositioning the pillows under her daughter’s head.  Terri moans and smiles. In these 
and other videos, Terri Schiavo seems to relate to her family, physicians and 
environment, providing apparent support for the Schindler’s claim that their daughter was 
conscious and responsive. As evidence of her communicative abilities, many found the 
videos convincing. A speech therapist stated that Terri was “clearly vocalizing” and that 
                                                
39 Judith Butler, Precarious Life (London: Verso, 2004): 32. 
 20 
“her vocalizations [were] generally purposeful and usually in response to specific 
environmental stimuli, most particularly family members.”40 Famously, Republican 
Senators Tom Coburn and Bill Frist, both physicians, cited the videos as evidence that 
Schiavo’s condition was “something very different than a persistent vegetative state.”41  
For many other viewers, legislators and doctors alike, the videos captured  
“something very different” than responsive acts of communication. The clips, each 
lasting one to two minutes, had been culled from four hours of footage in which Terri 
Schiavo appears generally non-responsive.42 After viewing the entire tape, the Florida 
judiciary concluded that while Schiavo seemed communicative “at first blush,” her 
actions were “neither consistent nor reproducible.”43  Specifically, the Court held that 
Schiavo’s “responses” were random and symptomatic; She was not “trying to talk” but 
rather “wakefully unaware,” that distinctive and uncanny characteristic of the PVS sleep-
wake cycle. In 2005, an autopsy of Schiavo’s body supported the Court’s interpretation.44 
Terri Schiavo’s brain had “withered to half its normal size,” devastating even the most 
                                                
40 Mele, Sara. “Pathologists statement in Terri Schiavo case.” World Net Daily. 
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basic of cognitive and relational abilities.45 Moreover, while the Senators had extolled 
Schiavo’s responsiveness to visual stimuli, her brain injuries had left her blind.  
 Terri Schiavo’s uncertain status as a linguistic being did not begin or end with the 
videos of www.terrisfight.org. For instance, in the early stages of her coma Schiavo 
underwent intensive speech therapy and, of course, just weeks before her death she was 
dramatically summoned to testify before Congress. 46 In its insistence, the question of 
whether Terri Schiavo could communicate functioned as an important hinge within the 
larger debate—whether she should be afforded or denied the “protections” of political 
life. In this way, the Terri Schiavo debate recalls the Aristotelian linkage between 
language and the life of the polis. For Aristotle, other animals may express pleasure and 
pain, but speech is “endowed to man alone” and “serves to indicate what is useful and 
what is harmful and so also what is just and unjust.” 47 However, Aristotle makes no 
mention of vocalizations like those of Terri Schiavo and, as subpoenas and videos attest, 
what it means to speak and communicate is neither given nor easily discerned. At Terri 
Schiavo’s bedside, Foucault’s revision of Aristotle’s definition of man (“a living animal 
with the additional capacity for political existence”) may be in need of elaboration; 
Modern man is an animal whose politics place not only his living but also his speaking 
being in question.  
 To illustrate we might track a question that divides and unites “sanctity of life” 
and “quality of life” ethicists: if Terri could choose, would she choose to live on in a 
persistent vegetative state? If she could speak, what would she say? Since Michael 
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Schiavo had successfully petitioned the Florida Court to act as Terri’s guardian and 
surrogate decision maker, the judiciary sought to answer these questions after confirming 
Schiavo’s PVS diagnosis. Although Terri Schiavo did not prepare a living will, during 
the trial several family and friends recounted oral conversations in which she expressed 
opinions about artificial life support. According to the testimony of Scott and Joan 
Schiavo, her brother- and sister-in-law, Terri discussed the issue after visiting her 
grandmother in intensive care and at a funeral luncheon for another family member. At 
that time, she expressed her desire not “to be kept alive on a machine” or to “live as a 
burden to others.”48 Joan described further statements made in reference to a television 
movie about a comatose man and a friend forced to remove a feeding tube from her baby. 
In those cases, Terri adamantly declared that “she wanted it stated in her will that she 
would want the tubes and everything taken out if that ever happened to her.”49 The 
Florida Court found Scott and Joan Schiavo’s claims credible and ruled that there was 
“clear and convincing evidence” that Terri Schiavo would not choose to continue life 
support in the present circumstances.50 The decision resulted in the first removal of Terri 
Schiavo’s feeding tube on April 24, 2001.  
 For those adhering to the principle of life’s sanctity, the Court’s decision was 
unacceptable because it missed the point. Terri Schiavo’s consent was not clearly 
relevant in the first place; what mattered was not her voice but her sacred life. For 
instance, when the Schindlers testified that they would maintain their daughter’s life “at 
any and all costs,” including amputation of limbs and open-heart surgery, the Court 
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observed that “even if Terri had told [the Schindlers] of her intention to have artificial 
nutrition withdrawn they would not do it.”51  Of course, Terri’s parents, like many others, 
believed she was conscious and responsive, that she was a speaking being. Strangely, 
those who sought to “sanctify life” through Terri Schiavo found her past testimony 
irrelevant and her present life saturated with testimony. As Ruth Miller put it 
at stake was not what Schiavo may have wanted—what she may or may 
not have consented to—when she was physically active, when she was 
capable of writing a living will but did not. […] the question at stake was 
what Schiavo’s inert, inactive body wanted right now—what signs it may 
or may not have been giving as to its political will.52  
 
Shifting attention from what Terri Schiavo did say about death and dying at a particular 
time with respect to specific conditions to what she might be saying “right now,” sanctity 
of life activists effectively undermined the Court’s decision. For instance, the videos at 
www.terrisfight.org evidence the widespread hope that Terri might betray her desires 
and intentions from the hither side of consciousness, as millions of rapt viewers searched 
her body for “signs it may or may not [be] giving as to its political will.”  
 Where her own body fell short of signs or the videos short of credibility, “sanctity 
of life” ethicists summoned “body doubles” or “proxies” to speak on Terri Schiavo’s 
behalf. Take for instance the CNN interview of Kate Adamson, a woman who had 
dramatically recovered from complete paralysis and “locked in” syndrome. After 
downplaying the differences between “locked in” syndrome and the persistent vegetative 
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state—namely, consciousness and chance for recovery—her words occupy Schiavo’s 
present space of testimony: 53 
I was unable to speak […] And the most terrifying thing was trying to 
somehow communicate with anyone that I was actually in there. I’m in 
here. I’m alive. Because people thought I wasn’t. They assumed I wasn’t 
in there […] And then the feeding tube was turned off for eight days. So I 
literally went through the starvation. I’m lying there. My whole body was 
screaming out, feed me; do not let me starve. I do not want to die. I was 
clinging to everything.54 
 
Adamson’s voice animates Schiavo’s body, screaming out “feed me; do not let me starve. 
I do not want to die.” As pundits analogized the removal of her feeding tube to “animal 
cruelty,” Schiavo/Adamson’s cries recall the voice of Aristotle’s animals. As one 
commentator suggested the act was worse than animal cruelty, we are pushed to imagine 
a pain beyond communication, a silent scream. 55 
  For those adhering to a quality of life ethic, the decision to remove Terri 
Schiavo’s feeding tube was far from cruel and her prior testimony clearly relevant. By 
following Terri Schiavo’s wishes regarding artificial life support, the Court “infected 
with the quality of life ethic” claimed to exercise Terri Schiavo’s humanity in the face of 
the increasingly inhuman shape of her life. The judge described the conditions in vivid 
terms 
In the final analysis, the difficult question that faced the trial court was 
whether [Schiavo], not after a few weeks in a coma, but after ten years in a 
persistent vegetative state that has robbed her of most of her cerebrum and 
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all but the most instinctive of neurological functions, with no hope of a 
medical cure but with sufficient money and strength of body to live 
indefinitely, would choose to continue the constant nursing care and 
supportive tubes in hopes that a miracle would somehow recreate her 
missing brain tissue, or whether she would wish to permit a natural death 
process to take its course and for her family members and loved ones to be 
free to continue their lives.56 
 
Having lost “most of her cerebrum and all but the most instinctive of neurological 
functions with no hope of medical cure,” consciousness, freedom and communication are, 
quite simply, beyond Schiavo’s reach; in delineating and exercising of Schiavo’s political 
will—that is, in acting as her proxy voice—the Court claimed to affirm her humanity.  
 Although the quality of life position is invested in Terri Schiavo’s prior 
statements, it is not divested from the question of her current bodily testimony. The 
Court’s exercise of Schiavo’s political will follows only upon the investigation of her 
PVS diagnosis, that is, only upon the practice of witnessing “what Schiavo’s inert, 
inactive body wanted right now—what signs it may or may not have been giving as to its 
political will.” In this way, the “quality of life” position shares in the prioritization of 
Terri Schiavo’s body as a site of testimony. As Ruth Miller again observes, “doctors [and 
judges alike] understand this testimony just as clearly as if she had spoken it”; Schiavo’s 
body is a kind of speaking “and it is this ability to testify—not what she actually may or 
may not have said—that is important.”57 One wonders what quality of life ethicists might 
have witnessed in a “body double” offered by the BBC shortly after Schiavo’s death, a 23 
year-old woman who, despite a PVS diagnosis, registered brain activity in response to 
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verbal commands.58 When asked to imagine simple tasks like walking around her home 
or playing tennis, the brain areas associated with those kinds of tasks exhibited activity. 
Lacking knowledge of what exactly her brain was “saying,” doctors applauded the 
woman’s ability to communicate. Had Terri Schiavo’s brain provided similar testimony 
in 2005, would her life have displayed a more “human quality”? Would the Court have 
moved forward with exercising her stated political will? 
 We need not settle these juridical uncertainties to observe how “sanctity of life” 
and “quality of life” ethicists divide and unite around the question: if Terri Schiavo could 
speak, what would she say? Although they diverge on what exactly Terri Schiavo might 
indicate as “useful and harmful […] just and unjust,” they agree that this question is of 
subordinate or secondary importance to the testimony of her body. To be sure, 
proponents of life’s sanctity and life’s quality charge one another with inhumanely 
silencing Terri Schiavo as each makes a claim on defending her humanity. However, 
such rhetorics obscure how both positions equally find her animality saturated with 
testimony.  In a manner characteristic of a bios centered on zoe, both turn to Terri 
Schiavo’s body; Gestures, physical events, neurological, or forensic information—
Schiavo’s body speaks and testifies. Insofar as this “speech” steers debates around her 
fate, the Aristotelian logic by which language divides bios and zoe, endures. At the same 
time, what constitutes language use⎯brain waves? eye tracking?⎯ transforms. Like the 
border between life and death, the distinction between speaking and non-speaking, the 
human and the animal, appear to be “fluid rather than static,” “biopolitical rather than 
metaphysical” boundaries. 
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 Peter Singer’s observation on the border between life and death can be extended 
to this series of binaries: the traditional distinction between the speaking human (bios) 
and the non-speaking animal (zoe) is supported only by circular logics. To illustrate, note 
the illogic at work in Aristotle’s seminal formulation in the Politics. There, Aristotle 
grounds the “gift” of human speech in man’s “rational soul.” However, since he cannot 
demonstrate the uniquely rational character of the human species without referring to 
speech, Aristotle begs the question. Why do humans have language? In virtue of their 
rational soul. Why do humans have a rational soul? In virtue of their language. Much 
later, Jean-Jacques Rousseau outlines an alternative and equally influential account of 
language. Rousseau grounds language in the body and passions and maps a progressive 
lineage from primitive cries of pain (“natural language”) to advanced symbolic 
capacities. In Rousseau’s text as well the exceptional character of human language leans 
on a begged question. If natural language is a sufficient condition of symbolization, why 
do the sentient vocalizations of other species fail to give rise to abstract language? If 
natural language is simply a necessary condition of symbolization, by what supplemental 
condition is linguistic exceptionality founded? One can predict how Darwin will stumble 
a century later and will not be surprised to learn that accounts of complex communication 
among non-human animals—from the songs of migratory birds to the signals and signage 
of apes—abound.59 (Un)grounded by circular reasoning, language “jumps orders and 
classes” depending on socio-historical context.  
 As we have seen, the case of Terri Schiavo illustrates the constitution of 
“speaking being” in a specifically biopolitical context; the persistent vegetative state 
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marks not only a new form of life but also emergent forms of communication and 
testimony. However, with the biopolitical realignment of life, medicine and the polis, not 
all bodies testify in emergent or even traditional manners. Recall that while millions 
listen intently to Schiavo’s comatose body, the dispatches of the underprivileged 
TennCare rolls and the voices of eating disordered women largely fall on deaf ears. 
Language, that traditional hinge between bios and zoe, promises to unlock “how some 
lives earn fast and furious protection while others barely qualify as grievable.” But the 
languages of Terri Schiavo confirm that what constitutes language shapes and reflects 
how “lives are supported and maintained differently.” To understand the course of these 
differential logics without begging the question requires an analysis of contemporary 
power and its conditions of emergence.  
 This introduction opened by observing the strangeness of the Committee on 
Government Reform’s decision to subpoena Terri Schiavo on the issue of “treatment 
options provided to incapacitated patients to advance the[ir] quality of life.” Now the 
testimonies of Terri Schiavo appear strange only in context with the silence of others. 
Why are the voices of Tennessee’s low-income patients not also summoned to testify? 
How does contemporary power distribute speech and silence? Questions like these are 
central to this project’s exploration of the fate of “life” and “language” in biopolitical 
contexts. The proceeding chapters use the work of Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben 
and Julia Kristeva to map how biopolitics places man’s existence as a living and speaking 
being in question. Here, a brief introduction of Foucault, Agamben and Kristeva’s 
theories of a “biopower” acts as an outline of this project’s investigation into the 
language/s of zoe and bios. 
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Foucault, Agamben, Kristeva 
 In The History of Sexuality Volume One Foucault describes the emergence of 
biopower by marking its distance, not simply from the Aristotelian polis, but also from 
the operation of “sovereign power.” There he defines biopower as the power to “foster 
life or disallow it to the point of death” and sovereign power as the power to “take life or 
let live.”60 In the pre-modern (Western) contexts in which sovereign power predominates, 
“life is seen from the perspective opened by death” and the sovereign’s right to kill.61 
That is, the sovereign wields power over life only in exercising the right to kill; he cannot 
“grant life in the same way that he can inflict death.”62 By contrast, the “threshold of 
modernity” marks the emergence of biopower, “a power bent on generating forces, 
making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, 
making them submit, or destroying them.”63  Facilitating the appearance of “population” 
as a phenomenon, biopower summons the knowledges and technologies of population 
control—statistics, demography, epidemiology, and a host of empirical sciences—to 
“grant” and “foster” forms of life. In biopolitical contexts, where power is wielded over 
the entire biological continuum from body to population to milieu, “death acquires 
importance only in the light radiated by life.”64  
 Anchored in the life of Spanish dictator Francisco Franco— a figure who wielded 
the sovereign right to kill for forty years only to die a living death much like Terri 
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Schiavo—the following chapter appraises Foucault’s theory of biopower and develops 
the notion of a power that places “living being in question.” No longer a naturalistic or 
organistic concept, for Foucault, life is a historical reality, a product of 
power/knowledge. In this way, life reflects the genealogical commitment that “there is 
‘something altogether different’ behind things: not a timeless and essential secret, but the 
secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal 
fashion from alien forms.”65  Resonating with this introduction’s critique of supposed 
metaphysical boundaries, genealogy is wed to the exposure of difference and, in the 
genealogy of “governmentality,” to the exposure of different mutations of “living being 
in question.” In Foucault’s account of raison d’etat, liberal and neoliberal forms of 
government, the figures of man, homo economicus, and the entrepreneur are 
representatives of the biopolitical fabrication of life and the in-distinction between zoe 
and bios. 
 Holding in view questions of difference, Chapter Two also critically examines the 
contemporary relation of sovereign power and biopolitical power. Entangled in “complex 
edifices” or “clashing” in Franco’s dying body, the “right to kill” is a contradiction in 
biopolitical contexts. For Foucault, the re-functioning of a power set on improving life to 
a power set on increasing the risk of death requires caesuras, axes of biological 
difference produced by modern racism. 66  Resolving the clash of a biopolitics turned 
thanatopolitics, Foucault suggests that today the sovereign right to kill survives in a 
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mutated and specifically racist form..67 However, the claim that biopower must become 
racist to become violent neglects the violence that underwrites rather than re-functions 
biopower. Individuals and groups are not only disallowed and abandoned by biopower 
but also abandoned to it, a relation embodied in Terri Schiavo’s persistent vegetative 
state. Neither flourishing nor prohibited, Schiavo’s life was extended and reduced to mere 
biological functioning. Recognizing the limitations of Foucault’s account of 
contemporary sovereign power, Chapter Two turns to Giorgio Agamben’s notion of the 
sovereign exception to develop a more adequate picture of the “demonic” proximity and 
coordination of biopolitics and thanatopolitics.   
 Agamben’s theory of biopower as the power to “make survive” and its central 
concept, the sovereign exception, follow from the positing of a more intimate and ancient 
relation between biopower and sovereign power. Unlike Foucault, Agamben argues that 
sovereign power is grounded, not in the right to kill, but in the right to decide on the 
“exception,” the space/time/bodies over which the rule of law is suspended. By producing 
a form of life included in the rule of law by being excluded from the rule of law, that is, 
by wielding power over life, the exercise of sovereign power involves a fundamentally 
biopolitical procedure. According to Agamben, biopower is “at least as old as the 
sovereign exception” and modern biopolitics is characterized by those conditions in 
which the “exception becomes the rule.” In the classical period, the sovereign exception 
produces the marginal figure of homo sacer or sacred man; outside both human and 
divine law, homo sacer is defined by the “unpunishability of his killing and the ban on 
                                                
67 “In the biopower system [killing is] acceptable only if it results not in a victory over political 
adversaries, but in the elimination of the biological threat to and the improvement of the species 
or race.” Ibid,” 256. 
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his sacrifice.”68 In modern biopolitics, as the sovereign decision elaborates across the 
juridico-political order, “bare [or sacred] life underwrites the actual political 
arrangements in which we live, posing as a contingency into which any political 
arrangement might dissolve.”69 Today, biopower “makes survive”; we are all “at least 
virtually” homo sacers.  
 Chapter Two argues that the exception is a tactic within the field of biopolitical 
governance, a sovereign logic that circulates in regulatory contexts to abandon lives to 
violence. The notion of the exception helps describe Terri Schiavo’s life as not only 
“bare” and reduced to survival but also as sacred. Unlike the “sanctity of life” position of 
the Religious Right, Agamben understands the call to “set aside” the “sacred” as a 
politicized exclusion, or more specifically, an “inclusive exclusion” in which life is 
subjected or abandoned to the law by being excluded from it. However, Agamben’s 
conclusion—that we are all, “at least virtually” Terri Schiavos— betrays an inattention to 
the differential distribution of violence in biopolitical contexts. Although sacred life is a 
“contingency into which any political arrangement might dissolve,” dissolution functions 
differentially. Coordinating Foucault and Agamben’s accounts of differential and 
contingent violence, Chapter Two argues that the exception is not the hidden intersection 
of sovereign and biopolitical power, but a tactic of their coordination in contemporary 
political life. On this reading, figures of bare life like Terri Schiavo reflect the movement 
of the logic of exception within the field of governmentality, the circulation of a tactic 
that makes a real contingency of states of exception. 
                                                
68 Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 73. 
69 Butler, Precarious Life, 68. 
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 Anchored in the life of the Muselmann—the prisoner of Auschwitz who, in the 
advanced stages of malnutrition, cannot speak or testify—Chapter Three follows upon 
Foucault’s analysis of “living being in question” to evaluate, with Agamben, “[speaking-
being] in question.” The central preoccupation of Agamben’s Remnants of Auschwitz and 
Primo Levi’s The Drowned and The Saved, the Muselmann is a figure of mute living 
death, a reflection of the most violent declension of biopolitical power. For Levi, a 
Holocaust survivor, the Muselmann embodies a wrenching paradox—the true witness of 
the camps is the one who cannot witness. For Agamben, this paradox marks a truth of 
Western subjectivity in general—speech is traversed by the speechless, subjectivation 
bears within itself a desubjectivation.  In Chapter Three Agamben and Levi’s Muselmann 
opens an exploration of speech as a “precarious and fragile event,” one produced by the 
movements of biopower and reflective of changing political conditions. For all the 
provocation and offense of the Muselmann-as-paradigm, Agamben’s account of the 
contingency of speech offers a unique and invaluable revision of Foucault’s description 
of the threshold of modernity; today man is “an animal whose politics places his 
existence as a living- [and speaking-] being in question.”  
 To demonstrate the fabrication of speaking being—the fact that speech is not 
given but constructed—Chapter Three turns to Agamben’s critical writings on the 
metaphysics and anthropology of language often overlooked by his Anglophone readers. 
In Language and Death, The Idea of Prose, and Infancy and History Agamben gives an 
account of the fabricating “structure of Voice” in the metaphysical tradition. In a critical 
history that focuses on Hegel, Heidegger and their inheritors, Voice is the indeterminate 
negative ground of speech, the ungrounding ground of the taking place of language in the 
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removal of voice (animal phone, mere sound).  In The Open, the “anthropological 
machine” describes the logic through which “man places muteness outside himself.” The 
“ceaselessly updated decisions” of the machine rearticulate and displace the difference 
between man and animal, speaker and non-speaker. In Chapter Three the structure of 
Voice and the anthropological machine illustrate the production of speaking-being and 
the speaking human. Separated in their formulation by over twenty years, both capture 
the politicized constitution of language and speech, the inclusive exclusions by which 
“man places muteness outside himself” and exposes other mute beings and animals to 
violence. 
 Keeping in view the notion of speaking being in question, Chapter Three also 
takes up a critical examination of Agamben’s attempt to “jam” the anthropological 
machine and the structure of Voice via the concept of “infancy.” Developed in Infancy 
and History and central to the ethics of “bearing witness to the inhuman” in Remnants of 
Auschwitz, infancy represents Agamben’s endeavor to found language beyond the 
violence of inclusive exclusion. Instead of producing the speaking animal through the 
anthropological machine and at the expense of mute others, infancy is an experience of 
muteness and pure potentiality that conditions speech yet is neither opposed nor 
(inclusively) excluded from speaking. This muteness supports a practice of testifying for 
the Muselmann, or for that matter, Terri Schiavo and of bearing witness to the fragile 
openness of a condition in which “human beings did not speak […] in which they were 
not yet human.”70 Chapter Three concludes by interrogating the jamming and witnessing 
capacities of infancy. I argue that the abstraction of infancy from a dependent 
                                                
70 See Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 161-162. 
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developmental stage to an independent condition of pure potentiality re-functions rather 
than halts metaphysical and anthropological machines. Obscuring the vulnerability and 
relationality the infans, Agamben removes voice/s—those of maternal and non-human 
others— often silenced in humanist metaphysics and anthropology.  
 Anchored in the lives of Helen and Isabel, two melancholic figures who exhibit 
the collapse of linguistic activity and feelings of death-like despair, Chapter Four 
explores how living and speaking beings in question themselves question today. That is, 
where the preceding chapters draw on Foucault and Agamben to demonstrate that 
biopower fabricates life and language, this chapter turns to the work of Julia Kristeva to 
more directly examine strategies of resistance. Arriving at a strategy of working-through 
(rather than jamming) differential and contingent logics, Chapter Four begins by 
uncovering an unlikely Kristevan theory of biopower. In her post-trilogy texts of the 
1990s, specifically The Sense and Nonsense of Revolt, Intimate Revolt, New Maladies of 
the Soul and The Feminine and The Sacred, Kristeva suggests that the sovereign function 
of power, represented by the Oedipal father and his law, is in decline. In its place a 
“power vacuum” has emerged, a regulatory power elaborated to the extent that “it can no 
longer be located” and invested in biological life to the extent that subjects are figured as 
“patrimonial individuals,” mere possessors of organs and biological processes.71 
Resonating with a specifically biopolitical form of power, for Kristeva, the power 
vacuum amounts to “soft totalitarianism” that reduces life to “life itself, life without 
                                                
71 Julia Kristeva, The Sense and Nonsense of Revolt (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2000), 4-5. 
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questions” and threatens to “destroy life after having devalued the question of its 
meaning.”72  
 In Chapter Four, the unlikely biopolitical turn in the Kristevan text yields an 
uncommon strategy for biopolitical resistance— psychic revolt. For Kristeva revolt is not 
a transgression of law but a displacement of authority within the psychic economy of the 
individual. Returning to the conditions of language and the movement of authorization, 
revolt empowers the “sacred” connection between life and meaning and resists the 
regulated “life itself, life without questions.” In contrast to Agamben’s ontological and 
androcentric account of infancy, Kristeva’s account of revolt is an embodied vulnerable 
practice, one that recognizes the differential experience of life adrift from meaning. This 
vulnerability subtends her attempt to re-function regulation at the psychic level. For 
Kristeva, biopolitical resistance is not about “jamming” movements of regulation and 
law. Instead it is about transforming social structures and economies of meaning such that 
power supports and nourishes life instead of abandoning it to depression and violence. 
Given the failure of Agamben’s project of transcending the regulation that this 
introduction encounters at every turn—in the principles of sanctity-of-life and quality-of-
life ethicists, from Terri Schiavo’s bedside and beyond—Kristeva’s attempt to imagine 
more supportive and sustainable imbrications of power and life, a “biography with and 
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FABRICATED LIFE: FOUCAULT AND THE BIO- OF BIOPOWER 
 
A “Negative Modality” 
 In his 1975-76 lectures at the College de France Michel Foucault describes the 
then recent death of Spanish dictator Francisco Franco as a symbol of “the clash between 
two systems of power: that of sovereignty over death, and that of the regularization of 
life.”1 Franco’s forty-year reign was characterized by the “great savagery” of his 
sovereign power to “let live or make die.”  During the Spanish Civil War, his Nationalist 
forces (supported by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy) killed tens of thousands of 
Republican officials, intellectuals, soldiers and sympathizers. After the war and until his 
own death in 1975, Franco violently suppressed or eliminated all of his political 
opponents, sometimes ordering that “the condemned be strangled to death by a metal 
collar” and requiring that the press cover the executions.2 Franco fell ill in 1973 and again 
in 1975. Before dying on November 20th of that year, he spent an extended period of time 
on artificial life support in a state much like Terri Schiavo. While Franco’s rule was 
defined by the power to “have people put to death or let them live,” his own death 
reflected the “regularization of life,” the power to “foster life or disallow it to the point of 
death.” Foucault summarizes: 
[Franco] was the bloodiest of all dictators, [he] wielded the absolute right 
of life and death for forty years, and at the moment when he himself was 
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2 Geoffrey Jenson, Franco: Soldier, Commander, Dictator (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 
2005), 99. 
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dying, he entered this new field of power over life which consists not only 
in managing life, but in keeping individuals alive after they are dead. […] 
thanks to […] the actual exercise of political biopower, we have become 
so good at keeping people alive that we’ve succeeded in keeping them 
alive when, in biological terms, they should have been dead long ago.3 
 
The deaths of Terri Schiavo and Francisco Franco equally mark biopolitical forms 
of life, but Franco’s more readily invokes the difference between sovereign power and 
biopower. Foucault’s definitions of biopower in the 1975-76 lecture course and the first 
volume of The History of Sexuality rely heavily on this contrast. In fact, Roberto Esposito 
has recently argued that, with respect to this Foucauldian notion, “a negative modality 
prevails: biopolitics is primarily that which is not sovereignty. More than having its own 
source of light, biopolitics is illuminated by the twilight of something that precedes it, by 
sovereignty’s advance into the shadows.”4 The contrast between sovereignty and 
biopolitics highlights a shift in asymmetry, a “balance tipped” in favor of death or life, a 
clash between Franco’s rule and Franco’s demise. However, the contrast seems to rely on 
a difference that biopower itself puts into question, a “natural” or “given” difference 
between life and death. In referring to the biological death denied to Franco, Foucault 
invokes the distinction between biological (zoe) and political (bios) forms of living and 
dying, an invocation that then threatens to reemerge in the difference between ”fostering 
life” and “disallowing it to the point of death.” As figures of biopolitical life, Schiavo and 
Franco do not illustrate the play of contrasts—between life and death, “making live” and 
“letting die”—as much as the blurring of boundaries and the dimming of understanding. 
                                                
3 Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended,” 248. 
4 Roberto Esposito, Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2008), 33. 
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At their bedsides and beyond, how do we describe the life and work of biopower without 
recourse to zoe/bios logics? 
If Foucault’s “negative modality” introduces this question, the general scarcity of 
biopower in his texts deepens and enlarges its reach. As Esposito suggests, the March 
17th lecture of the 1975-76 course and the concluding chapter of The History of Sexuality 
Volume One are Foucault’s only extended discussions of biopower. The 1977-78 course 
undertakes the study of mechanisms by which “the human species became an object of a 
political strategy.”5 However, after several lectures on “apparatuses of security” Foucault 
turns his attention to pastoral power and “governmentality.” The 1978-79 course is titled 
The Birth of Biopolitics yet its trajectory focuses almost exclusively on liberal and 
neoliberal forms of governmental reason. While the studies of pastoral power and 
governmental reason cover and indirectly illuminate many of the fields and objectives 
associated with biopower, Foucault’s failure to make biopower a sustained object of 
direct inquiry challenges and encourages its interrogation.  
This chapter draws on Foucault’s proximate researches and genealogical method 
to clarify his concept of biopower, and more specifically, the bio- of biopower. In the 
process, I advance an account of biopolitics that emphasizes and nuances the production, 
rather than the given nature or essence, of life. Foucauldian genealogy stresses that “that 
there is something altogether different behind things: not a timeless and essential secret, 
but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a 
piecemeal fashion from alien forms.”6 In their own piecemeal fashion, Foucault’s 1975-
                                                
5 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2007), 1. 
6 Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.” In Language, Counter Memory Practice. 
Edited by Donald Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 142. 
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79 lectures address the fabrication of life specific to biopolitics. Pastoral, raison d’etat, 
liberal and neoliberal modes of “governmentality” propose a series of figures marking 
fabricated life in its totalizing and individualizing forms: sheep and flock, man and 
population, homo economicus and society, entrepreneur and social market. Working 
through these figures, I disengage the living object of Foucauldian biopower from the 
distinction between zoe and bios.  
By connecting governmental reason and biopower, this chapter elucidates not 
only the life of biopower, but also its development and operation, its lines of descent and 
contemporary mutations. In his explorations of pastoral power, Foucault describes the 
16th and 17th century emergence of a Judeo-Christian form of government embodied in 
the relation of a shepherd to his flock. The science of police of the 17th and 18th century 
draws upon the logics of pastoral power to articulate the state’s concern for the lives of its 
citizens, their health, safety, morality and well-being. And whereas the police must “bear 
upon everything,” modern liberal and neo-liberal modes of governance strive to “actively 
enable” and economize the “natural course of things.” While neither synthetic nor 
comprehensive, Foucault’s account of various forms of governmental reason supplies a 
more nuanced understanding of the “threshold of modernity” and a sharper picture of 
contemporary biopolitical regulation. Today, the regulatory production of life is, more 
specifically, the “enterprise” of life; freedom is “manufactured” for and through an 
“animal whose [political economy] places his existence as a living being in question.” 
With this more nuanced understanding of the production of life, the chapter 
returns to the production of death in the sovereign right to kill. According to Foucault’s 
genealogy of government, biopower emerges in the decline of, but still “demonically 
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combines” with, sovereign power. Foucault claims that it is racism that gives sovereign 
power a lease, a “death-function,” in biopolitical contexts. Extending this underdeveloped 
line of thought, Giorgio Agamben introduces homo sacer, a figure of living death and the 
logic of exception, to describe the “hidden intersection” of sovereignty and biopolitics. 
Considering Foucault and his extensions, I argue that the exception is a tactic within the 
field of governmentality, one that helps explain how “death-functions” like racism do 
their work and that relieves the binary suggestions of Foucault’s “negative modality.” 
Working through the inclusion of homo sacer among the forms of fabricated life 
uncovered in the genealogy of government—man, homo economicus, entrepreneur— I 
confirm that sovereign power, in its pre-modern and combinatory forms, is likewise 
disengaged from the distinction between zoe and bios. 
 
Genealogy and the Fabrication of Life 
 Foucault’s claim that biopower has succeeded in “keeping [people] alive when, in 
biological terms, they should have been dead long ago” implies a distinction between 
biological and political forms of living and dying. That is, by marking the new 
impossibility of a life and death “in biological terms,” Foucault appears to distinguish zoe 
and bios at the very moment of their eclipse.  The move is not isolated to his remarks on 
Francisco Franco. Treating biopolitics more generally, Foucault writes: 
For the first time in history, no doubt, biological existence was reflected in 
political existence; the fact of living was no longer an inaccessible 
substrate that only emerged from time to time, amid the randomness of 
death and its fatality; part of it passed into knowledge’s field of control 
and power’s sphere of intervention. Power would no longer be dealing 
with legal subjects over whom the ultimate dominion was death, but with 
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living beings and the mastery it would be able to exercise over them 
would have to be applied at the level of life itself.7  
 
Foucault’s description of life as a “substrate” and “level” appears to figure a pre-modern 
pre-political materiality, a post-dated distinction between zoe and bios. The theoretical 
history of biopolitics, a lineage that includes German organicism and Anglo-american 
(neo)humanism, shares in this binary distinction with violent exclusionary effects. In the 
case of organicist Jakob von Uexkull, the presumption of a living substrate to be 
harmonized fit easily with Nazi political programs. Later, in response to this violent 
epochal event, neohumanists sought to recuperate the same binaries—human/animal, 
zoe/bios.  However, to identify Foucault’s account with these lines of thought bears a 
distortive violence of its own. Foucault’s genealogical approach to biopolitics marks a 
turn in the theoretical history of biopower, a turn that counters the binary suggestions of 
his own “negative modality.”  
The theoretical history of the conjunction “bio-politics” begins more than 50 
years prior to Foucault’s 1975-76 course. Although the term was used as early as 1911, 
the Swedish political scientist Rudolph Kjellén was likely the first to have theorized the 
notion of biopolitics. 8 His 1916 text The State as a Form of Life elaborated an 
“organistic” conception of political life. For Kjellén, “biopolitics” conceives the state as a 
living being or organism, as opposed to an abstract entity produced out of the agency, and 
                                                
7 Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume One An Introduction,  (New York: Vintage Books, 
1990), 142. 
8 Esposito, 16. G.W. Harris was the first to use the word “biopolitics” in a column for the “The 
New Age” December 28, 1911 where he defined biopolitics as “a policy which should consider 
two aspects of the nation: in the first place, the increase of population and competition; in the 
second place, the individual attributes of the men who are available for filling places of 
responsibility in the State.” See G.W. Harris, “Bio-Politics,” The New Age, Volume 10 No. 9, 
197. 
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in the interests of, its subjects. On this conception, the people’s spiritual and biological 
harmony, in short, their vitality, should not be one political concern among others but 
rather the state’s central purpose. Out of the traumatic period of inter-war Europe, 
“parasites” and “pathologies” became the central anxieties of organist theory and racism 
its fated course. Jakob von Uexküll’s 1920 Staatsbiologie travels this itinerary. Stating 
his concern for the social “cancers” of the German people, von Uexküll concluded that 
“what we are lacking is an academy with a forward-looking vision not only for creating a 
class of state doctors, but also for instituting a state system of medicine. We possess no 
organ to which we can trust the hygiene of the state.”9  Later Von Uexkull quietly 
endorsed the hygienic solutions of the German state. The zoologist maintained a sordid 
correspondence with the Englishman-turned-Nazi historian Houston Chamberlain and 
even penned an introduction to Chamberlain’s infamous anti-Semitic tract The 
Foundations of the Nineteenth Century in 1928.10   
Nazism made clear the ease by which the organistic pursuit of “spiritual and 
biological harmony” can come to support the eradication of a people. When interest in 
biopolitics revived in France in the 1960s the fruit of this reflection was a kind of neo-
humanist anthropology motivated by the war. On this track, Aaron Starobinski’s 
Biopolitics: An Essay on the Interpretation and History of Humanity and Civilization 
(1960) and Edgar Morin’s Introduction to a Politics of Man (1969) positioned human life 
as an energetic substratum of politics, a nature to be directed “by the forces of charity, 
                                                
9 Von Uexkull, Jakob. Staatsbiologie (Berlin: Verlag von Gebruder Paetel, 1920), 55. 
10 Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 
43; Torten Ruting, “History and Significance of Jakob von Uexkull and of his institute in 
Hamburg.” Sign Systems Studies 32.1/2 (2004), 35-72. 
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justice and truth.”11 While Starobinski and Morin sought to affirm human life in a manner 
that would counter the violence of the camps, neither substantively reflected on the 
construction of the human over and against other forms of life. As Hannah Arendt 
dramatically put it, the camps revealed that “the world found nothing sacred in the 
abstract nakedness of being human, […] a man who is nothing but a man has lost the very 
qualities which make it possible for other people to treat him as a fellow-man.”12 The 
camp image of a “man who is nothing but a man” is one that shoots through a series of 
binaries that undergird both racist biocracy and humanist affirmation—man/animal, 
nature/culture etc.  
Foucault’s genealogical method is set at a marked distance from the organist or 
neo-humanist declensions of biopolitical theory by its demand that we more deeply 
historicize the notions of “life,” “body,” “humanity,” etc. Instead of presupposing a 
natural given or organic substrate in need of harmonization or direction, Foucauldian 
genealogy opposes the “search for origins” and aims to counter metaphysical movements 
and assumptions. Genealogy is not an excavation of the “bottom” of things, but rather an 
“elevated gaze” by which “depth is restored as an absolutely superficial secret.”13 
“Effective history” records the history of interpretation through analyses of descent and 
emergence. On the course of descent [Herkunft], the method “maintains events in their 
proper dispersion,” emphasizing difference and disparity; with a particular interest in the 
“body as the inscribed surface of events,” the analysis of descent is “situated within the 
                                                
11 Neither text has been translated into English. Aaron Starobinkski, La biopolitique: Essai 
d’interpretation de l’histoire de l’humanite et des civilizations (Geneva: Imprimerie des Arts, 
1960); Edgar Morin, Introduction a une politique de l’homme (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1969). 
12 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 299-300. 
13 Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Freud, Marx.” In Michel Foucault: Aesthetics, Method and 
Epistemology. Ed. James D. Faubion (New York: The New Press, 1994), 273. 
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articulation of the body and history. Its task is to expose a body totally imprinted by 
history and the process of history’s destruction of the body.”14 On the course of 
emergence [Entstehung], genealogy establishes the “hazardous play of dominations” 
rather than the “final term” or “culmination” of historical development. Together, an 
analysis of descent and emergence counters the natural given “levels” or “substrates,” 
their health or harmony, parasites or pathologies.  
Foucault’s thesis that power and knowledge are not external to one another 
thoroughly shapes genealogy and its ruptures.  Through the lens of power-knowledge, 
organistic and neo-humanist theories appear as lines of thought unreflectively enmeshed 
in the play of dominations. Foucault clearly describes the internal relation of power and 
knowledge in the early pages of Discipline and Punish: 
We should admit [that] power produces knowledge […] that power and 
knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation 
without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any 
knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time 
power-relations.15  
 
In their connection to the method of genealogy 
[t]hese ‘power-knowledge relations’ are to be analyzed, therefore, not on 
the basis of a subject of knowledge who is or is not free in relation to the 
power system, but, on the contrary, the subject who knows, the objects to 
be known and the modalities of knowledge must be regarded as so many 
effects of these fundamental implications of power-knowledge and their 
historical transformations.16 
 
Genealogy is not itself disconnected from power-systems; the fact that “everything is 
dangerous” is true as much for Foucault’s “history of present” as Kjellen’s organistic 
                                                
14 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 148. 
15 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 27 
16 Ibid, 28. 
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theory of the state.17 Nevertheless, genealogy’s attention to “power-knowledge relations” 
marks the violent and racist effects of calls for harmony and hygiene, a turn of critical 
thought unavailable within the terms of organistic and humanistic theory themselves. 
In his early archaeological method, the study of discursive rules and practices, 
Foucault had taken “life” and modern “man” as objects of inquiry without the resources 
of “power-knowledge” or this critical turn. In The Order of Things Foucault provides a 
slow demonstration of the emergence of “man” and “life” in the field of knowledge, more 
specifically, the modern appearance of “human nature” and its corresponding episteme, 
the empirical human sciences. In this demonstration, the supposed timelessness of these 
notions undergoes an archaeological deconstruction whereby the alienness of “man” and 
“life” to Classical and Renaissance rationalities works to illustrate Foucault’s dramatic 
claim that “man is only a recent invention, a figure not yet two centuries old, a new 
wrinkle in our knowledge, […that] will disappear again as soon as that knowledge has 
discovered a new form.”18 This new man is both an “object of knowledge and as a subject 
that knows: enslaved sovereign, observed spectator.”19  It is only in the modern period 
that man comes to order and be ordered, to exist as bound to finitude, to be studied via 
biology and economics. In the Classical and Renaissance ages, there were epistemologies 
that ordered the world otherwise; human beings existed, but man did not.20  
                                                
17 “I would like to do the genealogy of problems, of problématiques. My point is not that 
everything is bad but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same thing.” Michel 
Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” In Michel Foucault: Ethics, Subjectivity, Truth (New 
York: The New Press, 1997), 256. 
18 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: 
Random House, 1994), xxiii. 
19 Ibid, 312. 
20 Ibid, 322. 
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In a manner that recalls his pronouncement on biopolitics in The History of 
Sexuality, Foucault announces that “the threshold of modernity is situated not by the 
attempt to apply objective methods to the study of man, but rather by the constitution of 
an empirico-transcendental doublet which was called man.”21 Through three doubles—
transcendental-empirical, cogito-unthought, return-retreat of the origin—Foucault gives 
greater detail to varieties of modern humanism. In the transcendental-empirico doublet, 
man is a transcendental condition of knowledge but also an empirical object of 
knowledge. In the cogito-unthought doublet, man is the “locus of misunderstanding,” 
ever confronting his own “unthought;” That is, “the modern cogito does not reduce the 
whole being of things to thoughts without ramifying the being of thought right down to 
the inert network of what does not think.”22 In the doublet of returning and retreating 
origins, man is an opening and object of history; “Man’s being is always maintained, in 
relation to man himself, in a remoteness and a distance that constitute him.”23 
Irreconcilably composed by the opposition of subject and object, each of these doubles 
reveals that modern man is not a given essence, but an unstable project. 
 Through a method that is to “alternate, support and complete” the work of 
genealogy, Foucault’s archaeology of the human sciences helps rethink “man” and “life” 
at the “threshold of modernity.” In The Order of Things biological knowledge and its 
objects are functions of the modern episteme, itself a mutation of Classical and 
Renaissance rationalities. Life “in biological terms” is here discursively constituted but, 
without an analysis of descent and emergence, not yet “totally imprinted” by history and 
                                                
21 Ibid, 319 (my emphasis). 
22 Ibid, 324. 
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the “hazardous play of dominations.”  The Order of Things readies its own genealogy, 
provoking the analysis of power-relations presupposed and constituted by “man and his 
doubles.” As Foucault reflects in an interview entitled “On Power:” 
What struck me, in observing the human sciences, was that the 
development of all these branches of knowledge can in no way be 
dissociated from the exercise of power […] Generally speaking, the fact 
that societies can become the object of scientific observation, that human 
behavior became, from a certain point on, a problem to be analyzed and 
resolved, all that is bound up, I believe, with mechanisms of power— 
which, at a given moment, indeed, analyzed that object (society, man, etc.) 
and presented it as a problem to be resolved. So the birth of the human 
sciences goes hand in hand with the installation of new mechanisms of 
power.24  
 
Foucault attends to these new mechanisms of power by bringing his genealogical 
program to the “arts of government.” The emergent “life” and “man” given over to the 
empirical human sciences in The Order of Things is that “life” given over to biopower 
and governmentality in his late lectures at the College de France. Foucault’s 
archaeological research and genealogical program resist the logic of the distinction 
between zoe and bios, but fully wresting the bio- of biopower from binary suggestions 
requires the application of genealogy to “life,” to man and his doubles. Foucault’s writing 
on governmental rationality, and the biopower-knowledge relations treated therein, bring 
us closer to this application. 
 
Governmentality: From the Pastorate to Neoliberalism  
In The History of Sexuality, Foucault describes biopower as a “bi-polar 
technology of power” composed of “disciplines” and “regulatory controls,” an “anatomo-
                                                
24 Michel Foucault, “On Power,” in Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 
1977-1984. Ed. Lawrence Kritzman (New York: Routledge, 1988), 106. 
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politics of the human body” and a “biopolitics of the population.” This bipolar 
technology “mark[ed] the beginning of an era of ‘biopower […] an explosion of 
numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control 
of populations.”  Two years later Foucault’s 1977-78 lecture course set out to research 
the biopolitics of population and “tried to see how the specific problems of population 
emerged” but was “quickly led to the problem of government.”25 Foucault’s subsequent 
lectures on governmental rationality are situated inside this arrested study of biopower. 
Nevertheless their attention to transforming population controls elucidate the operation of 
biopower, uncovering distinct episodes in the fabricated bio- of biopower. 
Foucault’s neologism—governmentality—is telling of his approach to 
governmental rationality. The “govern” of “governmentality” marks not only the work of 
state institutions but more generally, “the conduct of conduct,” all activities of guiding, 
directing or shaping the conduct of a person or persons. 26 Here the equivocality of the 
term “conduct” is clarifying, as Foucault notes, “to ‘conduct’ is at the same time to ‘lead’ 
others […] and a way of behaving within a more or less open field of possibilities.”27 The 
“mentality” of “governmentality” indicates ways of thinking about the nature and 
practice of government. In sum, “governmental rationality,” the “art of government” and 
“governmentality” all define a field of research into ways of knowing the conduct of 
                                                
25 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 88. 
26 The well-known phrase “conduct of conduct” does not appear in English translation. The 
source for the phrase is an original French portion of the essay “The Subject and Power:” 
“L’exercice du pouvoir consiste à ‘conduire des conduites’ et à aménager la probabilité. Le 
pouvoir, au fond, est moins de l’ordre de l’affrontement entre deux adversaries, ou de 
l’engagement de l’un à l’égard de l’autre, que de l’ordre du ‘gouvernement’.” See Michel 
Foucault Dits et écrits IV (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 237. 
27 Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” In Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel 
Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 
220.  
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conduct. In the 1977-78 and the 1978-79 courses, Foucault applies this attention to four 
more and less discontinuous arts of government— the pastoral, raison d’etat, liberal and 
neoliberal—to show how life was “fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms,” 
how forms of conduct emerged within “open fields of possibilities.” 
Foucault describes pastoral power as a “prelude” to the modern conduct of 
conduct, drawing a lineage from the Hebraic and Early Christian theme of shepherd and 
flock to governmental rationality. While this lineage is not itself contentious, Foucault’s 
discussion of pastoral power leads to the more dramatic claim that modern government is 
a “demonic” combination of “the city-citizen game and the shepherd-flock game.”28 The 
city-citizen game (of classical Greek rather than Hebraic or Christian descent) concerns 
itself with “forming and assuring the city’s unity,” whereas the shepherd-flock game 
concerns itself with the “lives of individuals.” Plato’s Statesman is a striking and clear 
example of the Greek rejection of the shepherd-flock game. The dialogue’s attempt to 
resolve the question ‘what is a statesman?’ confronts the analogy of the art of the 
statesman to the art of the shepherd. Ultimately, young Socrates concludes that the 
pastoral model of power gives politicians a task suitable only for gods. After all, “how 
could any lawgiver be capable of prescribing every act of a particular individual and sit at 
his side, so to speak, all through his life and tell him just what to do?”29  In giving 
prescriptions, the statesman should use the “bulk method” rather than “individual 
treatment.”30 To understand how, in a combinatory and demonic turn, pastoral power 
                                                
28 Michel Foucault, “Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Critique of Political Reason,” in Power: 
The Essential Works of Michel Foucault 1954-1984 (New York: The New Press, 2000), 311. 
29 Plato, Statesman. In Plato: The Collected Dialogues, Edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington 
Cairns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), 295b. 
30 Ibid, 295a. 
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developed its own problem of “the one and the many,” requires attention the Christian 
evolution of the Hebraic theme.  
According to Foucault, the Hebraic conception of pastoral power is characterized 
by four features. First, the shepherd wields power over a flock, a “multiplicity in 
movement,” not (as in Greek political thought) a land or territory.31 Second, the shepherd 
“gathers, guides and leads” dispersed individuals.” Whereas the Greek lawgiver 
intervenes on a unity that may endure without him, the shepherd’s “immediate presence 
and direct action causes the flock to exist.”32 Third, the shepherd is fundamentally 
beneficent; Unlike the Greek helmsman that navigates his ship through troubled waters, 
the shepherd applies a “constant, individualized and final kindness.”33 Fourth and finally, 
the shepherd is devoted to the good of the flock and must know his flock “as a whole and 
in detail.”34 Christianity modifies the Hebraic pastorate by emphasizing the moral ties 
between shepherd and flock (especially the virtues of responsibility and obedience) and 
by amplifying the individualizing knowledge of the shepherd. In particular the Christian 
pastorate stresses the work of self-examination and the guidance of conscience, conducts 
that encourage individuals to “work at their own ‘mortification’ in this world.”35 
Most importantly, Foucault suggests that Christian pastoral power converts the 
paradox of the “one and the many” into the problem of the “one and the many.” The 
paradox— that the shepherd must be prepared to sacrifice himself for the sake of the 
flock or “sacrifice the whole of his flock for each of the sheep”— attends Hebraic as well 
                                                
31 Foucault, “Omnes et Singulatim,” 302; Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 125. 
32 Ibid, 302. 
33 Ibid, 302. 
34 Ibid, 303. 
35 Ibid, 310-311. 
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as Christian versions of pastoral power. 36  Recall, for instance, that Moses is the Hebraic 
shepherd figure whose flock was saved in virtue of his capacity for sacrifice. If the 
movement of all and each cuts across the Hebraic themes, in the mutated Christian 
pastorate all and each mark the movement and collapse of individualization and 
totalization. Foucault draws special attention to how Christian individualization proceeds 
in a totalizing manner, by subjection.37 The Christian pastorate is a pastorate of souls 
wherein the shepherd effectively produces the soul, keeping watching over it and 
extracting its truth. Where the Hebraic shepherd wielded a “constant individualized and 
final kindness,” the Christian shepherd develops a network of “exhaustive, total and 
permanent relation of individual obedience.” In its “demonic” combination, Christian 
pastoral power is “a strange game whose elements are life, death, truth, obedience, 
individuals, self-identity—a game that seems to have nothing to do with the game of the 
city surviving through the [paradoxical] sacrifice of its citizens.”38 
Foucault’s discussion of pastoral power, its beneficent and demonic declensions, 
offers a glimpse of an essence, a soul, “fabricated from alien forms.” Flock and sheep 
serve as figures of this fabrication, born at first by the “immediate presence and direct 
action” of the shepherd and later by the networked guidance and knowledge of souls’ 
“internal, secret and hidden truths.” Pastoral power is “in its typology, organization, and 
mode of functioning, [in its exercise] as power, something from which we have not freed 
ourselves.”39 That is, in its “conduct of conduct” pastoral power is both a clear prelude to 
governmentality and an antecedent to biopower, sharing objectives—to keep watch, tend 
                                                
36 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 128. 
37 Ibid, 184. 
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to health and nourishment—and subject(ion)s—the lives of individuals and groups. This 
resonance deepens when the pastorate emerges more properly in the field of 
governmental rationality, when Foucault asks “What is it to govern the world in a 
pastoral sense?” and answers raison d’état.  
In defining raison d’état as the first form of modern governmentality, Foucault 
does not engage in traditional analyses of the state, its formation or sovereign legitimacy. 
He is not interested in considering the state “as a kind of political universal” that bears an 
essence “in and for itself.”40 From the perspective of governmentality, raison d’état 
reflects an investigation into “the type of rationality implemented in the exercise of state 
power,” an analysis that forgoes “a theory of the state, as one can and must forgo an 
indigestible meal.”41 As Foucault puts it succinctly, “the state is an episode of 
governmentality.” 42  Three major features illustrate the ways of knowing the conduct of 
conduct according to raison d’état. First, raison d’état is government according to 
reason; It is rational and takes into account the nature of what is governed (the state).43 
Second, the objective of raison d’état is to strengthen and reinforce the state itself.44 Third 
and finally, raison d’état requires a certain kind of knowledge so as to “hold out” against 
other states, a knowledge that is both prudential and concrete;45 The knowledge of the 
sovereign will focus on “things” rather than “laws,” specifically things that constitute the 
governable reality of the state. 
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41 Ibid, 78-79. 
42 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 248. 
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44 Ibid, 316. 
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 In its knowing directedness toward the state, raison d’état recalls the operation of 
pastoral power. The shepherd does not strive to strengthen himself, to bolster his glory or 
sovereignty but rather to know, strengthen and care for his flock. This pastoral 
inheritance is witnessed most clearly in the contrast of raison d’état to a more 
Machiavellian rationality. As Foucault puts it “what Machiavelli sought to save, to 
safeguard is not the state but the relationship of the Prince to that over which he exercises 
his domination, that is to say, it is a matter of saving the principality as the Prince’s 
relation of power to his territory or population.”46  Whereas Machiavellianism ties the 
perpetuity of the state to the mortal body of the Prince, raison d’état strives to “hold out” 
indefinitely, overcoming the Prince’s limitations through state strength.  
Alongside this Machiavellian contrast, the science of the police provides a 
positive illustration of the pastoral conduct of conduct according to raison d’état. In its 
Eighteenth century usage, the term “police” did not describe a group of officials 
concerned with crime-prevention but rather something effectively identical to 
government. Police science encompasses all the concrete and prudential knowledge 
required in the raison d’état.47 The task of the police is to keep watch over and strengthen 
the prosperity of the state, a broad objective illustrated in N. De Lamare’s Treaty on the 
Police—“the police sees to living,” “the sole purpose of the police is to lead man to the 
utmost happiness to be enjoyed in life,” and “the police sees to everything regulating 
‘society’ (social relations) carried on between men.”48 Moreover, the paradox of the 
police is to “to develop those elements of individual lives in such a way that their 
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47 Mitchell Dean. Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (London: Sage 
Publications, 1999), 90. 
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development also fosters the strength of the state,” recalling the paradox of the 
shepherd’s care for all and each.49   
Through the science of police, we can see that raison d’état marks an episode of 
governmentality and the production of life. The police make use of an empirical mutation 
of flock and sheep—man and population—to know and conduct all aspects of the state. 
Here, the growth of the sciences reflects and serves the science of police. As Foucault 
aptly puts it, “police makes statistics necessary, but police also makes statistics possible 
[…] police and statistics mutually condition each other.”50 Man and population, as figures 
of fabricated life proper to the police, emerge from the police state’s “regulatory mania,” 
entangled in a complex of problems (hygiene, prosperity, happiness) and known through 
proliferating sciences (statistics, demography, economics, social medicine). So known 
and conducted, man and population are to be regarded “as so many living effects of these 
fundamental implications of power-knowledge and their historical transformations,” as 
“living beings in question.”51 In this genealogy of raison d’état Foucault describes a 
transformation of the power/knowledge relations that produce man and population. 
Through a series of shifts and displacements, liberal govermentality gives rise to two new 
figures of individualization and totalization—“homo economicus” and “civil society.”  
According to liberal governmental reason, the total and detailed knowledge of the 
state presumed by raison d’état and its science of police is simply not possible. The 
processes of man and population are not a transparent “indefinitely modifiable datum,” 
but rather opaque “processes of a naturalness specific to relations between men, to what 
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happens when they cohabit, come together, exchange, work and produce […] a 
naturalness that basically did not exist until [liberal government].”52 Foucault illustrates 
the opacity of this nature— its limitation of knowledge—by emphasizing the invisibility 
(alongside the handedness) of Adam Smith’s theory of the “invisible hand” of economic 
process. Smith’s thesis holds that an individual agent “intends only his own gain, and he 
is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which is no 
part of his intention,” an end that also serves the public good.53 As an objective and 
natural reality independent of political realities, the hand may be made visible to the 
“lateral science” of political economy, but not to the economic agent or government.54 
The liberal disjuncture of economic knowledge and government contrasts with the 
alignment of economic knowledge and government in raison d’état. Francois Quesnay’s 
Tableau économique stands as the paradigmatic image of this alignment. Quesnay’s 
Economic Table, an “abstract representation of the totality of exchanges between 
economic actors,” is a device that gives sovereigns exact knowledge of (and thus power 
to control) all economic exchange.55 According to Foucault, the liberal “invisible hand” is 
the “exact opposite” of the Economic Table. Government can now be “mistaken,” and 
(recalling its distance from Machiavelli) “what makes bad government is not that the 
prince is wicked but that he is ignorant.”56 
The shift from raison d’état to liberal governmentality maps onto the disjuncture 
between mechanisms of discipline and mechanisms of security. In raison d’état an order 
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of security emerged in the form of the police state and the society of surveillance. 
Foucault draws a contrast between the disciplinary mechanisms of the secure police state 
and the mechanisms of security proper to liberal government. Disciplinary mechanisms 
work “to prevent everything, even and above all the detail.” 57  By contrast, mechanisms 
of security are functioned toward the security of inevitable and natural realities, dealing 
in possible and probable events to actively enable the processes of civil society. As such, 
liberalism produces a new relationship between freedom and security than that presented 
in the raison d’état framework. Instead of preventing everything on the assumption that 
security conditions freedom, liberalism holds that the converse is also true, liberty 
conditions security.58 Foucault puts it clearly:  
Liberalism formulates simply the following: I am going to produce what 
you need to be free. I am going to see to it that you are free to be free. And 
so, this liberalism is not much the imperative of freedom as the 
management and organization of the conditions in which one can be free.59 
 
The freedom traditionally celebrated by liberal philosophy is a “manufactured” freedom, 
enabled and managed by mechanisms of security.  
The notions of homo economicus and “civil society” reflect and drive the 
transformations of power/knowledge at work in liberal government. Despite Smith’s 
“benign” descriptor, the density of the population proposes a dangerous challenge to 
governmental reason, to either detach the market from the sovereign or to render the 
sovereign a function of the market.60 Navigating these alternatives, liberalism gives rise 
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to a sphere of intervention known as “civil society” composed of economic men (“homo 
economicus”). Foucault describes these emergent life forms 
Homo economicus and civil society are therefrom two inseparable 
elements. Homo economicus is, if you like, the abstract, ideal, purely 
economic point that inhabits the dense, full, and complex reality of civil 
society. Or alternatively, civil society is the concrete ensemble within 
which these ideal points, economic men, must be placed so that they can 
be appropriately managed.61  
 
As is well-known liberalism draws upon the laissez-faire method to know and govern this 
new sphere of reality. Foucault’s analysis, however, highlights the regulatory work of 
laissez-faire, its “activist and enabling” as much as a “passive and abstaining” posture.62  
The essential objective of governing civil society will be “not so much to prevent things 
as to ensure that the necessary and natural regulations work, or even to create regulations 
that enable natural regulations to work.”63 Whereas the raison d’état acts upon 
everything, secure liberal government “lets things happen” and “works within reality, by 
getting the components of reality to work in relation to each other.”64 
 If homo economicus and society are those figures of the liberal production of life, 
their mutation into “entrepreneurial man” and “social market” is tied to the emergence of 
a neoliberal governmentality in the Twentieth Century post-war period. Foucault’s 
analysis of neoliberalism focuses on two strains, the West German Ordoliberalen and the 
American Chicago School. Although they differ in many respects, each returns homo 
economicus to a more manipulable form and affects the economization of civil society. In 
the German case, the notion of the market is dramatically revised. No longer a transparent 
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or opaque natural reality, writers for the journal Ordo reimagine the market as an 
organized “artificial game of competitive freedom.”65 This market, itself a response to the 
perversions of capitalism during World War II, pairs with an interventionist “vital policy” 
that sought to “construct a social fabric in which precisely the basic units would have the 
form of enterprise.”66 In this social fabric, homo economicus is “not the man of exchange 
or man the consumer; he is the man of enterprise and production,” an entrepeneur.67 
 The Chicago School shares in the enterprising figure of Ordoliberalen if not its 
artificial picture of the market. Arguing against the growth of the public sector, American 
neoliberals called for the elimination of Keynesian social programs and protections. 
Alongside this apparent regulatory retreat, homo economicus is returned to a less opaque 
and more modifiable form. By emphasizing man’s faculty of choice in enterprise and by 
submitting economic man to a behavioral lens, American neoliberal government 
regulates conduct by shaping and modifying the market environment. In a sense, 
neoliberal reason draws upon that same activist enabling posture characteristic of 
liberalism but now the very form and sphere of conduct-to-be-conducted is fully cast in 
an economic mode. At this time economic science redefines and enlarges its object to all 
rational action, making possible “strictly economic interpretations of whole domains 
previously thought to be non-economic.”68 To illustrate Foucault highlights the economic 
analyses of criminal and penal policy, the new neoliberal possibility of asking “how 
much does it cost a country to have thieves running free?”69 How many free thieves can 
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the society reasonably sustain? The “economic government” of neoliberalism is not only 
government of the social market but government according to the social market, 
employing an economic measure for all things. 
 To illustrate the figures of fabricated life proper to the American neoliberalism—
entrepreneurial man and social market—Foucault draws attention to Becker’s theory of 
human capital. According to Becker, human capital is the composition of innate 
hereditary elements and abilities brought about by investment (educational, familial, 
reproductive, etc.) that serve in the accumulation of wealth and value. The notion of 
human capital provides a lens through which individuals and groups evaluate a wide 
range of choices and risks. The understanding of one’s life as a perpetual investment 
opportunity or site of employment links with and supports the idea that man’s life is an 
enterprise, that man is an entrepreneur of himself. The “entrepreneurial man” emerges as 
neoliberal governments shape market environments around enterprising populations and 
as entrepreneurs shape themselves for enterprise, making choices and building human 
capital.  
 As we see Foucault understands neoliberalism as a form of subjectivation and 
places the entrepreneur alongside a series of subjects uncovered by the genealogy of 
government. 70  Man and population, homo economicus and civil society, entrepreneurial 
man and social market—each pair marks a form of life particular to an episode of 
governmentality. More specifically, each form of life reflects and shapes a way of 
knowing the conduct of conduct. Together these figures are not a seamless timeline but a 
                                                
70 See John Protevi, “What Does Foucault Think is New About Neoliberalism?” Forthcoming in 
Pli: The Warwick Journal of Philosophy Vol 21. Accessed: 
http://www.protevi.com/john/research.html.  
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substantive line of descent. The power/knowledge relations they demonstrate are more 
and less discontinuous but they share in the pastoral logic of all and each, individualized 
and totalized life. Man is a “docile body,” entangled in the emerging problems and 
sciences of population. Homo economicus is a dense point of economic transaction whose 
conduct is enabled by the lateral economic sciences of civil society. The entrepreneur is a 
modifiable investment project, an enterprising unit of the (redundantly termed) social 
market.  
In virtue of its tie to the emergence and mutation of population, these figures are 
also episodes in the era of biopower. Although situated inside its arrested study, 
Foucault’s genealogy of government elucidates the fabricated bio- of biopower, its lines 
of descent and contemporary mutations, and the operation of biopower, its broad logic of 
‘all and each’ and specific mechanisms.  In 1976, Foucault’s descriptions of biopower in 
The History of Sexuality had linked its operations with the (not-yet formulated notion of) 
raison d’état. For instance, Foucault elaborates the idea of population controls with 
reference to  “the emergence of demography, the evaluation of the relationship between 
resources and inhabitants, the constructing of tables analyzing wealth and its 
circulation.”71 In his governmental researches, Foucault tracks the logic of ‘all and each’ 
further to liberal and neoliberal forms of population control. That is, the processes of 
individualization and totalization at work in the definition of biopower as a “bipolar 
technology” (an “anatomo-politics of the human body” and a “biopolitics of the 
population”) are given liberal and neoliberal declensions. In its individualizing operation, 
(neo)liberal biopower draws upon mechanisms attuned to the bodies of homo economicus 
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and the entrepreneur as sites of manufactured freedom and enterprise. In its totalizing 
operation, (neo)liberal biopower makes use of economizing mechanisms that act upon 
civil society and social market as elements, in equal order, of nature and capital.  
To the extent that the pastoral logic of ‘all and each’ connects to the bipolar 
technology of biopower, we should recall that this logic tends towards paradoxes and 
problems. Although Moses’ flock was saved precisely by his preparation to sacrifice all 
for the sake of one, the secular political pastorate involves no supernatural or mythical 
forces. In Foucault’s words, the ‘all and each’ logic of modern states tends towards the 
“demonic,” biopower not only “makes live” but also “lets die.” Foucault’s genealogy 
helps clarify these well-known yet ambiguous descriptions of modern government and 
biopower. Whereas the Hebraic version of pastoral power is “fundamentally beneficient,” 
a power of “constant, individualized and final kindness,” the secular political pastorate 
instrumentalizes the power of care, yielding systems of obedience and truth. Biopower is 
not the power of “cura materna (the mother’s unconditional duty to take care of her 
children)” as those who essentialize its beneficent antecedents or suspend its 
governmental mutations argue.72 Although biopower can claim pastoral power as an 
antecedent, biopower itself emerges only in modern governmental mutation, where a 
calculus of care achieves the “subjugation of bodies and the control of populations.”73 To 
be clear, though, the “demonic” course of modern societies reflects not only the distance 
of biopower from pastoral power in the elaboration of government but also the co-
ordination of biopower and sovereign power. Where governmentality elucidates the 
                                                
72 See Mika Ojankangas, “Impossible Dialogue on Bio-Power: Agamben and Foucault.” In 
Foucault Studies 2 (2005), 5-28. 
73 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 139-140. 
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production of life to its very limits (“letting die”), the question of sovereignty elucidates a 
production of death at the limit of biopower—the right to kill.  
 
Sovereignty, Thanatos, Biopower 
In The History of Sexuality, Foucault dramatically announces the “replacement” 
of sovereign right by biopolitical power via, what Esposito terms, his “negative 
modality.” However, in several more meticulous moments, Foucault revises and qualifies 
this claim. The era of biopower and governmentality does not signal the expiration of 
sovereign power. While biopower can be said to be the dominant feature of power’s 
activity today, it also co-operates with sovereign power in “complex edifices” and 
“systems of correlation.”74 To understand the demonic character of modern societies 
requires attention not only to the governmental calculus of “making live and letting die,” 
but also the survival of the power to kill.  Illuminating but limited, Foucault’s discussion 
of this survival focuses on the concept of racism. To raise the question of sovereignty 
more fully, this section also introduces Giorgio Agamben’s attempt to extend and 
“correct” Foucault’s line of thought. Agamben claims that sovereign power and biopower 
bear a hidden intersection and proposes a compelling new figure of fabricated life that 
reflects this secret violence, a figure of living death—homo sacer. When situated in the 
field of governmentality, homo sacer helps develop and extend Foucault’s account of 
“demonic” combinations. And, provided that intersections and combinations are 
submitted to Foucauldian genealogy rather than Agambenian ontology, homo sacer can 
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be summoned to disengage sovereign power from zoe/bios logics, their secrets and 
hidden truths. 
In Foucault’s only extended discussion of the “complex edifice” of sovereign and 
biopolitical power, he argues that it is racism that “justifies the death-function in the 
economy of biopower”; if biopower is to exercise the sovereign right to kill, “it must 
become racist.”75 For Foucault, the conditionality of racism to contemporary death-
functions lies in its potential to figure members of racial groups as biological threats to 
others. In biopolitical contexts, wherein all governmental resources administer to the 
living figures of man, homo economicus, or entrepreneur, to put to death is a scandal, a 
contradiction. But, if the death of others protects or “regenerates” the population, 
biopower can appropriate the right to kill. Racism gives sovereign power a lease in the 
modern world and, Foucault suggests, gives birth to a specifically biological genre of the 
race concept.76 In the pre-modern period, the concept of race had functioned in a 
revolutionary discourse of race struggle, but with the modern emergence of biological 
sciences race becomes a biological reality. 
Foucault’s discussion of racism’s role as a “death-function” helps clarify how the 
sovereign right to kill can be reconfigured and redeployed in biopolitical contexts. The 
fact that “never before [a politics of life] did regimes visit such holocausts on their own 
populations” is a simple and disturbing reflection of a time in which “massacres have 
                                                
75 Foucault, “Society Must be Defended,” 258 and 256 (my emphasis). 
76 In “Society Must Be Defended” Foucault distinguishes between racism and the revolutionary 
discourse of race struggle. Although I cannot rehearse this geneaological thread here, it should be 
noted that Foucault uncovers a pre-biological notion of race at work in the counter-histories that 
emerge at the end of the Middle Ages, histories that diverged from a rituals of sovereignty’s 
reinforcement. See “28 January 1976,” in “Society Must Be Defended,” 65-85. 
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become vital.”77 Further, when Foucault remarks, in support of his death-function thesis, 
that the “murderous states are also the most racist” he draws the event of Nazi biopolitics 
(and the complicity of German organicism) into the reaches of his genealogy. For 
Foucault, the Nazi state represents the most complete coincidence of biopower and the 
sovereign right to kill. There, the “regenerating” extermination of another race involved 
exposing one’s own race to the threat of death. The Nazi state was one in which, the 
depth of a perceived biological threat gave each “the power of life and death over his or 
her neighbors,” exposing anyone to the threat of death.78 However, when commenting on 
the Nazi state and the racist violence of biopower, Foucault confesses that he finds the 
topic “very difficult to talk about.” Uncomfortable with his “enormous claims,” Foucault 
promises a “whole series of lectures” on the demonic coordination of sovereign and 
biopolitical power. Absent these never-accomplished lectures, some of Foucault’s 
readers, most notably Giorgio Agamben, have shared in his discomfort or dissatisfaction. 
In his seminal text Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life Agamben laments and 
claims to “correct” the account of biopolitics that remains after Foucault’s untimely 
death.  
According to Agamben, what eluded Foucault was the hidden point of 
intersection between biopower and sovereign power and thus the hidden (sovereign) 
violence within biopower itself.  The sovereign power with which Agamben’s biopower 
“secretly” intersects is other than Foucault’s account of the power to “let live or make 
die.” Provocatively, Agamben follows Carl Schmitt in defining sovereignty not by the 
right to kill but rather by the right to decide on the “state of exception.” the 
                                                
77 Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume One, 137. 
78 Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended,” 259.  
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space/time/bodies over which the rule of law is suspended. More precisely described, the 
decision on the exception constitutes the sovereign for “what is at issue […] is not so 
much the control or neutralization of an excess as the creation and definition of the very 
space in which the juridico-political order can have validity.”79 The exception, we see, 
does not precede the normal, standing as an excess prior to the sovereign decision. Rather 
the decision produces norm and exception, outlining the space of the juridico-political 
order. As an important consequence of the sovereign decision, that which is excepted is 
related to the juridico-political order. The sovereign includes the exception by excluding 
it⎯“the rule applies to the exception in no longer applying, in withdrawing from it.”80  
The significance of this relationality between order and exception is made clear in 
Agamben’s insistence that sovereignty is not an exclusively juridical or political concept 
but one that expresses the fundamental relationship between law and life.81 Agamben 
adopts Jean-Luc Nancy’s connection of “ban” and “abandonment” to specify the relation 
of law to life in the state of exception. There, life banned by law is abandoned to law and 
law and life consequently coincide to the point of indistinction. Agamben emphasizes 
that the kind of life abandoned here, that which is included in the juridico-political order 
by being excluded from it, is not the natural life of zoe but rather “bare life.” Bare life is a 
“politicized form of natural life” that expresses “the irreparable exposure of life to death 
in the sovereign ban.” 82 Or, as Agamben summarizes it with respect to the state of 
exception: 
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There is not first life as a natural biological given and anomie as the state 
of nature, and then their implication in law through the state of exception. 
On the contrary, the very possibility of distinguishing life and law […] 
coincides with their articulation in the biopolitical machine.83 
 
The production of life and law via the sovereign decision is therefore an expression of 
biopolitical machinations. Whereas Foucault’s account had stressed that sovereign power 
evidenced a balance tipped in the favor of death, that is, the sovereign’s ability to kill as 
opposed to grant life, Agamben’s sovereign decision produces life as bare life. Sovereign 
power is the power to produce life as mere survival.   
As an illustration of the history and problematic of bare life that follows from the 
sovereign decision Agamben points to an archaic figure of Roman law, “homo sacer” or 
sacred man. Homo sacer is a man whose killing is unpunishable and whose sacrifice is 
banned. Consequently, the life of homo sacer that life exposed to all the violence, yet 
none of the protections of divine or human law. For Agamben sovereign power is that 
power that produces the dyad of homo sacer and the sovereign as limit cases—
respectively constituted and constituting cases—of the relationship between law and life. 
Since sovereign power involves the violent and irreparable capturing of “life” by the 
sovereign decision it should not be surprising that Agamben, again diverging from 
Foucault, claims that biopower is “at least as old as the sovereign exception.” What 
marks the distance from the Greek polis to the threshold of modernity is not the 
emergence of biopower but rather the elaboration of the state of exception such that the 
“exception becomes the rule.” Biopolitics is realized when we are all effectively homo 
sacers, when the limit figures of homo sacer and the sovereign are generalized across the 
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entire population. In Agamben’s words “If today there is no longer any one clear figure 
of the sacred man, it is perhaps because we are all virtually homo sacers.”84 
From this brief exposition of Agamben’s account of biopolitics, it is clear that his 
purported completion or correction is, in fact, a transformation and altogether different 
account of biopolitics than that found in Foucault. Nevertheless, the figure of homo sacer, 
by inserting itself amidst a series of figures already uncovered in the genealogy of 
government—man, homo economicus, entrepreneur— provides a promising and 
challenging point of dialogue. Homo sacer is that figure of fabricated life reflective of a 
“hidden intersection” between biopower and sovereign power, a power that, rather than 
“making live and letting die,” “makes survive.” Taken as a genre of fabricated life, homo 
sacer has at least two concrete representatives in Terri Schiavo and Francisco Franco. 
More than man or homo economicus, it is homo sacer that captures the kind of life and 
death undergone by Schiavo and Franco, a life reduced to mere survival and endurance, a 
life whose killing constitutes neither murder nor sacrifice. For Agamben, however, homo 
sacer cannot be taken as merely another genre of fabricated life because it marks a 
characteristic of their common production—bare life; If the state of exception is “a 
contingency into which any political arrangement might dissolve,” homo sacer is a 
potential (or “virtual”) form of life for man, homo economicus, entrepreneur.85 From this 
perspective, homo sacer is a figure of fabricated life but also a logic that haunts, by 
underwriting, all fabrication. 
Although Agamben describes contingency in dramatic and ontological terms, 
homo sacer can be articulated in terms more amenable to the method of genealogy and 
                                                
84 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 115. 
85 Judith Butler, Precarious Life (London: Verso, 2004), 68. 
 73 
more elucidatory of “demonic combinations.” On such a reading, what is at stake in homo 
sacer is not a secret and elaborating sovereign violence of biopower but rather the 
availability of the logic of exception within the field of governmentality, the circulation 
of a tactic that makes a real contingency of states of exception. Here the co-operation of 
sovereign power and biopower in “complex edifices” and systems of correlation is 
understood as the co-operation of tactics of exception and logics of ‘all and each.’ For 
instance with respect to Foucault’s account of the correlation of racism and the right to 
kill, the logic of exception can be summoned to help explain racism’s re-functioning 
capacity. The extermination of racial others regenerates the population in virtue of the 
bare life of racial others whose killing constitutes neither murder nor sacrifice. By de-
ontologizing Agamben to explain the lease of racism in the field of governmentality, 
homo sacer itself finds a lease in Foucault’s limited account of the relation between 
sovereign power and biopower. 
In her recent book Precarious Life Judith Butler provides a similar account of the 
contemporary conditions of sovereignty— its “anachronistic resurgence” in governmental 
contexts—while launching a condemnatory challenge of Agamben. She claims that 
[Bare life] does not yet tell us how this [demonic] power functions 
differentially, to target and manage certain populations, to derealize the 
humanity of subject who might potentially belong to a community bound 
by commonly recognized laws; and [it] does not yet tell us how 
sovereignty […] works by differentiating populations on the basis of 
ethnicity and race […]86 
 
Butler’s critique touches the real dangers that attend Agamben’s tendency towards an 
ontological rather than a genealogical method. By rendering the intersection of sovereign 
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power and biopower “hidden” and “secretive,” Agamben describes the elaboration of the 
sovereign exception as a kind of originative unfolding. In the process, homo sacer, as a 
conceptual resource of Agamben’s text, seems to overwhelm other analytics.  Detaching 
homo sacer from ontological currents involves exposing the superficiality of its secret, 
uncovering its status as a tactic or logic of exception. Genealogically speaking, it may be 
that Agamben’s ontological tendencies are themselves tactical. But so exposed, bare life 
can contribute to the question of how “power functions differentially to target and 
manage certain populations” precisely because it describes a process of constituting 
populations as targets and objects of management.  Moreover, homo sacer need not be 
over-tasked as a conceptual resource when summoned in correlation and tandem with 
other concepts that describe the field of governmentality and the technique of biopower. 
The understanding of homo sacer as marking the tactical logic of exception is 
alive, tensively, in Agamben’s more Foucauldian moments. But perhaps more 
importantly, it appears to function in, or is at least compatible with, Foucault’s 
description of pre-modern sovereign power. Take Foucault’s more extensive description 
of the right to “take life or let live” in the 1975-76 lecture course:  
in terms of his relationship with the sovereign, the subject is, by rights, 
neither dead nor alive. From the point of view of life and death, the subject 
is neutral, and it is thanks to the sovereign that the subject has the right to 
be alive or, possibly, the right to be dead. In any case, the lives and deaths 
of subjects become rights only as a result of the will of the sovereign.87 
 
As Paul Patton observes, the neutrality of the subject “implies the possibility of the 
withdrawal of that status and along with it the exclusion of the subject form the sphere of 
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sovereign power.”88 That is, the neutrality implies (or makes possible) the logic of 
exception. Even as sovereignty is exercised in a largely negative (“take life”) fashion, 
“the life of the subject is entirely encompassed by the sovereign’s power.” Here two 
definitions of sovereignty –the right to decide on the exception and the right to kill—
work together in a manner that anticipates their co-ordination in the field of 
governmentality. Before the emergence of governmental reason (as well as biological 
sciences), the encompassed (neutral, suspended) “life of the subject” is not “biological 
life,” as Patton wrongfully assume. Neither is the encompassed (neutral, suspended) “life 
of the subject” an exteriority to a relation of power, and thereby an invocation of the 
distinction between zoe and bios. Rather, the relation implied in neutral non-relation (and 
vice versa) situates sovereignty beyond the distinction between zoe and bios as an 
element of its very production. More clearly put, the subject of Foucauldian sovereignty 
marks the fabrication rather the invocation of the zoe/bios distinction.  
 This chapter opened with concerns about the binary suggestions of Foucault’s 
“negative modality,” his tendency to define biopower by the “twilight” of sovereignty. To 
the threat of that modality—a post-dated and thus persistent distinction between zoe and 
bios—the resources of genealogy and the thematic of governmentality offer much 
indirect illumination and conceptual relief. The genealogy of government proposes a 
figural series of the bio- of biopower—man and population, homo economicus and civil 
society, entrepreneur and social market—as well as the mutated survival of sovereignty-
in-decline.  But it is the contribution of a figure of sovereign fabrication—homo sacer—
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that completes the relief of Foucault’s negative modality. Here, wresting biopower and 
sovereign power from zoe/bios logics follows as much from Foucault’s genealogy as 
Agamben’s extensions. At the same time, homo sacer does not compose a genealogy of 
sovereignty as much as it marks another scarcity in Foucault’s text. Although biopower 
and sovereign power are equally detached from the distinction between zoe and bios, 
Foucault’s genealogy is asymmetrically directed to the “shepherd-flock game.” A 
genealogy of the exception would further elucidate the mutations and mechanisms of the 
“city-citizen game” in the twilight of binary logics. For now we can see that homo sacer, 
as a marker of sovereign tactics, is not a shadow but a question for “living beings in 
question.”89 In the following chapter homo sacer marks another scarcity in Foucault’s 
account of biopolitical power. In its status as a mute figure, homo sacer suggests that 









                                                
89 Here I find Mitchell Dean’s plain retranslation of Foucault’s demonic combination of “city-
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 AGAMBEN AND THE BIOPOLITICS OF LANGUAGE 
 
Levi’s Paradox, Agamben’s Paradigm 
Giorgio Agamben’s controversial 1999 text Remnants of Auschwitz is a 
wrenching exploration of a lacuna in Holocaust survivor testimony—the silence of “those 
who did not and could not bear witness,” those who are, paradoxically, the “true 
witnesses.” In a powerful and challenging passage that inspires much of Remnants, Primo 
Levi describes this paradox: 
I must repeat— we survivors are not the true witnesses. […] we are those 
who by their prevarications or abilities or good luck did not touch bottom. 
Those who did so, those who saw Gorgon, have not returned to tell about 
it or have returned mute, but they are the Muslims, the submerged, the 
complete witnesses, the ones whose deposition would have general 
significance. They are the rule, we are the exception […]. We who were 
favored by fate tried, with more or less wisdom, to recount not only our 
fate, but also that of others, the submerged; but this was a discourse on 
‘behalf of third parties’, the story of things seen from close by, not 
experienced personally […] We speak in their stead, by proxy.1  
 
Levi’s words are shot through with a sense of shame in testifying, incompletely and by 
proxy, for the “Muslims” or Muselmanner. In the camps, the Muselmanner were those 
who, having reached the devastating advanced stages of malnutrition, lost the ability to 
speak and to respond to their environment. “One hesitates to call [the Muselmanner] 
living: one hesitates to call their death death” but in the camps they are the rule, the 
survivor the exception. Herein lies, what Agamben terms, “Levi’s paradox”: the 
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Muselmann alone can provide testimony of “general significance,” the “true witness” of 
the camp is the one who cannot witness. 
In Remnants of Auschwitz Levi’s paradox is deepened by the Muselmann’s “mute 
refutation” of humanism and anti-humanism. According to Agamben, the Muselmann not 
only marks the destitution of the human— the fact that “it is possible to lose […] decency 
beyond all imagination, that there is still life in the most extreme degradation.”2 The 
Muselmann also marks the in-distinction of the human and the inhuman— the “end and 
ruin of every ethics of dignity and conformity to a norm.”3 In a dramatic attempt to 
articulate an ethics that “begins where dignity ends,” Agamben argues that “human 
beings are human insofar as they bear witness to the inhuman.”4 For Levi, to speak is to 
enter “a field of forces incessantly traversed” by the speechless, the submerged; for 
Agamben, this traversal is neither specific to survivor testimony nor an “occasional 
turmoil” of the subject. Rather, “humans bear within themselves the mark of the 
inhuman.”5 Herein lies not “Levi’s paradox” but Agamben’s paradigm: the double 
movement of subjectification and desubjectification is a fundamental characteristic of 
subjection in general; the Muselmann is the paradigmatic figure of logics intrinsic to the 
Western politics. 
Suspended between Levi’s paradox and Agamben’s paradigm, the ethics of 
“bearing witness to the inhuman” has generated substantial criticism vis-à-vis the 
Muselmann. In a widely read condemnation, J.M. Bernstein argues that the slippage from 
witnessing Auschwitz to witnessing Western subjectivity is an “aestheticization of [the 
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Muselmann’s] fate for the sake of a metaphysics of language.”6 While others find 
immanent non-aesthetic justification in the slippery “hidden matrix” of Agamben’s 
biopower,7 most acknowledge that there is little external or historical ground for the 
claim that the Muselmann represents processes intrinsic to (not simply typical of) 
Western politics.8  Such claims seem to betray Agamben’s “conceptual fundamentalism,” 
the distance between his “epochal concepts” and Foucault’s “fine grained, contextual, 
and historical analyses.”9 To the extent that Agamben figures the Muselmann as an 
inexorable or inevitable outcome of Western subjectivity, his “conceptual 
fundamentalism” threatens to undermine an ethics that “begins where dignity ends.” 
In recent attempts to re-articulate and defend his methodology, Agamben argues 
that his paradigms are, in fact, an extension of Foucauldian genealogy. The Signature of 
All Things includes a fascinating reading of the paradigmatic operation of the Panopticon 
within Foucault’s analysis of disciplinary power. A “diagram of a mechanism of power 
reduced to its ideal form,” the Panopticon is not merely a “dream building” but an 
                                                
6 J.M. Bernstein, “Bare Life, Bearing Witness: Auschwitz and the Pornography of Horror” in 
Parallax 12.1 (2004): 14. 
7 Jean-Phillipe Deranty offers such a reading: “the connection between witnessing at Auschwitz 
and witnessing in general is supported by a strong immanent justification within Agamben’s 
work. Many of the disturbing aspects of Remnants of Auschwitz dissolve when the book is 
relocated in this more general context.” See Deranty, “Witnessing the Inhuman: Agamben or 
Merleau-Ponty?” in The South Atlantic Quarterly, 107:1 (Winter 2008): 68. 
8 “[…] the claim that […] the Muselmanner are paradigmatic figures of contemporary politics 
does not in itself justify the logical claim that the danger they represent is intrinsic to Western 
political thought, nor the claim that this means that the violence of biopolitical sovereignty is an 
inexorable or unavoidable outcome of that logic. For if history teaches us anything, it may simply 
be that nothing is inevitable.” See Catherine Mills, The Philosophy of Agamben (Stocksfield: 
Acumen, 2008), 87. 
9 Patton, “Agamben and Foucault on Biopower and Biopolitics” in Giorgio Agamben: 
Sovereignty and Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 218. 
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“epistemological figure.”10 Suggesting that the “great confinement” and the “care of the 
self” serve a similar epistemic function, Agamben maintains that, in Foucault’s work and 
his own, “paradigms establish a broader problematic context that they both constitute and 
make intelligible.”11 More specifically, paradigms do not illuminate the relation of 
particular and general but that of a singular case and its “knowability.’’ Moving “from 
singularity to singularity and, without ever leaving singularity, [the method of paradigms] 
transforms every singular case into an exemplar of a rule that can never be stated a 
priori” and that can never be composed a posteriori.12 In this movement, the paradigm 
both suspends and exposes its belonging to a group such that its exemplarity and 
singularity can not separated.13 In this emphasis on singularity over continuity, Agamben 
intends to embrace the ruptures of genealogy and to redirect concerns over the slippage 
between the Muselmann and the Western Subject. Nevertheless, without a “total 
abandonment” of the logic of origins, Agamben’s paradigms do not amount to or extend 
Foucauldian genealogy.14 Where Foucault’s exploration of the arts of government can be 
effectively described as “fine-grained analysis” that moves “from singularity to 
singularity,” Agamben’s paradigms yield broad strokes of “kinship” and continuity that 
originate in the Roman figure of homo sacer and unfold to a “final biopolitical 
substance”—the Muselmann. 
                                                
10 Agamben, The Signature of All Things (New York: Zone Books, 2009), 17; Foucault, 
Discipline and Punish, 205, 220-221. 
11 Giorgio Agamben, The Signature of All Things, 17. 
12 Ibid, 22. 
13 Ibid, 31. 
14 Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 
ed. Daniel Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 139-164. 
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For all of the provocation and offense of Remnants of Auschwitz, as an ethical 
response to the Muselmann or as a methodological application of the paradigm, the text’s 
attention to language and speech is nevertheless unique and invaluable within the 
literature on biopower and biopolitics. An uncommon treatment, Remnants of Auschwitz 
casts speech as a “precarious and fragile event,” one open to the movements of biopower 
and reflective of mutating political conditions; the contingency of the capacity of 
speech— and therefore, the possibility of the incapacity of speech—structures Levi’s 
paradox and the mute condition of the Muselmann. Recalling the diagnosis of the 
threshold of modernity put forth in The History of Sexuality—“for millennia, man 
remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for 
political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a 
living being in question”—the lacuna of survivor testimony betrays the lacuna of 
Foucault’s threshold.15 That is, in its attention to the contingency of speech, Remnants of 
Auschwitz can be understood as revising and completing Foucault’s diagnosis— “modern 
man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living- [and speaking-] being in 
question.” 
This chapter follows upon the foregoing analyses of “living-being in question” (in 
the previous chapters) to develop the Agambenian thought of “speaking-being in 
question.” Agamben, for his part, claims to have “stubbornly pursued only one strain of 
thought: what is the meaning of ‘there is language’; what is the meaning of ‘I speak’?” 16 
In Anglophone contexts, where Homo Sacer has dominated the reception of his work, the 
                                                
15 Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume One: An Introduction, 143. 
16 Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History: Essays on the Destruction of Experience (London: 
Verso, 1993), 6. 
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meaning of ‘there is life’ has perhaps overshadowed and obscured the questions 
Agamben describes as the “motivum” of his work.17 Drawing on a diverse selection of 
texts, including Language and Death, Infancy and History, The Idea of Prose and The 
Open, this chapter demonstrates that, like living-being, speaking-being is, borrowing a 
Foucauldian phrase, “fabricated in piecemeal fashion from alien forms.”18 Un-grounding 
speech and uncovering its production, I focus on Agamben’s critique of the metaphysics 
of Voice and his call to jam the anthropological machine. Metaphysical and 
anthropological machinations figure speech as a faculty, founding the human being only 
through the movement of negativity. In stubborn pursuit of its meaning Agamben finds 
that speaking-being is not a “natural given” but a “historical production,” one that 
emerges only through the biopolitical “removal” or exception of non-speaking and the 
non-human. 
In its attention to the fabrication of speaking-being in Agamben’s texts, this 
chapter also considers Agamben’s notion of “infancy” as an “experimentum linguae” that 
connects the meanings of ‘I speak’ and ‘there is language’. Drawing from the term’s 
Latin etymology —infans, to be unable or unwilling to speak, to be speechless or mute—
Agamben imagines infancy as an experience of muteness that conditions speech, a non-
speaking that is neither opposed to nor excluded from speaking; neither speaking nor 
non-speaking, the infant is a figure of “not not speaking” and a marker of the “pure 
potentiality” to experience the “taking place of language.” Although Agamben intends his 
experimentum linguae to “jam” the anthropological machine, the abstraction of infancy 
(from a developmental stage to a “pure potentiality”) seems to resonate with the very 
                                                
17 Ibid, 6. 
18 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 142. 
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metaphysical gestures and anthropological maneuvers under Agamben’s critique. As 
such, this chapter interrogates the “jamming” capacity of infancy. Here I suggest that 
Agamben’s evacuation (or “purification”) of relationality from the account of “not not 
speaking” undermines his evacuation of negativity from “speaking-being.” For Agamben, 
undergoing and bearing witness to infancy opens a new experience of language and 
serves as testimony for lives and voices excluded by the negative; witnessing Auschwitz 
involves “bear[ing] witness to a time in which human beings did not speak […] in which 
they were not yet human.”19 But as an ethical or communicative event infancy cannot do 
without relations with others without doing violence to others. If the Muselmann is a 
stark and painful marker of how biopower places living- and speaking-being “in 
question,” in-fancy is not yet a mode of “not not” responding to that question, on behalf 
of the Musselmann or others silenced by exclusion.  
 
From the Metaphysics of Voice to the Machination of Man 
 Agamben’s text Language and Death: The Place of Negativity begins with a 
Heideggerian thought drawn from the pages of On the Way to Language. Heidegger 
writes: 
Mortals are they who can experience death as death. Animals cannot do 
so. But animals cannot speak either. The essential relation between death 
and language flashes up before us, but remains still unthought. It can, 
however, beckon us toward the way in which the nature of language draws 
us into its concern, and so relates us to itself, in case death belongs 
together with what reaches out for us, touches us.20 
 
                                                
19 See Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 161-162. 
20 Quoted in Agamben, Language and Death: The Place of Negativity (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota, 1991), xi (my emphasis). 
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A thematic investigation of this “flash,” Language and Death explores the connection 
between mortality and speech, two “faculties” that have, in the metaphysical tradition, 
marked the essence of the human in its distinction from the non-human animal. Engaging 
with Heidegger and Hegel in equal turn, Agamben argues that language and death, 
“inasmuch as they open for humanity the most proper dwelling place, reveal this same 
dwelling place as always already permeated by and founded in negativity.”21 In this 
section I connect what Agamben calls “the place of negativity” in his critique of 
metaphysics to the production of living- and speaking-being in his account of the 
“anthropological machine.” Developed in Agamben’s 2002 text The Open: Man and 
Animal, the concept of the anthropological machine describes the historical production of 
man as speaking man according to the inclusive exclusion of the non-speaking non-man 
(animal, inhuman, etc). Over twenty years prior to the writing and publication of The 
Open, the “negativity” of Language and Death anticipates and participates in the logic of 
inclusive exclusion at work in Agamben’s anthropological machine. Together 
metaphysical negativity and anthropological exclusion give a picture of the production of 
speaking being, a fabrication that carries, in its center and as its correlate, non-speaking 
beings exposed to violence.  
To grasp the notion of metaphysical “negativity” we might begin by reading 
Heidegger’s Dasein as “Being-the-there,” a translation that, for Agamben, locates Dasein 
as the “place of the negative.” In the opening pages of Language and Death, Agamben 
isolates and emphasizes the “purely negative structure” of “Being-towards-death” as the 
ownmost possibility of Dasein. In that well-known formulation, Heidegger refers to the 
                                                
21 Ibid, xii. 
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anticipation of the possibility of the impossibility of existence. The authentic experience 
of this radical impossibility allows Dasein to reach its proper dwelling place;22 that is, in 
“Being-towards-death” Dasein accedes to “its most certain and unalterable possibility” in 
a manner that discloses the Da to existence.23 Agamben’s reading highlights the negative 
and constitutive character of this disclosure. Making much of Heidegger’s claim that “in 
anticipating the certainty of death, Dasein opens itself to a constant threat arising out of 
its own there,” Agamben stresses that the Da is the source of a radical and threatening 
negativity.24 Since Dasein is “its own there,” the negative permeates Dasein “from top to 
bottom” as a constitutive (not obscure or occasional) quality of “Being-the-there.” While 
Agamben’s translation of Dasein as “Being-the-there” foregrounds negativity, it does not 
yet clarify how the negative derives from Da in the first place.25 Why exactly is the Da 
threatening? What is that “something in the little word Da that nullifies and introduces 
negation into [Dasein]”?26 
In pursuit of an elucidatory analogy, Language and Death turns to an account that 
Agamben claims is “morphologically and semantically connected with Da”— Hegel’s 
discussion of the demonstrative pronoun diese (this) in the Phenomenology of Spirit. 
Spurred by Hegel’s poetic recounting of the Eleusinian mystery and the tale’s 
reappearance in the Phenomenology, Agamben connects diese, alongside da, to the place 
of the negative. The “Eleusinian mystery” is the story of an Ancient Greek cult that 
enforced a code of silence upon its initiates, forbidding them to speak of the group’s rites 
                                                
22 Ibid, 1-2. 
23 Ibid, 4. 
24 Heidegger, Being and Time, 265. 
25 Agamben, Language and Death, 5. 
26 Ibid, 5. 
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and revelations.27 In a poem dedicated to Hölderlin, Hegel dwells on this “ineffable 
sentiment,” writing of silent Eleusinian priests that preserve “not one note of the sacred 
initiations” and of scholars that seek in vain for the group’s lofty meanings. In the 
Phenomenology, Hegel returns to the theme of the unspeakable in a discussion of sense-
certainty’s failure to fully grasp objects.  As a form of knowledge, sense-certainty 
attempts to embrace the pure immediate being of things; it asks, “What is the This?”28 But 
for Hegel, “any attempt to express sense-certainty is to experience the impossibility of 
saying what one means.”29 To say “this piece of paper” fails to reach or capture the 
sensory this that it means to say. As Agamben emphasizes, negativity inheres in all 
attempts to “take-the-Diese.” Every this contains a not-this; where the Eleusinian mystery 
is guarded by the silence of its initiates, in sense-certainty, language itself guards the 
ineffable. The “morphological” and “semantic” association of Heidegger’s Da and 
Hegel’s Diese lies, then, in the involvement, in each case, of a not-. In Being-towards-
death the Da is disclosed to existence only through the experience of the possibility of 
not-Da. In sense-certainty, each act of saying Diese carries not-Diese at its center.  
For Agamben, the “casual” association of Da and Diese deepens when we 
consider their common grammatical status as “shifters” and their shared participation in 
the structure of Voice. Classified as demonstrative pronouns, Da and Diese perform the 
special function of “deixis” or indication (in Latin, “demonstratio”).30 That is, before 
referring to an object, pronouns like ‘I,’ ‘you,’ ‘this,’ and ‘there’ indicate the instance of 
utterance.  As Emile Benveniste observes of the personal pronoun, I does not signify a 
                                                
27 Mills, 13. 
28 Agamben, Language and Death, 10. 
29 Ibid, 11. 
30 Ibid, 19. 
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subject outside of discourse but rather “the person who utters the present instance of 
discourse containing I.”31 Through indication, the I and other demonstrative pronouns act 
as “shifters,” grammatical units that are “contained in every code and that cannot be 
defined outside of a relation to the message.”32 Shifters are immanent to discourse, 
“empty signs” that become “full” when assumed in the instance of utterance. In effect, 
they “permit the passage between langue and parole,” making possible what is said and 
signified (parole) and indicating langue as that which transcends (and is presupposed by) 
parole. As Agamben describes it, shifters like Diese and Da allow “that experience of 
language that, in every speech act, grasps the disclosure of that dimension, and in all 
speech, experiences above all the ‘marvel’ that language exists.”33  That is, in virtue of 
their indication and shifting, language is “presupposed in everything said”; preceding and 
exceeding the event of parole is the taking place of langue.34  
Given their special grammatical function, Da and Diese are not simply 
“morphological” or “semantic” associates; Dasein and das Diese nehmen both signify “to 
be the taking place of language, to seize the instance of discourse.”35 To be clear, though, 
it is only by linking Da and Diese to the “supreme shifter”—“Voice”—that the “marvel” 
of their indication betrays their “common essence” in metaphysical negativity. The work 
                                                
31 Quoted in Ibid, 23. 
32 Ibid, 24. 
33 Ibid, 25. 
34 Daniel Heller-Roazen, “Editor’s Introduction” in Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy 
by Giorgio Agamben (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 4. Heller-Roazen helpfully 
explains why the presuppositional structure of language also entails that language cannot say 
itself. “Only because they always presuppose the fact that there is language are statements 
necessarily incapable of saying the event of language, of naming the word’s power to name; only 
because language, as actual discourse, always presupposes itself as having taken place can 
language not say itself. Preceding and exceeding every proposition is not something unsayable 
and ineffable but, rather, an event presupposed in every utterance, a factum linguae to which all 
actual speech incessantly, necessarily bears witness.”  
35 Agamben, Language and Death, 31. 
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of indication relies on the voice that speaks the taking place of language. For example, 
Benveniste’s claim that I signifies “the person who utters the present instance of 
discourse containing I” involves a “contemporaneity” that can only be accomplished 
through the “voice” that speaks the present instance of discourse containing I. But 
according to Agamben, “just as the I is not simply the psychosomatic individual from 
which the sound I projects,” the voice is not simply the “mere sonorous flux by the 
phonic apparatus.” While the voice (phoné) can “index the individual who emits it,” a 
different, more ontological Voice refers to the instance of discourse as such.36 This Voice, 
which is capitalized to distinguish it from voice (phoné), is the “originary articulation of 
human language.”  Importantly for Agamben, Voice presupposes voice as removed, 
disclosing the taking place of language (langue) and the instance of utterance (parole). 
That is, in a gesture of inclusive exclusion, voice is presupposed in every act of speech as 
excluded by Voice. “No-longer (voice) and not-yet (meaning),” Voice is the supreme 
shifter of the metaphysical tradition, the indeterminate negative ground of language and 
parole.37  
 In the case of Heidegger and Hegel’s shifters, Agamben contends that, captured 
in negativity, “’Taking-the-This’ and ‘Being-the-there’ are possible only through the 
experience of the Voice, that is, the experience of the taking place of language in the 
                                                
36 Agamben also refers to phoné as “mere sound,” “animal voice,” “animal phone,” or “ontic 
voice.” 
37 According to Agamben, Voice helps “measure the acuteness” of Derrida’s critique of 
metaphysics and “the distance that remains to be covered” in order to surpass it. While Derrida 
was right that “metaphysics is that reflection that places the voice as origin” Agamben claims that 
“it is also true that this voice is, from the beginning, conceived as removed.” Only by recognizing 
the removal of voice can metaphysics and negativity can be overcome. (Agamben questionably 
attributes the goal to “overcoming” and “surpassing” metaphysics to Derrida). See Agamben, 
Language and Death, 38-40. 
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removal of the voice.”38 Such a claim finds a straightforward demonstration in the 
Hegelian text where speaking the-this contains, in each case, a not-this (voice removed). 
Moreover, the structure of Voice also extends beyond these Eleusinian moments. For 
instance, Agamben locates the Voice in Hegel’s discussion of spirit’s emergence in 
consciousness through language. There, in the Jena lectures, Hegel describes how animal 
voice is differentiated from, and transforms into, human language as the voice of 
consciousness. According to Hegel, “every animal finds a voice in its violent death; it 
expresses itself as a removed-self.”39 That is, the animal does not have meaningful speech 
but, in finding a voice in death, it “expresses and preserves itself as dead.” Importantly, 
then, animal voice is not empty or lacking significance. It bears the trace of death. For 
Hegel, only this trace allows human language to become meaningful language. Language 
articulates and arrests animal voice and acts as a “tomb of the animal voice that guards it 
[the trace] and holds firm its ownmost essence: ‘that which is most terrible,’ ‘death.’”40 
Through the structure of Voice and in a clear exhibition of its negativity, Hegel’s account 
of human language includes animal voice (or the voice of death) as removed.  
While the removal of voice by Voice appears in unmistakable forms in Hegel’s 
texts, it is less clear how Voice structures Heidegger’s Being-the-There. In Being and 
Time, language is not grounded in or derived from animal voice, an anthropogenetic turn 
of thought that Heidegger aims, precisely, to overcome. Instead, Dasein is located in the 
place of language, Da, “without being brought there by its own voice.” Pursuing a radical 
separation of language and voice, the Stimmung of anxiety reveals to Dasein not a voice 
                                                
38 Ibid, 35. 
39 Quoted in Ibid, 45. 
40 Quoted in Ibid, 46. 
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removed (which would bear, as a trace, the having-been of voice) but a silence “lacking 
any further trace of a voice.”41 However, according to Agamben, Heidegger’s discussion 
of the call of conscience brings his radical thought to “a limit that he is unable to 
overcome.”42 Where anxiety revealed a silence beyond any trace of voice, the call of 
conscience “reverses” the empty silence into Voice. Neither a vocal offering (phoné) nor 
propositional discourse (parole), the call is a pure “giving to be understood,” the “pure 
intention to signify without any concrete event of signification.”43 On Agamben’s 
reading, the possibility to understand the call of conscience is more original than the 
experience of empty silence because it reveals Dasein to be the “negative foundation of 
its own negativity.” Only through the call of conscience can Dasein rise above throwness 
and authentically think death, which Heidegger here defines as an existential “wanting-
to-have-a-conscience.” While Heidegger radicalizes the negative ground of language, the 
call of conscience effects a reversal into silent Voice that is “ultimately analogous to the 
guarding of the ineffable in language posited by Hegel.”44 Beyond the presupposition of 
voice (as removed), the call of conscience confirms the inextricable connection between 
Voice and death.45  
                                                
41 Ibid, 57. 
42 Ibid, 58.  
43 Ibid, 59. 
44 Mills, 20. 
45 Supporting this reading of the call of conscience in Being and Time, Agamben suggests that the 
theme of Voice is “completed” in “What is Metaphysics?” There, Heidegger claims that the 
Stimmung of anxiety can only be understood through a soundless voice that “attunes us (stimmt) 
to the terror of the abyss.” Further, Heidegger describes the experience of Being as the experience 
of a voice without sound, through which human language is born “as an echo.”  In light of this 
echo, it seems that Heidegger falls back on the horizon of metaphysics that he sought to 
overcome. For Agamben, the “Heideggerian program for conceiving of language beyond every 
phone has not been maintained.” See Agamben, Language and Death, 60-61. 
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Agamben’s notion of infancy as an experimentum linguae aims to overcome the 
limits of Heidegger’s radical thought and, ultimately, to sever the connection between 
language and negativity that dominates the metaphysical tradition. For Agamben, infancy 
is an experience of muteness that does not “reverse itself” into Voice or fall back into the 
horizon of negativity. Before examining infancy more closely, we do well to reiterate and 
re-approach the need for its subversion of violence and the negative. According to 
Language and Death, negativity emerges through the operation of removal in which 
Voice presupposes voice in every act of speech as removed. As the negative foundation 
of language, Voice is marked by an inclusive exclusion that initiates and perpetuates 
violence. As Agamben puts it simply, “the foundation of violence is the violence of the 
foundation.” In Homo Sacer, he proceeds to link the metaphysics of voice to the 
production of bare life.46  
The question ‘In what way does the living being have language?’ 
corresponds exactly to the question ‘In what way does bare life dwell in 
the polis?’ The living being has logos by taking away and conserving its 
own voice in it, even as it dwells in the polis by letting its own bare life be 
excluded, as an exception, within it. Politics therefore appears as the truly 
fundamental structure of Western metaphysics insofar as it occupies the 
threshold on which the relation between the living being and the logos is 
realized. In the politicization of bare life—the metaphysical task par 
excellence—the humanity of living man is decided.47 
 
The passage from phoné to logos corresponds to the passage from zoe to bios, the voice 
(as removed) corresponds to homo sacer; by “taking away and conserving” voice/zoe, the 
living being has language and dwells in the polis. Drawing attention to the political 
                                                
46At the end of Language and Death Agamben claims that “it is the sacrificial violence [of Voice] 
that sacrifice presupposes in order to repeat it and regulate it within its structure” and more 
generally, that “the foundation of violence is the violence of the foundation.” Ibid, 104. 
47 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 8. 
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character of the threshold between phoné and logos, zoe and bios, Agamben claims that 
each passage decides “the humanity of living man” in a manner that abandons some lives 
and voices to violence.  
 While Agamben’s notion of infancy aims to subvert the metaphysical task par 
excellence, his text The Open re-approaches the decision on “the humanity of living man” 
through the anthropological task of differentiating human and animal. Through the 
concept of the anthropological machine, The Open helps illustrate how the passages from 
voice to language, living being to political being, intersect one another. Agamben begins 
The Open with an image that, for its mystery, rivals the Eleusinian poem. Found in a 
Hebrew Bible in the Ambrosian Library in Milan, the image depicts “the messianic 
banquet of the righteous on the last day.”48 Strangely, though, the righteous are 
represented with animal heads— “the eagle’s fierce beak, the red head of the ox and the 
lion’s head”— instead of human faces. Provoked, Agamben takes the image to suggest 
that “on the last day, the relations between animals and men will take on a new form, and 
that man himself will be reconciled with his animal nature.”49 To imagine a new relation 
between animals and men or a new (beaked) form of the human is to acknowledge the 
potential mutation of those categories. Consequently, Agamben introduces the notion of 
the “anthropological machine” to describe the mutating production of human-animal 
difference and the act of removal by which “the speaking man [attempts to] place his own 
muteness outside himself, as already and not yet human.”50 Like the relation of voice and 
                                                
48 Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 1. 
49 Ibid, 2-3. 
50 Ibid, 35. 
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language in Language and Death, the removals of the anthropological machine take the 
form of inclusive exclusions, conserving the animal other in the heart of the human. 
 Much of The Open proceeds as a deconstructive treatment of philosophical and 
anthropological attempts to properly assign language to man over and against the animal. 
In each case, language is un-grounded, revealing the operation of the anthropological 
machine. For example, in the Aristotelian text language-use distinguishes the human as 
“political animal” from mere animality and this capacity originates in the “gift of 
speech.”51 However, beyond an ambiguous reference to “Nature,” Aristotle does not 
identify the giver of this gift, nor does he explain why humans, as opposed to other 
animal species, receive it. Although he identifies the “rational soul” as distinctive of 
humanity and certainly positions rationality as a condition of speech, lest the question be 
begged by referring back to language, the origin of the rational soul-as-gift is caught in 
similar mysteries. The ambiguous origin of the “gift of speech” suggests the work of the 
anthropological machine in the Aristotelian text and his writings on animals betray it 
outright. When Aristotle famously defines humans as “political animals,” he writes that 
“man is more of a political animal than bees and other gregarious animals.”52  Any gifted 
givenness of human exceptionality is challenged by Aristotle’s own recognition that the 
communicative and communal life of “bees and other gregarious animals.” Specifically, 
the Aristotelian text betrays the operation of a pre-modern version of the anthropological 
machine that, according to Agamben, produces the non-man through the “humanization 
of the animal.”53   
                                                
51 Aristotle, The Politics, 3. 
52 Ibid, 3. 
53 Ibid, 37. 
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 The Open also uncovers the operation of the anthropological machine in 
evolutionary accounts of the origin of language. Here Agamben finds and follows an 
anxiety, in Darwin’s texts and others, over a pre-linguistic stage of human evolution—the 
“ape-man.” Agamben quotes Steinhal as he reckons with this anxiety and the 
contradictions it introduces into evolutionary theory: 
We have invented a stage of man that precedes language. But of course 
this is only a fiction; for language is so necessary and natural for the 
human being, that without it man can neither truly exist nor be thought of 
as existing. Either man has language, or he simply is not. On the other 
hand—and this justifies the fiction—language nevertheless cannot be 
regarded as already inherent in the human soul […] it is a stage of the 
soul’s development and requires a deduction from the preceding stages 
But why the human soul alone builds this bridge, why man alone and not 
the animal progresses through language from animality to humanity [?]54 
 
According to Agamben (and in the admission of Steinhal several years later), 
evolutionary theory is unable to answer the question it poses itself regarding the relation 
between the animal and the “animal-man.”55 That is, Darwin and his readers fail to 
explain why the capacity of speech follows from the evolution of homo sapiens but not 
from the evolution of other animals. The distinctively human nature of the bridge from a 
pre-linguistic to a linguistic stage of existence remains caught in Steinhal’s working 
“fiction.” As a machination of the anthropological machine, the animal-man of evolution 
represents a more modern fabrication, one that produces the non-man through the 
animalization of the human (rather than the humanization of the animal). 
                                                
54 Quoted in Ibid, 35. 
55 Later Steinhal will write: “I then sought to discover the origin of language in man. But in this 
way, I contradiction my presupposition: that is, that the origin of language and the origin of man 
were one and the same; I set man up first and then had him produce language.” Ibid, 37. 
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 The ancient and modern versions of the anthropological machine each draw on 
the logic of “inclusive exclusion.” Agamben defines the machine as a function that 
includes by exclusion and excludes by inclusion:  
the machine necessarily functions by means of an exclusion (which is also 
always already a capturing) and an inclusion (which is also always already 
an exclusion). Indeed, precisely because the human is already presupposed 
every time, the machine actually produces a kind of state of exception, a 
zone of indeterminacy in which the outside is nothing but the exclusion of 
an inside and the inside is in turn only the inclusion of an outside.56  
 
The humanized animal (“the man-ape, the enfant sauvage or Homo ferus, but also […] 
the slave, the barbarian”) and the animalized human (“the Jew or the neomort and 
overcomatose person”) are figures of this “zone of indeterminacy” or “state of exception” 
and the violence that it circulates and supports. “The animal-man and the man-animal are 
the two sides of a single fracture, which cannot be mended from either side.”57 Like these 
anthropological machinations, Voice shifts and divides animal voice and human 
language. In fact, the negativity of Language and Death seems to coincide with the 
notion of the state of exception that Agamben develops in his later work and employs in 
The Open. As an illustration, consider the resonance between the machine’s exceptional 
logic of inclusive exclusion and the presupposition of voice as removed in the structure of 
Voice. The removal of voice is “always already a capturing” of a silence (or removed 
voice) in the act of speaking; the “silence” that is included in the act of speaking is “also 
always already an exclusion” of voice. So described, we might liken the structure of 
Voice to a “metaphysical machine,” one that is “from the beginning” taken up in 
anthropological strategies that produce states of exception and bare life.  
                                                
56 Ibid, 37. 
57 Ibid, 36. 
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 An analysis of Agamben’s extended engagement with Heidegger in The Open 
more directly addresses the relationship between metaphysics and the anthropological 
machine. In this complicated engagement, Agamben focuses on The Fundamental 
Concepts of Metaphysics and Heidegger’s attempt, therein, to define the world-relation of 
humans and animals. As is well known, in that text Heidegger famously describes the 
animal as “poor in world” in a manner distinct from both Dasein and non-living material 
objects. Whereas Dasein is “world-forming” and the stone is fundamentally “without 
world,” the animal is “poor in world” in the sense of deprivation, that is, in the sense of 
possible, yet denied, access to being.58 Specifically, the animal’s mode of relation is a 
“captivation” with its environment wherein the animal is paradoxically and respectively 
open and closed to beings and being-as-such; while animal captivation is an intense form 
of openness riveted to beings, the captivated animal cannot “disconceal its disinhibitor” 
and is closed being-as-such.59 By contrast, Heidegger argues that Dasein can suspend the 
relation of environmental captivation and open onto being and world.   
 On Agamben’s reading, the account of profound boredom in Fundamental 
Concepts of Metaphysics reveals the close proximity, rather than abyssal distance, of 
Dasein and the animal. In profound boredom, Dasein is riveted to “something that refuses 
itself” in a manner analogous to the animal captivated by something unrevealed.60 For 
Heidegger, this refusal refers to “possibilities that lie inactive,” possibilities that, as 
unutilized, “leave us in the lurch” of boredom. By being delivered over to inactive 
                                                
58 Martin Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1995), 177.  
59 Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, 59. 
60 As Agamben puts it, in boredom “Dasein is delivered over to something that refuses itself, 
exactly as the animal, in its captivation, is exposed in something unrevealed.” Ibid, 65. 
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possibilities in boredom, Dasein is compelled to break towards the distinctively human 
experience of pure possibility.61 Agamben makes much of the “being-compelled”/“being 
held in limbo”/“being held in suspense” that characterizes this second stage profound 
boredom. To be compelled towards pure possibility is simply to suspend the captivation 
with inactive possibilities. Likening boredom to a shifter, Agamben figures it as, 
effectively, the passage from animal captivation to human world. “Profound boredom 
appears as the metaphysical operator in which the passage from poverty in world to 
world, from animal environment to human world, is realized.”62 Instead of a radical abyss 
between the human and the animal (in which “the open” opens “beyond the limits of the 
animal environment, and unrelated to it”) Agamben uncovers a close proximity of man 
and animal (in which “the open” opens “by means of a suspension of the animal relation 
with the disinhibitor”).63 In what would appear to be profoundly un-Heideggerian 
anthropogenetic turn of phrase, Agamben defines profound boredom as the “becoming 
Da-sein of the living man.”64 Boredom is a metaphysico-anthropological operator in 
which the question of openness to world and being is folded into the differentiation of 
human and animal.  In another operation of inclusive exclusion, “the jewel set at the 
center of the human world and its clearing is nothing but animal captivation.”65  
 Agamben’s critique of metaphysical negativity and anthropological machinations 
operate in close proximity because they address a single, albeit large, target—the 
                                                
61 In Heidegger’s words “to such coming to be left in the lurch by beings’ telling refusal of 
themselves as a whole there simultaneously belongs our being impelled toward this utmost 
extremity that properly makes possible Dasein as such. We have thereby determined the specific 
being held in limbo of the third form: being impelled toward the originary making-possible of 
Dasein as such.” Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 144. 
62 Agamben, The Open, 68. 
63 Ibid, 68. 
64 Ibid, 68. 
65 Ibid, 68. 
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inclusive exclusion of voice/s through in the grounding of speaking-being. As we have 
seen, each turn involves critical movements through the Heideggerian text. In Language 
and Death, Agamben find the structure of Voice in Heidegger’s account of the call of 
conscience; in The Open, Agamben presents a machinating picture of Dasein as an 
animal that “has awakened from its own captivation to its own captivation.”66 But 
alongside these critiques, Agamben also makes use of the very limits that Heidegger is 
unable to overcome. Agamben shares Heidegger’s desire to stop rather than re-function 
metaphysical and anthropological machinations. At the conclusion of The Open, he 
announces that 
render[ing] inoperative the machine that governs our conception of man 
will therefore mean no longer to seek new—more effective or more 
authentic—articulations, but rather to show the central emptiness, the 
hiatus that—within man—separates man and animal, and to risk ourselves 
in this emptiness: the suspension of the suspension, Shabbat of both 
animal and man.67 
 
To render the machine inoperative is not to redirect its fabrication but to abandon its 
work altogether. In all of its Heideggerian resonance, Agamben’s concept of infancy—an 
experience of language without Voice, an alternative “double negativity” that opens unto 
pure potentiality—aims to take the “risk” of suspending the suspension. In this way, 
Agamben proposes infancy as a mute challenge to the structure of Voice, the 
anthropological machine and the violence in which they each participate—the production 
a speaking (human) being that removes or inclusively excludes voice/s.  
 
Infancy, Animality and the Limits of Language 
                                                
66 Ibid, 70. 
67 Ibid, 92. 
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 Agamben introduces the concept of infancy to articulate a new experience of 
language beyond the removal of voice by Voice.  The concept draws on an essay written 
four years prior to Language and Death, “Infancy and History: An Essay on the 
Destruction of Experience” (1978), in which Agamben diagnoses the poverty of modern 
experience. There he claims that modern man’s “average day contains nothing that can be 
translated into experience” and argues that this poverty is reflected, at the level of theory, 
in the split of the subject of knowledge and the subject of experience.68  In a description 
that could have easily appeared in the pages of Kristeva’s The Sense and Nonsense of 
Revolt, Agamben writes that “experience has its necessary correlation not in knowledge 
but in authority—that is to say, the power of words and narration; and no one now seems 
to wield sufficient authority to guarantee the truth of an experience and if they do, it does 
not in the least occur to them that their own authority has its roots in an experience.”69 
While the next chapter will take up the connection between Kristeva and Agamben’s 
accounts of “the power of words and narration,” here Kristevan resonances retreat with 
Agamben’s introduction of infancy as an experimentum langue. For Agamben, infancy is 
an ontological concept, one evacuated of psychic/psychological content and mobilized to 
escape the structure of Voice and the machination of anthropology. In this section I 
explore the jamming capacity of the infantile “negation of negation” and “suspension of 
suspension.” I argue that ontological infancy is not only de-psychologized (in ways that 
Agamben intends) but also politicized (in ways that he does not acknowledge). Defining 
infancy as human infancy and abstracting its potentiality from relations-with-others, 
Agamben removes voice/s—those of women and non-human animals— often silenced in 
                                                
68 Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History: On the Destruction of Experience, 15. 
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humanist metaphysics and anthropology. While infancy helps mark the production of 
speaking being, ontological infancy undermines Agamben’s attempt to jam exclusionary 
and silencing productions of speaking-being. 
 In his characteristic play with etymology, Agamben’s concept of infancy draws 
on an archaic Latin term in-fans meaning “to be unable or unwilling to speak, to be silent 
or speechless.”70 Although tied to the figure of the infant child as one who cannot speak, 
Agamben is careful to emphasize that “in-fancy is not a simple given whose 
chronological site might be isolated, nor is it like an age or psychosomatic state which a 
psychology or a paleo-anthropology could construct as a human fact independent of 
language.”71 The archaic meaning of infancy points beyond the term’s indication of a 
developmental stage and toward its revelation of the contingent character of human 
speech. Unlike the “natural voice” of non-human animals, human infants do not have a 
given voice. According to Agamben, “animals are not in fact denied language; on the 
contrary, they are always and totally language. In them la voix sacrée de la terre ingénue 
(the sacred voice of the unknowing earth) […] knows no breaks or interruptions. Animals 
do not enter language, they are already inside it.”72 By contrast, the human ‘wordless’ 
experience of infancy is an ontological break or interruption that conditions the 
possibility of speech. Coexisting with a language that appropriates it “in each instance to 
produce the individual as subject,” infancy is a mute undergoing constitutive of the 
(human) speaking subject.73 To speak is to be appropriated by language and alienated 
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71 Agamben, Infancy and History, 4. 
72 Ibid, 59. 
73 Ibid, 55. 
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from infancy, not as a developmental trauma but as an ontological condition carried 
within every act of speech.74 
 If infancy is a kind of muteness internal to the act of speaking, Agamben is 
careful to distinguish it from a genre of the ineffable guarded by the structure of Voice. In 
order to counter the movement of negativity, Agamben emphasizes that infancy is a 
“sacrifice of sacrifice” that “touches” the “thing itself” of language. While Voice operates 
by “inclusive exclusion” infancy expresses the “negation of negation” that renders its 
muteness as a “not not speaking” (or “in in-fari”).75 Speechless but not without relation to 
language, infancy reflects a “pure” experience of language itself without speech. As we 
saw in his deep appropriation of the theory of shifters, Agamben maintains that langue 
has an anonymous and pre-suppositional character with respect to parole; speech 
presupposes that there is language and language is presupposed in everything that is said. 
As Daniel Heller-Roazen puts it, “preceding and exceeding every proposition is not 
something unsayable and ineffable but, rather, an event presupposed in every utterance, a 
factum linguae to which all actual speech necessarily bears witness.”76 When infancy 
“touches” the “thing itself” of language it touches not an ineffable or removed thing 
behind langue. For Agamben, “the thing itself is not a thing; it is the very sayability, the 
very openness at issue in language, which, in language, we always presuppose and 
forget.”77 To touch or engage the thing itself is not to encounter the site of unspeakable 
sacrifice or ineffable removal but rather the site of potentiality as sayability. 
                                                
74 Mills, 23 
75 Ibid, 33. 
76 Daniel Heller-Roazen, “Editor’s Introduction: ‘To Read What Was Never Written.’” 4. 
77 Agamben, Potentialities, 35. 
 105 
 Agamben’s unique account of potentiality is central to his claim that “not not 
speaking” opens infancy unto pure potentiality rather than violent indeterminacy. Drawn 
from an idiosyncratic reading of Book Theta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Agamben’s 
potentiality extends the logic of double negation to potentiality’s relation to privation and 
actuality. According to Agamben, the essence of potentiality is maintained in relation to 
privation. “To be potential means: to be one’s own lack, to be in relation to one’s own 
incapacity. Beings that exist in the mode of potentiality are capable of their own 
impotentiality; and only in this way do they become potential. They can be because they 
are in relation to their own non-Being.”78 If potentiality is maintained in relation to 
impotentiality, the capacity of speech maintains itself in relation to the incapacity of 
speech. So described, potentiality provides the metaphysical structure for Agamben’s 
claim that every act of speaking maintains a relation to time without speech (infancy) and 
vice versa. In effect, the double negation “not not speaking” defines infancy through the 
thought of the persistent relation of potential and impotential . With respect to actuality, 
then, Agamben claims that potentiality “does not disappear in actuality; on the contrary, 
it preserves itself as such in actuality […] potentiality, so to speak, survives actuality and, 
in this way, gives itself to itself.” 79  Where traditional metaphysics introduces the 
negative, the threat of nullification between actuality and potentiality, Agamben finds a 
persistent relation. Daniel Heller-Roazen describes the “gift of itself to itself” in terms 
that emphasize, again, a double negation  
                                                
78 Ibid, 183. 
79 “[…] if a potentiality to not-be originally belongs to all potentiality, then there is truly 
potentiality only where the potentiality to not-be does not lag behind actuality but passes fully 
into it as such.” Ibid, 184. 
 106 
at this point, actuality reveals itself to be simply a potential not to be (or 
do) turned back upon itself, capable of not not being and, in this way, of 
granting the existence of what is actuality […] in the movement of the 
‘gift of itself to itself,’ potentiality and actuality, what is capable and what 
is actual, what is possible and what is real, can no longer strictly be 
distinguished.80 
 
Potentiality is not exhausted or extinguished in actuality. Understood as a potentiality 
“turned back on itself,” actuality maintains a relation to potentiality that “survives” and 
“preserves itself.” Agamben’s account of infancy extends this thought in order to 
disengage the potential to speak from the removal of voice and (again, contra-Voice) to 
affirm sayability instead of ineffability. Infancy is not exhausted in speaking but rather 
speaking is infancy “giving itself to itself.”  
 Given the picture of infantile potentiality provided by double negation, 
Agamben’s notion of infancy seems strikingly self-relational. Indeed the relations of 
potentiality enumerated above are in each case relations of “one’s own”—“beings that 
exist in the mode of potentiality are capable of their own impotentiality, ” potentiality 
“preserves itself in actuality” “giving itself to itself,” “turning back on itself.”81 
Agamben’s writings on the “axolotl” in The Idea of Prose and “For a Philosophy of 
Infancy” give a helpful illustration of the auto-directedness of infancy. Agamben takes a 
recurrent interest in the axolotl, an amphibian native to the freshwater lakes of Mexico, 
because of its “stubborn infantilism” or neoteny.82 While other amphibians lose juvenile 
traits (gills) in order to develop adult traits (lungs and reproductive capacities), the axolotl 
maintains juvenile and adult traits alongside one another. According to Agamben, 
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81 Agamben, Potentialities, 182-183 (my emphasis). 
82 Agamben, The Idea of Prose (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 95. 
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insights drawn from the life of the axolotl have helped revise understandings of human 
evolution. Humans are now said to evolve, not from individual adult primates but from a 
young primate with premature reproductive capacities.83 Thus, “traits that are transitory in 
primates have in humans become definitive, somehow bringing to pass, in flesh and bone, 
the type of the eternal child.”84 Drawing on the axolotl’s stubborn infantilism, Agamben 
proceeds to imagine this eternal child as “abandoned to its own state of infancy, and so 
little specialized and so totipotent that it rejects any specific destiny and any determined 
environment in order to hold onto its immaturity and helplessness.”85 Unbound from and 
undetermined by any destiny or environ, the neotenic child is thrown into “the pre-
eminent setting of the possible [possibile] and of the potential [potenziale] […] What 
characterizes the infant is that it is its own potentiality [potenza], it lives its own 
possibility [possibilità].”86 Axolotl-inspired infancy is shot through with a potentiality 
that it gives to itself, being and living its own potenza and possibilita.  
 While the child is a common figure of dependency on others, Agamben’s eternal-
child appears, in a hyperbolic self-relational fashion, to hold or choose its own 
helplessness. As a contrast, the independence of Agamben’s immature infant can be 
considered alongside the dependence of Judith Butler and Julia Kristeva’s recent writings 
on “vulnerability.” Introduced in her important text Precarious Life, Butler’s notion of 
“primary vulnerability” describes the infantile “condition of being laid bare from the 
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start,” of being “given over to the touch of the other.”87 For Butler, primary vulnerability 
is an experience of exposure that reflects and conditions social attachments; “without 
seeing how this primary condition is exploited and exploitable, thwarted and denied […] 
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to understand how humans suffer from 
oppression.”88 In La haine et le pardon, Kristeva outlines an alternative relational 
vulnerability, one that is sited in the specifically speaking body.89 According to Kristeva, 
vulnerability lies in the “crossroad” of “biology/language” and is “integral to the identity 
of the human species and the singularity of the speaking subject.”90 Failing to 
acknowledge the vulnerable junction of bodies and words encourages “rejections caused 
by race, social origin or religious differences [that have] taken over the place once 
occupied by charity.”91 As the absent fourth term of Enlightenment humanism, Kristevan 
vulnerability “inflects” liberty, equality, and fraternity “towards a concern for sharing.”  
  Agamben’s auto-relational independent infancy appears to be an inversion of 
Butler and Kristeva’s accounts of relational dependent vulnerability. In denying or 
thwarting that condition, Agamben performs exclusions that Butler and Kristeva link to 
its disavowal. Abstracted from exposure to others, the axolotl-inspired eternal child is 
disconnected from the social attachments and losses of others. In fact Agamben’s only 
mention of infantile relations-with-others is a reference to the “vain” misguided project of 
parenting. There Agamben claims that, because the child “risks its whole life” in play, “it 
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is in vain that grown-ups attempt to check this immediate coincidence of the child’s life 
and possibility, confining it to limited times and places: the nursery, codified games, 
playtime, and fairy-tales.”92 More dramatically and completing the abstraction of infancy 
from vulnerable exposure, Agamben maintains that the child “escapes” the violent 
production of bare life because 
it adheres so closely to its physiological life that it becomes indiscernible 
from it. (This is the true sense of the experiment on the possible that we 
mentioned earlier.) Similar in this respect to a woman’s life, the life of a 
child is ungraspable, not because it transcends toward an other world, but 
because it adheres to this world and to its body in a way that adults find 
intolerable.93  
 
In an unfortunate and suspicious reduction of the child and the woman to physiological 
life, Agamben deepens the picture of infancy as auto-relational and independent. More 
specifically, by figuring the child as in a certain sense its own mother, Agamben obscures 
the child’s dependent relation to others yet reveals its dependence on maternal sacrifice. 
In effect, Agamben’s comment suggests that the reduction of relations to auto-relations 
supports the reduction of woman and child to ungraspable physiology and vice versa. 
Like Heidegger, Agamben’s “thought reaches a limit that he is unable to overcome.” The 
escape of infancy from the structure of bare life produces bare life in its own turn.  
 Following Agamben’s analogies and Butler and Kristeva’s concerns, what would 
happen if the figure of the child were read systematically as the figure of the woman, if 
infancy were, in each case, substituted with maternity? Like infancy, maternity is 
involved in language development; early maternal relations support the development of 
symbolic capacities and are preserved in the act of speaking. Further, like being a child, 
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giving birth involves a movement of potentiality. For instance, while Agamben describes 
the infant’s potentiality as “totipotent,” actual totipotent cells develop only in the 
maternal body, after cell fertilization and before the development of the zygote into 
specialized multi- or pluri-potent cells; in a process that can be described as maternity 
“giving itself to itself,” totipotent cells produce not only the fetus but also placental and 
other extra-embryonic cells. Such translations of infancy into maternity are simple if not 
straightforward because, in Agamben’s text, the child is already a mother-child and the 
mother already a child-mother. Recall that Agamben models infancy on the life of the 
axolotl, a neotenic figure that links infantilism and reproductivity. Part of the ontological 
and evolutionary story of Agamben’s infancy, the axolotl is an eternal child that can also 
give birth, the animal coincidence of mother and infant that challenges attempts to fully 
distinguish one from the other. As a consequence, even the above translation (of infancy 
into maternity) tends toward reversals. For instance, much symbolic support takes place 
prior to the separation of infant ego and maternal body and, while totipotent cells develop 
and divide in women’s bodies, they are also indeterminate in the sense of being not-
simply the mother’s and not-yet the fetus’s.94 Given the kind of indeterminacy easily set 
into motion between woman and child, it seems that maternity is included in Agamben’s 
concept of infancy by way of exclusion, the very operation that the infantile experience 
of language was to overcome. In this way, infancy reflects what Emma Jones has called 
the “andrological machine,” the capacity of humanist metaphysics to separate the human 
(infant) “from ‘everything else’, everything unfigurable, be it woman, animal, non-white 
                                                
94 Interestingly, since embryonic stem cells are not totipotent but pluripotent (and therefore 
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person, monster, and so on.”95 The independence and auto-relational character of infancy 
emerges (and unravels) only by the child’s dependent relation to the mother’s mute 
inclusive exclusion.  
 Having already read the child as a woman, infancy as maternity, what would 
happen if infancy were also read as animality, the child as the animal? In light of the 
axolotl’s mute figuration of both infancy and maternity, it appears that Agamben’s 
experimentum linguae participates in the ineffable removal of the animal as well as the 
unspeakable sacrifice of woman. An eternal child and a non-human animal, the axolotl, 
contradictorily, does “not not speak” and yet it is “always already inside language.” 
Following these tensions the axolotl should be read not as a metaphorical figure but as a 
real animal tied up in the anthropological machine. Such a reading promises to focus on 
the evolutionary gestures of the axolotl and threatens to multiply the voices of infancy’s 
inclusive exclusion—introducing animal-mothers alongside child-mothers. Formulated 
over ten years after his axolotl writings and their evolutionary hypotheses, Agamben’s 
anthropological machine offers a strong critique of evolutionary accounts of human 
language. In The Open, we recall, Agamben challenges the distinctively human nature of 
the bridge between pre-linguistic and linguistic stages of existence. In each evolutionary 
formulation of this passage, the human link to language is “presupposed every time” and 
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produces a state of exception.96 Drawn from the life of the axolotl, Agamben’s own 
evolutionary hypothesis, which claims that humans developed from young primates with 
premature reproductive capacities, also grounds language in the human and produces a 
state of exception. For Agamben, the hypothesis supports his account of infancy not only 
as an approach to language but also as an approach to the “entire sphere of the 
exosomatic tradition which, more than any genetic imprint, characterizes homo 
sapiens.”97 Linking the somatic to “genetic prescription and the exosomatic to totipotent 
potentiality, he proceeds to claim that “animals are not concerned with possibilities of 
their soma that are not inscribed in the germen […] they pay no attention to that which is 
mortal […] and they develop only the infinitely repeatable possibilities fixed in the 
genetic code.”98 Separated only by such false dichotomies (soma/exosoma, genetic 
determinism and totipotent potentiality), translating infancy and animality is again simple 
if not straightforward. To illustrate one might simply consider the innumerable accounts 
of animal play that can be described as a concern with somatic possibilities beyond 
germen. Those with close relations to animals of many species can attest to the way that 
animals also “risk [their] whole life” in play and the vanity of attempts to check or 
confine that activity to limited times and places. Likewise one should be wary of any 
picture of homo sapiens so wholly detached from the somatic sphere and genetic 
imprints.  
 To be sure, in Infancy and History Agamben draws on Chomsky, Lenneberg and 
Jakobsen to offer a more sophisticated account of the “complex interrelation” of 
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endosomatic and esosomatic inheritance, one that supports his developmental and 
ontological hypothesis that animals are “always already in language” whereas humans 
lack language and must “receive it from the outside.”99 However, this hypothesis, by 
further twists and turns, also operates through the work of inclusive exclusion. Not only 
does Agamben cite and disregard important exceptions to it—for instance, the existence 
of certain birds that, deprived of hearing a song of their species, can only produce the 
normal song in partial form—but the search for a “mediating element” between 
endosoma and esosoma returns him, via phonemes, to the “engine” of human infancy. 
That is, in a gesture that is evolutionary and ontological (and later wholly deconstructed 
by his own account of the anthropological machine), Agamben presupposes the human 
character of the phonemic passage between phone and logos, langue and parole. Finally, 
the circular claims that share in this presumption are not overridden by an attempt to 
anchor phonemes in infancy through the chora.100 The chora is itself an indeterminate 
figure that gathers infancy, maternity and animality, a ‘site’ that circulates the child-
mothers and mother-animals of Agamben’s inclusive exclusions.101 Whether supported by 
crude dichotomies or more insidious procedures, Agamben’s infantile distinction between 
animals “always already in language” and humans “deprived and receptive to language” 
drives rather than jams the anthropological machine. 
                                                
99 Agamben, Infancy and History, 65. 
100 Consider the circular claim that “only human language, as something belonging to both the 
endosomatic and the esosomatic, adds another sense to semiotic meaning, transforming the closed 
world of the sign into the open world of sematic expression.” Belonging by adding sense and 
adding sense by belonging, Agamben proceeds to link infancy to the chora: “[phonemes] are 
located in the correspondence-difference (in the chora, as Plato would have said) between the two 
regions, in a ‘site’ which can perhaps be described only in its topology and which coincides with 
that historico-transcendental region—before the subject of language and without somatic 
substance—which we have defined as human infancy.” Ibid, 67. 
101 The concept of the chora will be discussed more extensively in the proceeding chapter’s 
treatment of Kristeva’s distinction between the semiotic and the symbolic. 
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 By imagining infancy as maternity and animality in equal turn, an experimental 
approach to Agamben’s experimentum linguae finds his thought at “a limit that he is 
unable to overcome.”102 Infancy promises to challenge the movement of negativity and 
the machination of anthropology. But in a movement of persistent reversal, the 
independent auto-relational picture of infancy betrays, each time, its dependence on the 
inclusive exclusion of maternal and animal voices (and their strange hybridities). 
According to Agamben, “only on the day when the original infantile openness is truly, 
dizzyingly taken up as such […] will men be able finally to construct a history and 
language which are universal and no longer deferrable, and stop their wandering through 
traditions.”103 But the multiplying voices of infancy’s inclusive exclusion—child-
mothers, animal-mothers, animal-children— suggest only a deferral that is itself 
dizzying. On the whole, this excavation of infancy’s included others is more than a 
simple recognition of Agamben’s (long acknowledged) anthropocentrism and (less 
acknowledged) androcentrism. In a widely-read article on the topic of anthropocentric 
community, Matthew Calarco has shown that the figures of Agamben’s new politics are 
modeled on the refugee and limited to human beings alone.104 Citing the critical 
demonstrations of Language and Death, Calarco queries after its anthropocentric 
conclusions 
If one accepts Agamben’s argument that man’s essence is not to be found 
in his experience of language and death as such, then does not the 
displacement of man’s essence simultaneously work to disrupt the strict 
binary that excludes the animal from man’s essence? […] if man’s proper 
essence and the ground for human community can no longer be found in 
                                                
102 Agamben, Language and Death, 58. 
103 Agamben, The Idea of Prose, 98. 
104 Matthew Calarco, “On the Borders of Language and Death: Agamben and the Question of the 
Animal.” Philosophy Today (2000) 44: 96. 
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an experience of language and death as such, then how can a thought of 
another coming community not lead to a rethinking of the place of animals 
in community?105 
 
Given the thoroughgoing critique of metaphysical negativity in Language and Death, 
Agamben’s withdrawal from the “question of the animal” is, for Calarco, a missed 
opportunity to rethink the place of animals in community beyond violent logics of mute 
inclusion/exclusion. In light of the dizzying reading of infancy and its others provided 
above, it is now appropriate to say that Agamben more than misses the opportunity to 
rethink the place and voice of animals. In line with the violence of humanistic 
metaphysics and anthropology, infancy inclusively excludes the voices of women and 
animals. As a new figure and experience of language, infancy does not simply forego the 
“question of the animal” as much as it renders a more expansive and non-violent response 
to that question more difficult to achieve.  
 Understood as a dependent and relational foil to Agamben’s infancy, Butler and 
Kristeva’s notion of vulnerability would seem an apt resource for such a response; unlike 
infancy, vulnerability marks the exposure of the (speaking) body, a condition ineluctably 
given over to, rather than inclusively exclusive of, others. Careful not to collapse 
vulnerability and maternity, both authors discuss the dependence of infants on maternal 
others and early caregivers. Butler writes of newborns “abandoned” to “primary others” 
in virtue of “bodily requirements” and, throughout her work, Kristeva emphasizes 
maternal support of symbolic development; the chora (where Agamben anchors 
phonemic passage to the human child) is, in the Kristevan text, linked to maternal 
semiotic conditions of language. However, while the relational character of vulnerability 
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extends to maternal others, it does not extend, for either theorist, to non-human animal 
others. In her recent text Animal Lessons, Kelly Oliver challenges Butler and Kristeva’s 
failure to consider non-human animals as embodied, mortal beings capable of being 
wounded or wounding others. In a query that runs parallel to Calarco’s critique of 
Agamben, Oliver asks: 
Once we take bodily vulnerability—which is to say the fact that we are 
mortal and can be wounded—as our starting point, are we delineating 
what constitutes humanity? Or are we setting out what constitutes all 
living creatures? And if we are relational, dependent beings by virtue of 
having bodies, then isn’t this also true of animals? Moreover, if we extend 
the notion of dependence in the way that Butler and Kristeva do to make it 
a cornerstone of ethics and politics, then aren’t we also obligated to 
consider the (material and conceptual) interdependence of humans and 
animals?106 
 
Like Agamben’s account of infancy, Butler and Kristeva’s theories of vulnerability invite 
but do not require that we rethink the place of animals in community. Failing to “extend 
the notion of dependence” beyond the borders of the human, Butler and Kristeva 
“derealize” the shared embodiment of non-human animal others.107  
 Following Calarco and Oliver’s concerns and in light of Agamben’s 
experimentum lingaue, what comes of the deferral of voices and questions, animal and 
otherwise? In the case of Agamben, resources seem to lie in reflexive rather than 
jamming capacities of his thought. In this chapter, Calarco’s commitment that “the 
critical promise of Agamben’s thought is to be found in its ability to disrupt classical 
notions of human community” is substantiated by the coordination of the critique of 
                                                
106 Oliver, Animal Lessons: How They Teach Us to be Human, 44.  
107 Chloë Taylor also discusses Butler’s omission of non-human embodiment in her essay “The 
Precarious Lives of Animals: Butler, Coetzee and Animal Ethics” Philosophy Today 52.1 (2008): 
60-72. Taylor highlights the violence of this omission in a discussion of the “derealization” of 
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negativity and the anthropological machine.108 Bridging Language and Death and The 
Open, “man’s essence is not to be found in his experience of language and death as such” 
because language is a historical production that follows from the removal or inclusive 
exclusion of voice. While infancy challenges the pursuit of “a language and a history 
which are universal,” it nevertheless reflects the disruptive and radical thesis that 
language is “fabricated in piecemeal fashion from alien forms.”  To carry out its critical 
promise, Agamben’s disruptive thesis should be engaged and returned to his own texts. 
The experimental reading of experimentum linguae models such a reflexive critique. By 
pursuing the operation of inclusive exclusion and uncovering the removal of maternal and 
animal voices, the experiment uses Agamben’s own resources to find his thought at a 
“limit he is unable to overcome.” Whether experimenting with an experimentum linguae 
or multiplying (andrological/racist/monstrous…) machines, Agamben’s critical promise 
can be returned to his own text. There, dizzying deferrals are, each time, opportunities to 
rethink and the limits of language and the production of speaking-being. 
 
Remnants and Relationality 
 In Remnants of Auschwitz, the controversial text with which this chapter began, 
Agamben links the contingency of the capacity of speech—and therefore the possibility 
of the incapacity of speech—not to the infant but the Muselmann. In the words of Primo 
Levi, the Muselmann is the “true witness” of the camps that cannot witness. Challenged 
by Levi’s paradox, Agamben develops an ethics of “bearing witness” to the inhuman in 
the human, the de-subjectification in subjectification, the Muselmann in the survivor. 
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Describing witnessing as testimony Agamben alludes to the concept of infancy as the 
condition and object of bearing-witness. 
the authority of the witness consists in his capacity to speak solely in the 
name of an incapacity to speaking—that is, in his or her being a subject 
[…] it is because there is testimony only where there is an impossibility of 
speaking, because there is a witness only where there has been 
desubjectification, that the Muselmann is the complete witness and that 
the survivor and the Muselmann cannot be split apart.109 
 
And further, “the speech of the witness bears witness to a time in which human beings 
did not yet speak; and so the testimony of human beings attests to a time in which they 
were not yet human.”110  Without naming this infantile contingency and muteness, 
Agamben alludes to infancy as that quiet time of not-yet speaking that structures the 
possibility of incapacitated, impossible speech in the body of the Muselmann. To bear 
witness to the “complete witness,” then, involves bearing witness to infancy as a marker 
of a fragile openness to the movements of biopower and reflective of mutating political 
conditions. Infancy, it seems, plays a critical role in responding ethically to biopower and 
its silencing exclusions. By way of conclusion, I return to Remnants of Auschwitz to 
reiterate its central insight into the “precarious and fragile event of speech” and to 
consider the critical promise and problems of infancy as witness to “biopolitical 
machine.” 
Although Agamben’s reading of Levi’s paradox is shaped by his method of 
paradigms and his theory of biopower (each of which is associated with what Paul Patton 
has termed a “conceptual fundamentalism”) it is the theory of shifters that decisively 
connects the condition of the Muselmann to the condition of Western subjectivity. 
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Adapted from the texts of Benveniste and Jakobsen, the theory of shifters describes the 
passage between langue and parole and the movement of negativity in the removal of 
voice by Voice. For Agamben, then, Levi’s paradox is structured by the negativity of 
Voice that inclusively excludes the Muselmann in the testimony of the survivor as well as 
an ethico-anthropological machine that produces the human and the inhuman. What 
haunts Levi is that “to bear witness is to enter into a vertiginous movement in which 
something sinks to the bottom, wholly desubjectified and silenced, and something 
subjectified speaks without truly having anything to say of its own (“I tell of things…that 
I did not actually experience’).”111 Linking the structure of testimony to the negative 
structure of Voice clarifies how infancy is to open a new ethics of bearing witness. 
Precisely because the Muselmann’s muteness is conditioned by infancy it is not 
equivalent to the unspeakable or ineffable. Never wholly exhausted or destroyed by the 
shift to speech, infancy is carried within every act of speaking itself as a “not not 
speaking.” Once a child, and never wholly desubjectified or silenced, the Muselmann is 
carried within every act of witnessing as “not not witnessing.” So described, Remnants of 
Auschwitz can be taken to navigate an ethical terrain between, on the one hand, theories 
of witnessing that figure the Holocaust as ineffable or unspeakable and, on the other 
hand, theories that figure its trauma as merely historical and wholly speakable.112   
Although an experimental reading of the indeterminate figure of the Muselmann 
suggests itself,113 the promise and problems of infantile testimony can be marked more 
broadly in Remnants’ continuation of the auto-relational logic addressed throughout this 
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chapter. In an incisive essay on the status of relationality in Agamben’s ethics of 
testimony, Catherine Mills deftly argues that Agamben’s “bearing witness” fails to meet 
the minimum condition of “ethics,” that of bearing on relations-with-others. Critiquing 
Agamben’s appropriation of grammatical shifters in his account of linguistic subjectivity, 
Mills reminds us that shifters position speakers vis-à-vis language and other living and 
speaking beings. “Pronouns such as ‘I’—and ‘you’—necessarily position the speaking 
subject in relation with those being addressed or identified.”114 Agamben’s infancy 
renders the speaking/witnessing being more fragile but that fragility appears to follow 
from the abstract “expropriation of language” not concrete relations-with-others. It is this 
characteristic of infancy that lends the Muselmann so readily to Agamben’s paradigmatic 
trajectory and its controversies. 
For Mills, a particular moment in Remnants of Auschwitz—a citation from the 
memoir of Robert Antelme— calls out for a relational response that Agamben’s “bearing 
witness” cannot give. In that passage, Antelme recalls the flushing of a prisoner’s face 
after being called forward to his execution. “He turned pink after the SS man said to him, 
‘Du komme hier!’ He must have glanced about him before he flushed; but yes, it was he 
who had been picked, and when he doubted it no longer, he turned pink.”115 For 
Agamben, the prisoner’s flush is “like a new ethical material” that “like a mute 
apostrophe [flies] through time to reach us, to bear witness to him.”116 On Mills’ reading, 
Agamben’s qualifications of the flush—that it is like ethical material, that it allows for 
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testimony—illustrate his failure to recognize the prisoner’s alterity and the possible status 
of the flush as itself testimony.117 That is, Mills suggests that bodily affect is one of the 
inclusive exclusions of Agamben’s auto-relational witness and, more broadly, that the 
apostrophe “flying through time” still hangs in the air.118 Without a more relational 
account of the infantile witness, bodies are yet another inclusive exclusion of infancy.  
 In the following chapter I consider the question of embodied testimony more 
directly as part of a Kristevan evaluation of the biopolitics of speaking being. There, I 
return to and re-evaluate the critical promise of Kristeva’s vulnerable speaking body in 
context with her call for the “sacrifice of sacrifice” in relations both psychical and power 
laden. Here I conclude by suggesting that the critical reflexive promise of Agamben’s 
texts may, as in the metaphysical and anthropological cases, be returned to the 
biopolitical machine. For one thing, “bearing witness” might lend itself the critical 
concern with inclusive exclusion found in Agamben’s critique of the metaphysics of 
Voice and the machinations of anthropology. But more specifically and following Mills’ 
keen provocation, Agamben might return to the “question which defines the motivum of 
his thought”—“what is the meaning of ‘there is language’; what is the meaning of ‘I 
speak’?”119 It seems that Agamben pursues this question less “stubbornly” in Remnants of 
Auschwitz and to more disastrous results than in other works. But even these failures 
prove the question a worthy motivum, extending its terrain at a dizzying pace. After 
                                                
117 An apostrophe is a rhetorical, and fundamentally relational, gesture “in which the text calls 
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Agamben and in biopolitical contexts, can bodies, an animal or a mother speak? If they 
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 KRISTEVA AND THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF BIOPOWER 
 
Melancholia and the Mute Symptom of Biopower 
In her 1987 text Black Sun psychoanalyst Julia Kristeva describes melancholia as 
a suffering subjectivity characterized by “the intolerance for object loss” and “the 
signifier’s failure.”1 Unable to lose and symbolically compensate for the archaic maternal 
Thing, melancholics suffer from “symbolic collapse”—a slowing down of linguistic 
activity and a feeling of meaninglessness and despair. To illustrate, Kristeva draws on 
several case studies from her own clinical practice. For one analysand, Helen, depressive 
episodes are like a mute living death. “I find myself glued to the spot, as if paralyzed, I 
lose the ability to speak, my mouth fills with chalk, my mind completely empty. [It is] as 
if I were dead but I do not think of killing myself, nor do I desire to do so, it is as if it had 
already been done.”2 For another analysand, Isabel, pregnancy exacerbates the quiet 
suffering. Isabel “gives birth for death’s sake,” entering the life of motherhood in order to 
exit her own. Her daughter is a “parenthesis within the depression,” a “new speech 
inhibitor in [Isabel’s] already not-so-talkative world.”3 According to Kristeva, the painful 
not-so-talkative world of melancholia involves an archaic failure to affirm and deny 
maternal loss. In a double movement within primary narcissism, the infans must consent 
to lose the mother so as to recover her again in signs. Unable to successfully accept and 
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negate loss through language, Helen and Isabel suffer from “an unsymbolizable, 
unnameable narcissistic wound.”4  
In Black Sun Kristeva locates the cause of melancholia’s characteristic 
struggles—the struggle to lose and the struggle to speak— in the changing conditions of 
symbolic law and the crisis in the paternal function. A wider notion than civil or criminal 
law, the psychoanalytic concept of symbolic law refers to the form-giving function of 
social structures and institutions including language itself; symbolic law is that which 
supports or, more traditionally put, “sublimates” bodily experiences and semiotic drives 
in meaningful signifying systems.5 In her 1980s trilogy—Black Sun (1987), Tales of Love 
(1983), and Powers of Horror (1982)—Kristeva suggests that contemporary symbolic 
law fails to symbolize and give meaning to the archaic processes of primary narcissism. 
For Kristeva, the failures of symbolic law reflect a crisis in the paternal function, its lack 
of (maternal) love.6 In primary narcissism, the child first encounters love through a 
process of identification with the “imaginary father” as the site of the mother’s love. This 
encounter counter-balances the stern law of the father and establishes psychic space.7  
Today, the devaluation of maternal love and the reduction of loving forms of social 
support offer little protection against stern prohibitions and threaten to abolish psychic 
                                                
4 Ibid, 12. 
5 Kelly Oliver, “Bodies against the law: Abu Ghraib and the war on terror.” Continental 
Philosophy Review (2009) 42: 63-64. 
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York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 387. 
7 See Kelly Oliver, “Kristeva’s Imaginary Father as a Screen for the Desiring Mother” in 
Subjectivity without Subjects: From Abject Fathers to Desiring Mothers (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1998), 55-78. 
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space.  The melancholics of Black Sun struggle because, in the absence of effective signs 
and loving support, the double movement of affirming and negating maternal loss is 
difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Women, more deeply identified with the mother 
and less supported by a patriarchal symbolic order that symbolizes sexist drives and lacks 
maternal love, are especially prone to melancholia. Seeking refuge from the law of the 
father in the “flimsy defense” of depression, melancholic women like Helen and Isabel 
are unloved and consequently unable to lose or to speak. 
In the 1980s trilogy Kristeva’s attention to the changing conditions of symbolic 
law begins a critique of the Oedipal model of power and its relevance in contemporary 
life. Importantly, the erosion of symbolic law that encourages melancholia reflects a 
weakening of the pre-Oedipal imaginary father and a concomitant deformation of the 
Oedipal law of the father. If the imaginary father is a loving conduit between the maternal 
body and the law of the father, then the decline of the imaginary father separates drives 
and affects from law and vice versa. As bodies silently suffer the disconnection from a 
law that gives form, law itself “suffers” the disconnection of drives and affects. 
Throughout the trilogy, Kristeva emphasizes that the crisis of the paternal function refers 
not to the lack of law but the lack of love and the lack of love in law. No longer 
substantive, the empty law of the father bears a “fierce but artificial and incredible 
tyranny.”8 In a striking resemblance to Agamben’s account of the “sovereign ban,” empty 
law is “in force without significance”; in the biopolitical fracture between drives and 
words, the body is “abandoned to law and remitted to itself.”9 On behalf of Narcissi 
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“burdened with emptiness” or perhaps abandoned to emptiness, Kristeva inquires of the 
dysfunctional Oedipus—“hasn’t this logic, which Freud brought to the fore and which 
characterizes the religious, social, and artistic man, reached a saturation point?”10  
In ways prepared by the mute symptoms and empty laws of the 1980s trilogy, this 
chapter uncovers an important biopolitical turn in Julia Kristeva’s thought.  In The Sense 
and Nonsense of Revolt (1996), Intimate Revolt (1997), and The Feminine and The 
Sacred (1998), Kristeva connects the emptied mutation of the law of the father to the 
elaboration of a normalizing power, specifically, a normalizing power that reduces the 
subject to an owner of bodily organs, bios to zoe.  Here, unloving law is associated with 
manifold regulatory mechanisms that manage life instead of giving it meaning. Focusing 
on the production of a “life of death,” “life for itself, life without questions,” Kristeva 
warns of the expansion of what is effectively biopolitical power and the rise of 
biopolitical values, especially the rise of that “supreme value,” “life itself.”11  Rarely read 
in such terms, this chapter aims to make explicit the biopolitical attentions of Kristeva’s 
The Sense and Nonsense of Revolt, Intimate Revolt and The Feminine and The Sacred. 
Today, the mute symptom is also a biopolitical symptom that reflects normalizing 
mechanisms and laws “in force without significance.” Kristeva’s melancholic figures of 
mute “living death,” Helen and Isabel, are not only case studies in melancholia or 
Oedipal crisis but figures of “a politics that places man’s existence as a living and 
[speaking-] being in question.” 
                                                
10 Ibid, 387; Julia Kristeva, The Sense and Nonsense of Revolt (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2000), 15. 
11 See Julia Kristeva, The Feminine and The Sacred (New York: Columbia University Press, 
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In its identification of a biopolitical turn in the Kristevan text, this chapter extends 
and refocuses earlier explorations of the biopolitical production of life and language. 
There, Foucault and Agamben demonstrate that living and speaking-being are not 
“given” but rather fabricated or “in question.” Here, Kristeva turns toward the question of 
resistance: how do “living beings in question” themselves speak and question today? In 
her words “who can revolt, and against what? Can a patrimony of organs revolt against a 
normalizing order? How?”12  According to Kristeva, in postindustrial post-Communist 
democracies, revolt is still viable on the psychic, if not the political, level. In her texts, 
psychic revolt is not the transgression of law but the questioning confrontation and 
displacement of authority within the individual psyche.13 A creative imaginative practice, 
revolt returns to the conditions of language and speech, renewing the psychic process of 
authorization. Because it supports the “sacred” connection of life and meaning and mends 
the fracture of drive and law, revolt is a mode of psychic resistance to normalized “life of 
death” and a support for a “life to be told and written,” a biography. This chapter 
develops an account of psychic revolt as an intimate form of biopolitical resistance and 
measures its possibilities alongside another return to the conditions of language —
Agamben’s notion of infancy. Unlike the abstract and androcentric movements of 
infancy, revolt is an embodied and vulnerable activity that aims to disappear the sexed 
distinction between “those who give life (women)” and “those who give meaning (men).” 
However, insofar as Kristeva maintains the distinction between zoe and bios, revolt 
threatens to be a psychic version of the biopolitical machine, its process of return and 
renewal the “ceaselessly updated decision in which the caesurae and their rearticulation 
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are always dislocated and displaced anew.”14  In the final analysis, the status of revolt as 
an effective form of biopolitical resistance, one that supports lives to be told and written 
without fabricating also “lives of death,” hinges on finding a “less lethal less bloody” 
proximity between the working through (of psychic revolt) and the refunctioning (of the 
biopolitical machine). 
 
The “Power Vacuum” and “Soft Totalitarianism” 
 In The Sense and Nonsense of Revolt Kristeva describes the conditions of 
contemporary power as a “power vacuum,” a phrase that captures power’s dispersion in 
manifold normalizing mechanisms and its non-locatable character in post-industrial post-
Communist democracies. Where symbolic law once operated and organized, today there 
is only disorder, the vacuumed “absence of plans.”15 In The Feminine and The Sacred, 
Kristeva describes a similarly regulatory and disseminating power as “a new version of 
‘soft totalitarianism.’” There she claims that power’s ambition to normalize and manage 
life bears a totalitarian threat: the threat of destroying life after having devalued the 
question of its meaning.”16 In this section I argue that Kristeva’s notions of the “power 
vacuum” and “soft totalitarianism” form what is effectively, if not explicitly, a picture of 
biopolitical power. Although Kristeva does not employ the terms “biopower” or 
“biopolitics” (here or elsewhere), the “power vacuum” and “soft totalitarianism” together 
theorize the expansion of a power that manages and regulates life, a power that “makes 
live and lets die.” In this way, these texts undertake biopolitical extensions of concerns 
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prominent in the 1980s trilogy, while also recasting Foucault and Agamben’s own 
theories.  Suggesting that the “society of the spectacle” participates in the normalization 
of life, Kristeva now ties the emptiness of law to the multiplication of norms, the “loss of 
values” to the hypervaluation of “life itself.” 
To grasp the biopolitical extensions of The Sense and Nonsense of Revolt, we 
might begin by evaluating Kristeva’s description of the power vacuum as normalizing, 
falsifiable and non-locatable.”17 In its character as a normalizing order, the power vacuum 
illustrates the connection between the emptiness of law and expanding regulatory power. 
Where the 1980s trilogy maps the deforming impact of fierce yet artificial law on the 
preverbal child, the power vacuum makes clear that the erosion of symbolic law involves 
the proliferation of norms. Today, “in the place of the prohibition or power that cannot be 
found, disciplinary and administrative punishments multiply, repressing or rather 
normalizing everyone.”18 On this point, Kristeva draws on the writing of French legal 
theorist Mireille Delmas-Marty, whose research on globalization and human rights law 
links the “soft laws” of neoliberal deregulation to the expansion of normalizing power.19 
In her text Towards a Truly Common Law Delmas-Marty provides a description of the 
“anarchical proliferation of norms” in the power vacuum:  
I use “proliferation” to express the impression of being hit by an avalanche 
of norms, a massive quantity without historical precedent, and “anarchy” 
because it is difficult to get one’s bearings […] Deregulation is not the 
opposite of regulation but a redeployment of norms according to different, 
less transparent and more complex mechanisms.20 
 
                                                
17 Ibid, 4. 
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Delmas-Marty’s description of “anarchy” and “proliferation” is strikingly Kristevan. Soft 
law produces a normalizing order, an “avalanche” of norms in which “it is difficult to get 
one’s bearings.” Diagnosing a soft symbolic law, Kristeva’s own text describes a kind of 
regulatory avalanche, a disorienting psychic trauma that leaves analysands suffering from 
a “lack of reference points.”21  
As a falsifiable order, the power vacuum marks the relationship between the 
growth of regulatory power and the loosening of contemporary authority. According to 
Kristeva, the reduction of law to normalization undermines agencies of power. Open to 
corruption and perversion, government and social institutions decline and, more deeply, 
law itself breaks down. In the power vacuum, “there are no longer laws but measures […] 
Measures are susceptible to appeals and delays, to interpretations and falsifications.”22 
Today, legal interpretation amounts to little more than the pursuit of loopholes, to 
“finding omissions in the law that allow otherwise unlawful acts to be carried out within 
the terms of the law.”23 More than substantive codes, crime and transgression reflect (the 
empty interpretations of) disciplinary tactics. In the place of guilt or innocence, metrics of 
normality and abnormality, credit and debt, govern social life. “We no longer speak of 
culpability but of public menace; we no longer speak of fault (in an automobile accident, 
for example) but of damages. Instead of responsibility, there is liability […] crime cannot 
be found at the same time as prohibition.”24 Although individuals are no longer culpable, 
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they are held liable by measures that repress in indirect and re-directable ways; where 
there was once punishment, there is now normalization. 
   In its non-locatable character, the power vacuum illustrates the connection 
between normalizing and falsifiable power and the frustration of political revolt. Today 
power is everywhere and authority is nowhere; norms are disseminated in regulatory 
mechanisms yet agents of legitimation are absent or empty masquerades. Drawing on 
Guy Debord’s notion of the society of the spectacle, Kristeva develops these two sides of, 
what she calls, the “invisibility” of power. Normalizing mechanisms are not only diffuse 
they are diffuse throughout mass mediated culture; power cannot be located, in part, 
because a sea of images take up its operation. In this sea, the absence of authority is 
confirmed on every stage, from the celebrity judges to the incessant and ever-revising 
judgment of celebrities themselves. In short, the spectacle is a pervertible, normalizing 
“media-friendly” theatre. As Kristeva puts it, “people are increasingly excited when they 
think they have unearthed a guilty party, a scapegoat” because we live in “a so called 
liberal society in which there is no surveillance and no punishment except in these 
theatrically mediatized cases that become a sort of catharsis of the citizen’s nonexistent 
guilt.”25 In this theatre of blame and shame, invisible power reflects and supports the 
multiplication of norms and the corruption of authority.   
Marking the challenges of psychic as well as political forms of revolt, the power 
vacuum recasts Kristeva’s well-known discussion of the spectacle in New Maladies of the 
Soul (1995). There, Kristeva argues that the intensification of media culture inhibits 
psychic life and, in particular, frustrates individuals’ ability to symbolize and represent 
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psychic trauma.26 In The Sense and Nonsense of Revolt, these “new maladies of the soul,” 
symptomatologies that share the “inability to represent” as a “common denominator,” are 
linked to a normalizing, falsifiable and non-locatable power.27 Although the notion of 
psychic revolt is more thoroughly developed in the proceeding section, with respect to the 
spectacle it can be understood as a confrontation and displacement of authority in the 
imagination; a creative process, revolt returns to and renews the authorization by which 
the individual belongs to the world of meaning. In New Maladies of the Soul Kristeva 
emphasizes how the spectacle collapses intimacy and exhausts the imagination. Saturated 
by media images, “the psychic life of modern individuals wavers between somatic 
symptoms (getting sick and going to the hospital) and the visual depiction of their desires 
(daydreaming in front of the TV).”28 In The Sense and Nonsense of Revolt, the expiring 
imagination and the non-locatability of power bear upon the activity of revolt. As 
Kristeva now frames it, how can individuals revolt against authority if they cannot find 
it? How can individuals revolt against authority if they are too rapt by the spectacle to 
even search for it?  
The power vacuum begins a Kristevan sketch of power that resonates with and 
recasts Foucault and Agamben’s accounts of biopolitical power, especially its 
contemporary mutation in so-called liberal society. In its normalizing, falsifiable and 
non-locatable operation, Kristeva uncovers conditions characteristic of biopower and 
biopolitics—the fierce mutation of empty law, the proliferation of regulatory techniques 
and the frustration of resistance. According to Kristeva, the “power vacuum and the loss 
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of values were ‘not yet issues’” at the time of Revolution in Poetic Language (1974). The 
“evolution in question has probably been under way since the end of the French 
Revolution and the development of democracy that followed” but it “appeared in a more 
obvious, more drastic, more threatening ways after the recent collapse of communism.”29 
Where Revolution in Poetic Language relies on a dialectical model of power as 
(substantive) prohibition and foregrounds the transgressive potential of the semiotic, The 
Sense and Nonsense of Revolt (1996) uncovers the flimsy prohibition and the more 
drastic and threatening effects of normalization.30 Although Kristeva acknowledges the 
modern roots of the power vacuum, she emphasizes its post-industrial post-Communist 
context, specifically, the rise of mass media and consumer culture. Unlike Foucault or 
Agamben, for whom ancient logics or modern thresholds require more than passing 
appreciation, Kristeva’s power vacuum focuses almost exclusively on the most recent 
formations and deformations of regulatory power. 
Through her contemporary attentions, Kristeva reckons the power vacuum with 
an unlikely but compelling contemporary of biopolitics—the spectacle. In Discipline and 
Punish, Foucault’s delineation of modern discipline and pre-modern spectacular 
punishment bears an implicit critique of Debord’s spectacle. There, Foucault’s 
announcement that modern “society is one not of spectacle but of surveillance” is clearly 
directed at Debord and reaches, by extension, Kristeva’s power vacuum. 
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Society is one not of the spectacle but of surveillance. Under the surface of 
images, one invests bodies in depth; behind the great abstraction of 
exchange there continues the meticulous, concrete training of useful forces  
[…] it is not that the beautiful totality of the individual is amputated, 
repressed, altered by our social order, it is rather that the individual is 
carefully fabricated in it, according to whole techniques of forces and 
bodies. We are much less Greeks than we believe. We are neither in the 
amphitheatre, nor on the stage, but in the panoptic machine.31 
 
In this dramatic announcement, Foucault conflates the spectacle with the “amputating” 
anachronistic scaffold of sovereign power and defines discipline—“under the surface of 
images,”  “behind the abstraction of exchange”— as the form of power definitive of 
modern societies. In more mediated and commodifying contexts than that of Discipline 
and Punish, Kristeva’s power vacuum highlights the disciplinary capacities of the 
spectacle. For Kristeva, the import of the spectacle lies in the fact that today the psyche 
is, “according to whole techniques of forces and bodies,” carefully fabricated through 
mass media and consumer culture. Further, where “invisible” power falls short and 
abnormal un-useful forces erupt, the spectacle facilitates the empty resurgence of law in 
theatrical scapegoating. In effect, Kristeva suggests that the normalizing order is a little 
more “Greek” than Foucault believes. Today, the amphitheatre and the panopticon 
coexist in dynamic, and sometimes demonic, ways. 
To follow Kristeva’s contemporary line of thought it seems that the spectacle is as 
much biopolitical as it is disciplinary. Specifically, Foucault’s account of liberal and 
neoliberal biopower resonates with Kristeva’s striking claim that “there is no punishment 
or surveillance beyond the spectacle” that economizes social relations. In his reflections 
on liberalism and neo-liberalism, Foucault distinguishes discipline and biopower 
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according to their respective modes of surveillance. If discipline “regulates everything” 
and “lets nothing escape,” biopower “lets things happen. Not that everything is left alone, 
but laissez-faire is indispensable at a certain level.”32 Where discipline holds that “the 
smallest things must not be abandoned to themselves,” biopower “stands back 
sufficiently so that one can grasp the point at which things are taking place.” This mode 
surveillance, described earlier as the regulatory mode of (neo)liberal deregulation, is 
precisely that at work in the contemporary spectacle. For instance, with its ever-
increasing importance in daily life, the internet appears a unlimited field of free 
exploration and self-creation. Yet, “standing back sufficiently” in embedded 
advertisements and the code of search tools, ever-advancing technologies of user-tracking 
surveil and shape freedom. This genre of laissez-faire regulation undertakes, to borrow 
another Foucauldian phrase, the “manufacture of freedom.” The media spectacle 
disciplines and scapegoats the abnormal, through the saturation of normalizing images or 
the mocking circulation of viral videos. But it also presents and promotes an “anything 
goes” attitude in which normalization parades (and operates) as empty rebellion and fake 
autonomy. “Letting things happen” without leaving things alone, the power vacuum 
marks the mediatized and the so-called liberal shape of biopower. 
The notion of the “patrimonial individual” ties the power vacuum even more 
decisively to biopolitical power. Specifically, the patrimonial individual illustrates how 
the normalizing but falsifiable, surveilling but spectacular form of contemporary power 
places living-being in question. Reflecting the increasing “primacy of the market 
economy over the body,” the subject of the power vacuum is not a human being with 
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rights but “the owner of [their] genetic or organo-physiological patrimony,” one who 
possesses their organs “and that only in the best case scenario.”33 When an economic 
measure of all things applies not only to one’s sense of oneself but to one’s body, 
subjects become owners of organs, this in the “best case scenario.” As Kristeva points 
out, “there are countries where a person does not even own his own organs” or “where 
organs are stolen in order to be sold.”  For the exposed and economized patrimonial 
individual, “the whole question is whether my patrimony can be remunerated or free: 
whether I can enrich myself or, as an altruist, forgo payment in the name of humanity or 
whether I, as a victim, am disposed of it.”34  
A figure of a post-industrial consumer culture that economizes everything, the 
“patrimonial individual” resonates with two representatives of living-being in question —
the entrepreneurial man and homo sacer. Foucault’s figure of neoliberal biopower, the 
entrepreneurial man treats his own life as a perpetual investment opportunity. Making an 
enterprise of himself, the entrepreneur understands and develops his capacities according 
to their service in the accumulation of wealth and value. Kristeva’s patrimonial individual 
highlights the exposed, embodied, psychic dimension of this neoliberal subject. For the 
patrimonial individual, life as enterprise is reflected in the deformation of early processes 
of psychic investment. On the successful completion of primary narcissism, the 
movement of loss, abjection and idealization should culminate in a redirection of psychic 
investment from the maternal body to language. For Kristeva, this redirection is the “first 
sublimation, which becomes intrinsic to the human condition”: “the investment of signs 
is translated by a surpassing of the depression, by a jubilation […] ‘I’ do not invest the 
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breast, ‘I’ do not invest mama; ‘I’ invest my own capacity to produce signs.”35 Reflecting 
how power conditions transform that which is “intrinsic to the human condition,” the 
patrimonial individual does not accomplish the “first sublimation.” In the power vacuum, 
individuals struggle to effectively invest drives in signs and spiral into rather than surpass 
depression.36 The patrimonial individual makes an enterprise of depression, investing 
drives in their body, making meaning only in the sense of making market value. If 
depression is a “flimsy defense” against the fierce tyranny of empty law, the enterprise of 
depression can be understood as a flimsy—precarious, risky— offense to a normalizing 
but falsifiable power. In the best-case scenario, investment can “pay off” as privileged 
bodies enrich themselves towards better market position. In the worst-case scenario, 
patrimonial individuals are more deeply caught up in the enterprise of others, their 
patrimony remunerated, “their organs stolen in order to be sold.”  
In the precariousness of its enterprise, the patrimonial individual also resonates 
with the bare life of Agamben’s homo sacer, that figure whose life is abandoned to law in 
force without significance and whose death constitutes neither murder nor sacrifice. 
Divested from the world of signs, the life of the patrimonial individual is not a bios but 
rather, as Agamben describes bare life, a “bios that is only its own zoe” where zoe is, 
depending on its politicized market value, “convertible into cash.”37 Marking the 
disappearance of a human being with rights, the patrimonial individual is abandoned to a 
law that is empty but occupied by market logics. Both politicized and economized, the 
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best and worst case scenarios of patrimony hinge on the contingency of market 
speculation. In the enterprise of life in which bare life is a way of life, “anything goes” 
and anything can be sold but not all bodies are valued and values rise and fall. Where 
Agamben speaks, in relation to bare life, of an inner solidarity between democracy and 
totalitarianism, Kristeva describes the loss (or economization) of values as a “new 
version of soft totalitarianism.” For Kristeva, “the famous loss of values, erects life as the 
supreme value, […] life for itself, life without questions” and threatens to “destroy life 
after having devalued the question of its meaning.”38 Producing the bare life of the 
patrimonial individual, the “soft totalitarianism” of the power vacuum does not support 
bios— “lives to be told and written,” lives that bear and give meaning— as much as it 
manages zoe—owners of organs and zoological life  
In The Feminine and The Sacred Kristeva describes the violence in “soft 
totalitarianism” in generalizing terms, but she also emphasizes that its dangers weigh 
more heavily on the lives and psyches of women. That is, given the sexed associations of 
the “ancestral distinction between those who give life (women) and those who give 
meaning (men),” women experience the totalitarian threat of the power vacuum in 
disproportionate ways. In so-called liberal society, political and cultural changes promise 
to support the lives of women as bearing and giving meaning and to help women “give 
meaning to the act of giving that is life.” However, the reversibility of these promises and 
can be observed in the rise of technology and access to contraception and artificial 
insemination. Today, technology often reduces women to being merely possessors of 
zoological life; the “control of the birth rate” manages and impoverishes the erotics of sex 
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and the spiritual experience of birth.39  In contexts dominated by the supremacy of life as 
a political and cultural value, the association of women with “those who give life” 
reflects and encourages the regulation of “wives and mothers [as] natural executors of 
zoology.”  
In her suggestion that soft totalitarianism registers more deeply for women 
Kristeva implies also that patrimony is gendered. More closely tied to life itself, and more 
readily encountered as a body to be economized, marketed or managed, “those who give 
life” are often patrimonial women. Here, the “whole question” is again “whether 
patrimony is remunerated or free,” whether one is a victim or beneficiary of 
dispossession. Among patrimonial women, vulnerability to invasive control and 
regulation is unevenly distributed. For instance, Catherine Waldby and Melinda Cooper 
have shown that sexual and reproductive economies are drawn, in a globalized manner, 
along complex racial and class lines. In much of the sexual and reproductive economy—
i.e., sex work, surrogate mothering, oöcyte “vending” and more— women of the 
developing world provide contractual use of their bodies to consumers from developed 
countries.40 In the sale of oöcyte (eggs) poor women with fair skin and coloring (from 
Romania and Eastern Europe) contribute to the United States reproductive market and 
dark-skinned women without WASP characteristics (from China and India) contribute to 
a market in research tissues.41 The “tissue economy” of patrimonial persons is gendered, 
as Kristeva would almost exclusively emphasize, but it is classed, raced and globalized as 
well. In general, these economies testify to the connection between the loss of values (in 
                                                
39 Ibid, 13.  
40 Catherine Waldby and Melinda Cooper, “The Biopolitics of Reproduction: Post-Fordist Bio-
technology and Women’s Clinical Labour.” Australian Feminist Studies 23. 23.55 (2008): 57-73.  
41 Ibid, 14-15. 
 143 
soft totalitarianism) and the patrimonial individuals (in the power vacuum). As 
reproductive laborers, the life and work of oocyte vendors and surrogate mothers is rarely 
valued and always managed and exposed to risk.42 Very often, their contribution to a 
larger narrative, a bios, about the growth of biotechnology or the growth of a single 
family, is erased. 
Waldby and Cooper’s “tissue economy” helps illustrate the “threat of destroying 
life after having devalued the question of its meaning” and the limitations of the term 
“soft totalitarianism.” That is, the notion of “soft totalitarianism” captures the violence of 
a biopolitics turned thanatopolitics— a destructive attention to life as the “supreme 
value.” But it does not capture, and must be held in close proximity to, the complexity of 
gendered violence and the normalizing, falsifiable, non-locatable character of power. 
Today, when value centers reductively on life, power operates in a decentered fashion 
through dense and multiple forms of difference. Mechanisms for controlling and 
economizing “owners” of reproductive bodies are dispersed throughout the normalizing 
spectacle. Under the guise of freedom—specifically the freedom to sell and transform our 
bodies or to buy and take others’ bodily material (eggs, organs, etc.) to make our “own” 
babies etc—the subjectivation process of patrimonial individuals is an “invisible” and 
falsifiable one, hidden in the images and mediated relations that economize one’s 
embodied sense of self. To speak of “soft totalitarianism” in this context is to highlight 
the contemporary disconnection between life and meaning. Without the practice of 
interpretation and the giving of meaning, “life would become a life of death, that is, a life 
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of physical and moral violence, barbarity.”43 In the next section I read Kristeva’s notions 
of the sacred and revolt as an account of resistance to a regulated “life of death,” a 
biopolitics turned thanatopolitics. With weighty stakes for those most vulnerable to 
dispossession and disconnection, revolt is a form of resistance that “gives meaning to the 
act of giving that is life.” 
 
Psychic Revolt and Sacred Experience as Biopolitical Resistance  
 In The Sense and Nonsense of Revolt, Kristeva offers a bleak picture of the 
possibility of resistance in the power vacuum. Given the normalizing, falsifiable and non-
locatable character of power, the future of revolt is in peril. As Kristeva frames the 
impasse, if we cannot locate power and authority (and if many are too intoxicated by the 
media spectacle to even search for power and authority), how can we revolt against it? In 
The Feminine and The Sacred, Kristeva offers a connected and similarly bleak picture of 
a sustaining reconnection of life and meaning, a connection that she describes as 
“sacred.” If soft totalitarianism values only “life itself, life without questions,” then the 
question of the meaning of life is reduced to its destructive management. For Kristeva, 
the alarm sounded by the concepts of the power vacuum and soft totalitarianism spurs an 
account of precarious and vulnerable resistance. In The Sense and Nonsense of Revolt and 
Intimate Revolt, she develops a theory of revolt that is not the transgression of law but the 
confrontation, displacement and assimilation of authority in the psychic economies of 
individuals.44 In The Feminine and The Sacred, Kristeva celebrates manifestations of 
                                                
43 Kristeva, The Sense and Nonsense of Revolt, 7. 
44 Kelly Oliver, The Colonization of Psychic Space (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2004), 143. 
 145 
sacred experience that narrate and work through violent exclusions. In this section, I 
develop an account of resistance that synthesizes her notion of the sacred and revolt. 
Emphasizing their reciprocal work, I argue that psychic revolt empowers the sacred 
connection between life and meaning. If biopolitical power manages and regulates the 
intimate depths of psychic life, sacred revolt takes up the necessity and the promise of an 
intimate resistance. At once psychic and political, Kristevan resistance strives to mend 
the severance of life and meaning that characterizes the power vacuum and soft 
totalitarianism.   
 To grasp Kristeva’s notion of psychic revolt we must begin by wresting the term, 
etymologically, from its narrowly political meaning in common use. With origins in the 
Latin verb volvere, to turn or return, the French semes of revolt suggest its connection to 
sullying, reversal, detour, cycle, stalling, upheaval, recovery, reassessment among other 
meanings and mutations.45 For Kristeva, the etymology of revolt is suggestive of the 
term’s sense and nonsense. Where “revolution” has an etymology of intellectual 
associations via revolvere (to consult, to reread, to tell), revolt has a more surprising 
trajectory. For Kristeva “surprise is never extraneous to revolt”; “revolt twists and 
turns—indeed, veers off—depending on history.”46 In the power vacuum, of course, 
revolt threatens to “veer off” into its very expiration. But in Freud’s texts, the notion of 
revolt operates and surprises in two important themes—oedipal revolt and the return of 
the archaic.47 Both themes are in evidence in Freud’s account of the murder of the father 
in Totem and Taboo. In this well-known fable for the origin of civilization, primitive men 
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live in hordes where the father prohibits his son’s access to women. One day, in an act of 
rebellion, the sons murder the father, replace him with the totem symbol, feast and, in 
their guilt, develop a social bond. For Freud, this murder of the father is an “element of 
filial rebelliousness” that forms the social order and that emerges, “in the later products 
of religions, often in the strangest disguises and transformations.”48 Here Oedipal revolt is 
a part of the archaic formation of social life that, in its success or failure, returns in 
surprising disguises, twists and turns.  
Freud’s rebellious sons and volvere’s surprising semes prepare the notion of 
psychic revolt. For Kristeva, the most important element of the Freudian fable is the 
“fruit” of the son’s crime—the appropriation of the father’s qualities and the social bond. 
In their revolt, the sons identify with and appropriate the father’s qualities—authority, 
law, and value. By taking his place, the sons displace authority and make it their own. 
Importantly, Oedipal revolt is not a transgression of law but rather a confrontation with 
and displacement of power that authorizes the individual. Describing the “fruit” of 
authorization, Kristeva writes from the first person perspective “‘I’ feel flattered to be 
promoted to the level of someone who could, if not be the father, at least acquire his 
qualities, identify with his power; ‘I’ was associated with this power; ‘I’ was not 
excluded.”49 Promoted to one who can, like the father, own authority, the sons “forge the 
link that will be the socius.”50  Through identification and authorization they earn a sense 
of inclusion, a place, in the social order. For Kristeva, this authority and social tie is a 
pleasure “subjacent” to the guilt of the crime; alongside bonding feelings of guilt, the 
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sons feast and celebrate the fruits of revolt. In this way, Oedipal revolt shares in the 
surprising etymology of revolt; displacing and assuming psychic authority, the sons’ 
revolt is an upheaval that reverses and transforms.  
Drawing on the twists and turns of Oedipal revolt, Kristeva celebrates a broader 
practice of revolt that confronts, displaces and assimilates an authority in the psychic 
economy of the individual. Psychic revolt makes use of the paradox of Oedipal revolt in 
which “social authority becomes individual authority through the individual’s revolt 
against that very authority.”51  For the developing child, the rebellious incorporation of 
social authority is a condition for entering the symbolic order. In adult life, psychic revolt 
is a regenerative return to the past that questions and displaces old law and renews 
symbolic ties. In each case, it is a necessary process of authorization by which the subject 
becomes an agent of power and meaning and accomplishes a sense of belonging in the 
social-symbolic order. Only through revolt can one find and make meaning; its failure 
marks the onset of those nihilistic and disempowered “new maladies of the soul” and its 
“fruits” lie in the social belonging and individual autonomy that enable the capacity to 
represent. Kristeva describes the return and reward of revolt: “Through a narrative of free 
association and in the regenerative revolt against the old law (familial taboos, superego, 
ideals, oedipal or narcissistic limits) comes the singular autonomy of each, as well as a 
renewed link with the other.”52 As a process of return, revolt regenerates social bonds and 
empowers the individual to interpret and give meaning anew.  
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Today the non-locatability of power upends the promise of revolt and underscores 
the crime subjacent to its pleasure, the cost of its “fruit.” For Kristeva, psychic revolt is 
tied to the revolting process of abjection undertaken in primary narcissism. In abjection, 
the infans renders the mother’s body abject—disgusting, vomitous, revolting—in order to 
facilitate maternal separation. Abjection is necessary part of the child’s rebellion; only by 
abjecting the maternal body can the child begin to confront, displace and assimilate 
paternal authority. As Kristeva famously states in Black Sun, “the loss of the mother is 
the first step on the way to becoming autonomous. Matricide is our vital necessity, the 
sine-qua-non condition of our individuation.”53 When authority cannot be located, 
subjects struggle to abject the maternal body. Here, the inability to revolt is a sign of 
societal depression.54 Disempowered, excluded and lacking social bonds, a depressed 
culture experiences (and economizes) the symptoms a depressed individual feels in 
isolation—despair, symbolic collapse, a severance of social ties. Alongside depression, 
the power vacuum also bears another destructive trajectory—the eruption of abjection in 
social life. According to Kristeva, when identification with power no longer works “’I’ 
feel excluded” in a depressive mode or, in an effort to abolish the feeling of exclusion 
altogether, “‘I’ include myself at the top [and] ‘I’ exclude those at the bottom […] 
renewing exclusions at the lower echelons of the social edifice.”55  Here subjects in 
search of a non-locatable authority or a purified social order re-invoke violent processes 
of identity differentiation against the lower echelons of society. In the absence of 
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resources to give meaning to the archaic processes of loss and abjection “life becomes a 
life of death, a life of physical and moral violence, barbarity.”56 
Against its depressive failure or barbaric mutations, “the singular autonomy of 
each [and the] renewed link with the other” is won in association with the imaginary 
father in the form of loving social support. As noted earlier, the imaginary father is a site 
of maternal love and a counter-balance to the stern law of the father, a loving conduit that 
supports the transfer of drives and affects into signification. In the process of separating 
from the maternal body within primary narcissism, the child identifies with and idealizes 
the imaginary father as the site of the mother’s love, an “accepting or loving third” 
between an abject mother and the stern law of the father. Kristeva describes this 
androgynous site as “not a ‘pure signifier’ but as the very space of metaphorical shifting: 
a condensation of semantic features as well as nonrepresentable drive heterogeneity that 
subtends them, goes beyond them and slips away.”57 In effect, the loving third is a figure 
of the semiotic element of language, “not just the semiotic rhythms of the maternal body, 
but those rhythms as they show up in the speech of the other.”58 Identifying with the 
third, the child transfers drives and affects to the site of meaning and begins the entrance 
into the symbolic order.59 In this way, the figure of the semiotic in language is an 
important assistant to the matricide necessary for revolt and symbolic authorization. 
Providing an accepting space for drives in language, the third promises resources to the 
symbolization of loss and abjection and thereby protects against depressive collapse or 
abjecting eruptions. Without supportive sites of transference for drives, with only empty 
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laws and regulatory mechanisms, individuals in the power vacuum lose their sense of 
belonging to the social order, their openness to finding and making meaning. Understood 
as a questioning return and displacement of the past, intimate revolt is an attempt to 
rehabilitate and revitalize processes of authorization that enable one to find and give form 
to drives and affects. 
What Kristeva terms “the sacred” is also an anti-depressant that shares a lineage 
with, and suggests an avenue of working-through, the violence of abjection. In The 
Feminine and The Sacred, Kristeva casts melancholic and sacred experience as foils of 
one another. Where melancholia is  “flimsy defense” against maternal loss and a fragile 
shelter from feelings of exclusion in a normalizing order, the sacred is “rooted in a 
certainty about life” and “a self-assurance here and now.”60 In its precarious hold on 
meaning-giving life, melancholia precipitates the very suicidal tendency it aims to 
escape. By contrast, sacred experience celebrates the pleasure of socio-symbolic bonds. If 
the sacred and melancholia are foils of one another in The Feminine and The Sacred, 
Kristeva presents the sacred and abjection as analogues in Powers of Horror, even 
entitling a section of that text “As Abjection—So the Sacred.” As the sacred, abjection is 
highlighted as a separation process that both constitutes and undermines identity. 
According to Kristeva, the abject is something  “rejected from which one does not part, 
from which one does not protect oneself as from an object.”61 In abjection, the mother is 
sacrificed, a victim of the child’s abjecting separation. And yet, this sacrifice is not total; 
the abject mother continues to occupy and even threaten the child in adult life. 
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In The Feminine and The Sacred, Kristeva defines the “self-assurance” of the 
sacred more directly (and broadly) as the intersection of life and meaning. There, she 
explains that “the sacred resides in that transition, in that passage, and not in its edges, 
lower (filth: pubic hair) or upper (the strict prohibition that veils or cuts off heads: the 
horror of monotheistic fundamentalism).”62 Neither the abject nor the Law in themselves, 
the sacred is the passage as a possibility of life with meaning; it is “the borderline 
between nature and culture, the animalistic and the verbal, the sensible and the 
nameable.” 63 In “soft totalitarianism,” the sacred borderline is far from certain or 
assured. Especially for those lives most vulnerable to dispossession and disconnection, 
regulatory techniques and empty laws sever the connection of life and meaning and open 
lives to violence. With respect to sacred life, the patrimonial individual appears more 
speculative than certain. For many, the economization of life sets off the suicidal 
tendency of melancholia, seeking subjective shelter in market logic that circulate 
violence. For others, the economization of life sets off the exclusionary tendency of 
abjection, sacrificing and consuming bodies (or body parts) from the lower echelons of 
society. In such conditions, it is clear that the self-assurance of the sacred, its certainty, is 
not given but produced or accomplished.  
Kristeva ties sacred experience to this dramatic upheaval of so-called liberal 
society, even providing a rallying cry for sacred empowerment, inclusion and pleasure —
“Infinite jouissance for each person at the intersection of happiness for all…is it anything 
else but the sacred?”64 Mirroring her call for “the singular autonomy of each [and the] 
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renewed link with the other” through a psychic revolt that revitalizes and rehabilitates, 
the happiness of the sacred takes root out of the “fertile moment of depression.”65 
According to Kristeva, the sacred can be found and formed out of the relocation of 
refusal in melancholia. Melancholics refuse to lose (the maternal Thing) and are caught 
within the passage of life and meaning, adrift from symbolic resources. In sacred 
experience, the subject refigures and relocates the refusal to lose. Specifically, the sacred 
supports loss by refusing to forget it. Martha Reineke captures the spirit of this movement 
when she writes that “if the subject can work through and articulate that which has been 
barred and concealed in the course of its own formation and division, the subject need not 
sacrifice that which has been excluded in order to secure its own being.”66 Sacred 
experience is a process of returning and working-through the drive force associated with 
maternal sacrifice. In a sense, the sacred is a “sacrifice of sacrifice,” an attempt to include 
the excluded by symbolically supporting and sublimating that which has been “barred 
and concealed.”67 To be sure Reineke appears to overestimate the mastery by which one 
can sacrifice sacrifice, even pressing the thought that we “need not” our “vital necessity.” 
In its redoubled form the sacrifice is, again, not total. The repressed sacrifice returns in a 
manner that undermines the identity of the subject and threatens to repeat itself within 
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symbolic life. Although the sacred cannot “secure our being” it can support it, 
encouraging (but not completing) the redirection of violent drives into signs.  
The insecure “fruit” of the sacred can be grasped in Kristeva’s proximity and 
departure from Freud with respect to the process of “working-through” that sacrifices 
sacrifice. In his technical paper “Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through” Freud 
describes “working-through” as a repetition of the drive “modified by interpretation 
and—for this reason—liable to facilitate the subject’s freeing himself from repetition 
mechanisms.”68 The interpretive modified repetitions of “working-through” stand in 
contrast with those of “acting out” wherein “the patient does not remember anything of 
what he has forgotten or repressed, but acts it out. He reproduces it not as a memory but 
as an action; he repeats it, without, of course, knowing that he is repeating it.”69 In the 
distinction between working-through and acting-out, Freud links the former to symbolic 
modification and support of drives, the latter with their violent eruption. As Kristeva 
presents it, the sacrifice of sacrifice is this interpretive process of working-through vis-à-
vis sacrifice. By working through sacrifice, one interpretively redirects drives into signs, 
repeating (or redoubling) the sacrifice (as a sacrifice of sacrifice) in a manner that 
changes the very structure of the repeating drive (as sign).  
In “Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through” Freud cites the transference 
relationship (between analyst and analysand) as the main “instrument” for transforming 
the “compulsion to repeat” in acting-out into a process of working-through. On his 
picture, the analyst  
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admits [the compulsion] into the transference as a playground in which it 
is allowed to expand in almost complete freedom and in which it is 
expected to display to us everything in the way of pathogenic instincts that 
is hidden in the patient’s mind. Provided [that the patient] respects the 
necessary conditions of the analysis we regularly succeed in giving all the 
symptoms of the illness a new transference meaning.70 
 
For Freud, the transference relationship allows drives to pass from body to symbolic form 
through a “playground” that offers an initial form via the space of the transferential 
relationship itself. On Kristeva’s picture, the imaginary father or loving third occupies the 
position of transference within the process of working-through. As we have observed, the 
loving third marks the site of the child’s early drive transfer, the place where the semiotic 
emerges in the speech of the other. The sacrifice of sacrifice redirects and modifies a 
repeating drive only by finding an accepting place in language, the resources of which 
enable the “recreation of the transferential dynamic with other others” (i.e. beyond the 
analyst). With the support of the loving third, Kristeva suggests the interminable 
character of working-through marks a virtue rather than a failure of interpretive return.71 
As she puts it, “the interminability, no longer inexorable but open, is a sort of numerical, 
countable infinity that will continue in the future of a life and generations to come.”72 An 
interminable sacrifice of sacrifice is a process that is not masterful or “freeing” but open 
and supportive. In a manner analogous to psychic revolt, it appears that the promise of 
the sacrifice of sacrifice is won only in association with the imaginary father that links 
the interminable work of working-through to the infinite openness of loving bonds.  
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For Kristeva, “the sacred seems both essential to women and very threatened in a 
world that knows how to do everything except unite ‘souls.’”73  More readily encountered 
as an abject body to be marketed and managed, the sacred is “essential to women” 
because they are more vulnerable to sacrifice. For women suffering the disconnection of 
life and meaning, she imagines how the sacred might amount to a form of resistance  
What if the ancestral distinction between those who give life (women) and 
those who give meaning (men) were in the process of disappearing? What 
do you think? It would be a radical upheaval, never before seen […] might 
women be in a position to give a different coloration to the ultimate 
sacred, the miracle of human life: not for life itself, but life bearing 
meaning, for the formulation of which women are called upon to offer 
their desire and their words.”74 
 
For depressive patrimonial women reduced to “those who give life,” the sacrifice of 
(maternal) sacrifice promises to “call upon their desire and words,” to work-through and 
mend the disconnection between life and meaning. In the soft totalitarianism of the power 
vacuum, however, sacrificial logics operate along dense and multiple forms of difference 
and according to diverse and entangled histories of exclusion. Imagined through a more 
complicated picture of dispossession and disconnection, the sacrifice of sacrifice could 
approach its own promise—“infinite jouissance for each person at the intersection of 
happiness for all.”  
While this picture of even more radical upheaval recalls and diversifies the need 
for loving thirds in psychic and social life, Kristeva complicates this undertaking by 
linking the sacred even more essentially to women. In a slippage that will be shown to be 
recurrent in her thought, Kristeva reduces women to “those who give life”  
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The vaginal body, that dwelling place of the species, imposes on woman 
an experience of the ‘interior,’ of internal reality that does not allow itself 
be easily sacrificed by the prohibition, or represented by the codes 
resulting from the prohibition (language, images, thought and so on). 
Whether mistress or mother, a woman remains a stranger to the sacrifice 
she participates in it, she assumes it, but she disrupts it, she can also 
threaten it. It is therefore understandable how a vital depth also constitutes 
a social danger.75 
 
Here Kristeva suggests that women’s vaginal reproductive body is a resistant outside to 
movements of power. No longer “familiar” with sacrifice, as its frequent victim, women 
are “strangers to sacrifice” as an interior that “does not allow itself be easily sacrificed by 
the prohibition.” Such a claim essentializes women’s claim on the sacred in a manner that 
would foreclose attention (and resistance to) diverse axes of sacrificial violence. More 
broadly, it reflects Kristeva’s maintenance of an excess to the violence of the power 
vacuum and soft totalitarianism. While Kristeva celebrates the disappearance of the 
distinction between “those who give life (women)” and “those who give meaning (men),” 
she does not abolish the distinction between zoe and bios. In the Kristevan text the 
intersection and entanglement of zoe and bios is clear—from her celebrations of “life 
bearing meaning” to her outline of normalizing mechanisms that produce the patrimonial 
individual— but so also is their ultimate heterogeneity. In a recent interview with John 
Lechte, Kristeva answers the question decisively: “JL: In the end do you accept the well-
foundedness of the distinction between zoe and bios? JK: Yes, entirely.”76 Kristeva’s 
commitment to the zoe/bios distinction is examined more directly in the proceeding 
section. Here the question of resistance is framed by the very fact that, in the power 
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vacuum, “interior reality” is not given, least of all for vaginal bodies and others 
vulnerable to intimate and invasive regulation. In the conditions Kristeva describes—a 
normalizing, falsifiable, spectacular order that (de)regulates psychic life —the locus of 
resistance is not excess but intimacy. 
 The sacred and revolt should be thought together as forms of intimate resistance 
that empower the borderline of life and meaning by producing it anew. As we have seen, 
the elaboration of normalizing power in the power vacuum and the “loss of values” in 
soft totalitarianism create conditions in which patrimonial individuals experience, in 
differential ways, the disempowerment of diffuse power and empty laws and the weak 
symbolic ties of a “culture” in which “life itself” is the supreme value. In these 
biopolitical conditions, patrimonial men and women suffer the disconnection of life and 
meaning. Having shown that the psyche is a political and power laden scene, Kristeva 
maintains that the “transformation of man’s relationship to meaning […] intrinsically 
concerns public life and consequently has profoundly political implications. In fact, it 
poses the question of another politics, that of permanent conflictuality.”77  In this way, 
Kristeva’s intimate forms of resistance do not aim to “deliver us” from the political, nor 
do they imply that the “couch is expected to rise up and take power.”78  In recognition of 
the depths and non-locatability of normalizing power, psychic revolt and sacred 
experience return to and renew the conditions by which we become political-beings and 
subjects of power. Both returns outline a process through which drives and affects find 
support in signifying systems. This support is endangered in the soft totalitarianism of the 
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power vacuum where depression, a flimsy defense and an enterprise, is a not-so-talkative 
way of life.  
To be clear, the extent to which psychic revolt and sacred experience amount to 
resistance hinges on whether their returns repeat and refigure the process of 
authorization. If the sacrifice of sacrifice falls back into sacrifice or if, in revolt, “‘I’ 
include myself at the top [and] exclude those at the bottom,” then Kristeva’s intimate 
resistance is merely a repetition of the violence of a normalizing falsifiable order. As 
observed in the earlier discussion of Freud’s notion of “acting-out,” the compulsion to 
repeat is itself a form of resistance, a resistance to the process of recollecting and 
reckoning with formative traumas. The notion of “working-through,” which helped 
clarify the sacrifice of sacrifice in its distinction from compulsive repetition, describes 
another course of repetition. Working-through repeats and, via interpretation, modifies 
the drive in a manner that loosens (or “frees”) it from the “repetition mechanism” (or the 
compulsion). The movement of loosening marks a space of interrogation and reflection 
that distinguishes its repetition from unknowing compulsion and that introduces an 
internal change in the drive itself. The notion of working-through should describe the 
goals of the broad project of intimate resistance. Interpreting formative impasses, 
intimate resistance repeats in return but this repetition must also modify and refigure. Not 
masterful but interminable, not as much liberatory as supportive, revolt and the sacred 
must return and repeat only with resources of interpretation. 
In the case of both revolt and the sacred, the most important resource of this kind 
is that of questioning. For Kristeva, the sacred intersection of life and meaning is, in a 
sense, itself a question. In New Maladies of the Soul and Intimate Revolt, Kristeva 
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reinterprets symbolic castration beyond the paradigm of lack (characteristic of the 
Lacanian Symbolic) and argues that castration is essentially a question.79 That is, in a 
manner consistent with her claim that the child enters language only with support, 
Kristeva suggests that the symbolic order cannot be founded on lack and negation alone. 
Importantly, the transition from the pre-symbolic to the symbolic is also spurred and 
supported by questioning. To be sure, the child develops signifying capacities through the 
negation of saying “no,” trading objects and things (especially the maternal thing) for the 
representation of the signs. The “no,” which reflects the negativity of maternal 
separation, opens unto all symbols and introduces negativity into language itself.80 
Language bears a lack insofar as signs are not things.  However, before the “no,” 
questioning allows an experience of relationality that supports the drives in language and, 
eventually, supports the reconnection of signs and things in the form of a “negation of 
negation.” In effect, the relational pleasure of questioning counter-balances the 
impending trauma of negation. Of this transition Kristeva summarizes that “its value lies 
not in being a brutal cut. It lies in benevolently generating the capacity of thinking itself, 
precisely since beyond negation, what psychoanalysis calls symbolic castration is a 
question […] the question opens the infans to discourse and allows speech to be taken 
toward an endless horizon.”81 The value of the sacred cut lies in its connection to 
questioning and, in the sacrifice of sacrifice, the process of questioning contributes to that 
of working-through wherein the question helps interpret and modify drives and affects in 
language. 
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In the repetition of return, the transformative role of questioning is perhaps most 
clear in Kristeva’s writings on psychic revolt. “Opening unto the symbolic in the form of 
a double negation, an indefinite questioning,” psychic revolt is a return to the conditions 
of authorization that questions and displaces old laws for the sake of the future as a future 
that authors questions.82 This process is different from the revolt of the “nihilist” whose 
repetitions withdraw into old values or un-questioning new ones. “It is not enough to 
revive the permanence of revolt, which technology may have blocked, in order to 
recapture happiness or some sort of serene stability of being.”83 Instead, the interrogations 
of revolt “relentlessly repeat retrospective return so as to lead it to the limits of the 
representable/thinkable/tenable.”84 At these limits the revolting subject experiences the 
value of questioning as drives and affects are brought to language in a manner that is 
conflictual but supportive (not secure and serene). At the borderline of life and meaning, 
the experience of the value of questioning introduces a change in the repetition of return. 
The so-called new values of the soft totalitarian power vacuum are “values that have 
forgotten to question themselves.”85 The life of the patrimonial individual is, we recall, 
not simply a life without speech but a “life without questions.” In the process of renewing 
and revitalizing the connection between life and meaning, psychic revolt installs the 
question as the value of this sacred cut. In this way, the indefinite questioning of revolt 
marks the possibility of another economy, one that interrogates the totalitarian threat of 
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the power vacuum, “the threat of destroying life after having devalued the question of its 
meaning.”86  
The picture of psychic revolt as a practice of indefinite questioning should be read 
in context with the understanding of biopower as a power that “places living [and 
speaking] being in question.” Borrowed and adapted from Foucault’s description of the 
threshold of modernity, the notion of “living [and speaking] being in question” marks 
how biopower operates through questioning. That is, the question of what constitutes life 
and language is part of the biopolitical production of an answer to—or to use Agamben’s 
vocabulary, a “decision” on— that question. At the level of the psyche, the questioning of 
revolt is also linked to an answer or “decision” because it supports the child’s “no” and 
“opens unto the symbolic.” In revolt, questioning is critical and interpretive but it is also 
part of a process that is both repetitive and productive. In intimate resistance, the 
refigured psychic economy borne of questioning is not one beyond the movement of 
decision (or, obviously, the sacred cut of the question). Rather it is an economy that 
might be better able to interpret, critique and work-through the impasses of authorization 
and the values those impasses circulate and hide (under the guise of “life itself”) in the 
soft totalitarianism of the power vacuum. Clearly, then, Kristeva’s account of intimate 
resistance diverges from that of Agamben, a fact made clear by her celebration of a life 
that authors questions in order to author biography, “a life to be told and written.” 
 
Zoe, Bios, Biography 
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The melancholic women of Black Sun pre-date and pre-figure the biopolitical turn 
in the Kristevan text outlined in this chapter. Failed by a flimsy symbolic law, Helen and 
Isabel suffer from symbolic collapse and occupy a “not-so-talkative world.” For each, 
depression is like a “living death,” a “bottomless despair” cut off from language and 
withdrawn from the social world.87 In The Sense and Nonsense of Revolt, Intimate Revolt, 
The Feminine and The Sacred and other later texts, Kristeva argues that the mute 
symptom and the general “inability to represent” reflect the vacuumed totalitarian 
character of contemporary power. Making clear the multiplication of normalizing power 
and regulatory mechanisms that attend soft symbolic law, Kristeva uncovers mutations of 
Helen and Isabel in the living death of patrimonial men and women. In the power 
vacuum, the economization of embodied life is another flimsy defense in a depressive 
culture disempowered and disconnected from meaning-making. In this context and at the 
borderline of zoe and bios, intimate resistance is “another politics” because it engages, at 
the psychic depths of normalization, a practice that eludes Helen, Isabel and others— the 
practice of biography. Although “it is not a time of great works,” the “tiny revolt” of 
questioning in order to tell our story “resuscitates our innermost depths” and “preserves 
the life and mind of the species.”88 The connection between psychic revolt and biography 
highlights resistance as a refiguring displacement and narration of the past, a disruption 
and recombination of our formative impasses. But it also returns us to a more troubling 
trajectory in the Kristevan text—the maintenance of the distinction between zoe and bios. 
In the discussion of psychic revolt above, Kristeva’s tendency to link women’s vaginal 
body to an inherently resistant zoe is suspended. However, even when following the more 
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promising thought of Kristevan resistance—one rooted in intimacy rather than excess—
revolt returns to the question of zoe and bios. By way of conclusion, this section marks an 
excess harbored in Kristeva’s intimate resistance and re-frames the capacity of her text to 
work-through its own omissions. Specifically, I weigh the differences of Kristeva and 
Agamben’s strategies of biopolitical resistance, an infans to be worked-through and 
infancy that jams. 
 As this chapter has observed, Kristeva is attentive to how lives conflated with 
“life itself, life without questions” (zoe) are rendered more vulnerable to violence and 
exclusion. With a particular investment in disappearing the distinction between “those 
who give life (women)” and “those who give meaning (men),” Kristeva’s account of the 
power vacuum and soft totalitarianism uncovers the metonymic relation of zoe-body-
woman-animal and its operation through differential and differentiating power. In 
women’s reduction to the reproductive dwelling place of the species, their bodies are 
opened up to more invasive and violent regulation. However, in another movement she 
commits this same reduction, suggesting that the dwelling place “does not allow itself be 
easily sacrificed by the prohibition, or represented by codes resulting from the 
prohibition.”89  To be sure, Kristeva’s critical explorations offer significant resources to 
theorize the exclusions of her own text. The notions of abjection and sacrifice can be re-
functioned, in a reflexive manner, to theorize the production of “a vital depth that also 
constitutes a social danger,” a resistant outside to normalizing violence. 
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Nevertheless Kristeva’s attention and inattention to slippage suggests that her text 
is itself ambivalent, especially vis-à-vis zoe-body-woman-animal.90 On the one hand, she 
critiques the violence of a normalizing power that produces individuals, in differential 
and differentiating ways, as depressive enterprising patrimonial men and women that 
struggle to speak. On the other hand, Kristeva has a tendency to link life, women and 
animals to an excess materiality beyond the reach of prohibitions and the movements of 
normalizing power. The question of Kristeva’s ambivalence can be set in a more 
biopolitical frame. On the one hand, “life itself, life without questions” is a production of 
the power vacuum and a reflection of biopolitical power. On the other hand, there is zoe, 
an excess pure and resistant materiality that precedes and exceeds subjection, the 
“generally biological aspect of life: which would be as it were ‘programmed’ […] by 
genetic destiny.”91 Cast and re-cast again, Kristeva’s ambivalence marks a regulatory 
undercurrent to her attempt to recover and produce lives to be told and written, 
biographies. In the process, Kristeva produces life itself, a life of (one of the least 
biographical of characteristics) destiny. Returning and repeating again, this production 
has been observed in the vital necessity of sacrifice maintained in psychic revolt. 
As it bears upon the distinction between zoe and bios, Kristeva’s ambivalence 
diverges from an Agambenian frame.  On Agamben’s terms, so long as Kristeva accepts 
the zoe-bios distinction, the attempt to recover and support lives to be told and written 
will produce bare life. For Agamben, “tiny revolts” that displace old authorities and 
work-through the impasses and traumas of an individual’s history, are biopolitical 
machinations, “ceaselessly updated decisions in which the caesurae and their re-
                                                
90 Oliver, Animal Lessons: How They Teach Us to be Human, 300. 
91 Lechte and Margaroni, “Interview: Sharing Singularity,” 158-159. 
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articulation are always dislocated and displaced anew.”92 This machination applies as 
much to the movement of refiguring as repeating, each an effective re-functioning of a 
“bloody and lethal” logic. If we consider Agamben’s own analogous call to return to and 
renew the conditions of speaking-being, his divergence from Kristeva deepens further. 
Found in the concept of infancy discussed at length in the previous chapter, Agamben’s 
return aims to jam the logic of inclusive exclusion whereby language guards the 
ineffable. Infancy is an experience of muteness as “not not speaking” that conditions 
speech. In a manner that figures every speaker as an “eternal child,” every event of 
speech carries infancy at its center not as silence but as pure sayability. Drawing on 
Kristeva’s account of vulnerability in Le haine et le pardon, the previous chapter 
challenged the invulnerable a-relational character of infancy. Abstracted from relations of 
dependence and perhaps in demonstration of Agamben’s own ambivalence, infancy was 
shown to take on the very logic of inclusive exclusion that it aimed to jam.  
Kristeva’s infans is linked not to jamming but to working-through, an activity that 
develops her account of vulnerability and renders her ambivalence more ambiguous. A 
characteristic of the speaking body, Kristeva locates vulnerability at the sacred crossroads 
to which revolt returns—“biology/language.”93 That is, Kristeva maintains that humans 
are vulnerable because they occupy the ambiguous passage between life and meaning 
through which one is entangled with and exposed to others. As the foregoing explorations 
of revolt illustrate, the notion of vulnerability characterizes the early trials and impasses 
of this passage. In primary narcissism, the infans is exposed to and undertakes loss, love 
and violence. A relational yet porous being, maternal separation marks the major event of 
                                                
92 Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 38. 
93 Julia Kristeva, La haine et le pardon (Paris: Fayard, 2005), 113.  
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primary narcissism, a trauma that forms a deep narcissistic wound. At the outer “edges” 
of this passage, the Oedipal stage fills out the shape of this wound, as the assimilation 
into language supports and compensates but cannot wholly undo the trauma of 
separation. In sum, Kristeva presents the infans as occupying a “scar” between body and 
word within which the infans is both “wounded and wounding,” having undertaken and 
undergone the crossroads of biology/language.94   
Understood as the mark of vulnerability, psychic revolt can be read as a return to 
the conditions of the infans that aims to reconcile and heal its wounds. By supporting and 
reconnecting bodily drives and affects in language, the subject recovers the love and 
pleasure that also characterize vulnerability. In narcissistic and Oedipal exposure, the 
infans experiences the supportive dependence of the loving third and the pleasurable 
sublimation of the body in language. In psychic revolt, one returns to the conditions of 
authorization to mend and renew its connection to loving support and the joys of 
language. As a process of healing and reconciliation, revolt is a psychic undertaking with 
“profound political implications.” Without the possibility of healing return, the character 
of vulnerability as wounded and wounding sets up a circuit of violence that is adequately 
described as ambivalent and summarized in Agamben’s notion of a bloody and lethal 
biopolitical machine. As wounded and wounding, subjects either disavow vulnerability, 
in a manner that promotes the violence against others, or they are swallowed up by 
vulnerability, in the sadomasochism of depression and other flimsy defenses. In the 
Kristevan text, these threats are real but the dilemma is illusory. For Kristeva, 
vulnerability is more ambiguous than ambivalent because the passage makes possible 
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positive and critical experiences of dependence. Through the indefinite questioning of 
revolt the subject can work-through rather than act-out the wound of biology/language, 
zoe/bios. That is, the questions and pleasures of vulnerability can wrest the regulatory 
undercurrent of Kristeva’s text from wounded-wounding machination and set it in a more 
ambiguous passage, one wrought with the violence of wounds but also opened unto the 
possibility of healing. To the suffering of Helen and Isabel, psychic revolt does not 
promise to jam or transcend the soft totalitarianism of the power vacuum but it suggests a 
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This dissertation examines the significance of biopolitical power to forms of life 
and language in the contemporary West. Over the course of its explorations, Foucault’s 
description of the threshold of modernity operates as a helpful anchor in connecting the 
concept of biopower to the production of speaking-being as well as living being. In that 
famous pronouncement, Foucault remarks that “for millennia, man remained what he was 
for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for political existence; modern 
man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question.”1 In 
biopolitical contexts, where “the life of the species is wagered on it own political 
strategies,” zoe (the simple fact of living shared by living beings) and bios (the way of 
life proper to persons and poleis) are indistinct; as Foucault puts it, biopower places 
“living being in question.”  Insofar as the distinction between zoe and bios had 
conceptually hinged on the “additional capacity” for language, the distinction between 
“having” and “not-having” language is also ambiguous; as is argued throughout these 
pages, biopower places living [and speaking-] being in question.” The question ‘How 
does life have language?’ is an old mechanism of exclusion but one that finds a mutation 
and lease in biopolitical contexts where new productions of “having” and “not having” 
language reflect and contribute to the regulatory support of some lives and the 
abandonment of others. Today, life and language are fabrications of biopolitical power 
and what constitutes living and speaking being reflects the regulatory strategies and 
tactics of a productive power.  
                                                
1 Foucault, The History of Sexuality (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 143. 
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To map how the question of language operates as a differential strategy of 
biopower this dissertation turned to the work of Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben and 
Julia Kristeva as well as rich and difficult sites of living and speaking being in question. 
Prominent among these sites (but not therefore paradigms, in Agamben’s sense or 
otherwise), the figures of Terri Schiavo, the Musselmann, and Helen and Isabel help open 
important dimensions of the language of biopower and access useful theoretical resources 
of resistance. As singular illustrations each provides an anchor in the challenge of 
supporting excluded voices when operations of inclusion and exclusion, fostering and 
disallowing, are caught up in movements of biopower. That is, with respect to the notion 
of “living and speaking being in question,” these figures help open questions that might 
open unto living and speaking otherwise.  Prominent among these questions: How might 
“other” voices earn support without disallowing the voices of other others? What 
constitutions of language or movements of power ready or realize this transformation? By 
way of conclusion, I return to the impasses of these examinations in a manner that 
synthesizes my hitherto discrete conversations with Terri Schiavo, the Musselmann, 
Helen and Isabel. 
As diverse figures of “living death” these sites of living and speaking being in 
question mark the productive depths of the power to “make live” as well as its apparently 
contradictory capacity to link with the power to kill. In biopolitical contexts, even the 
most “intrinsic” features of life, like its distinction from death, reflect the genealogical 
“secret that [life has] no essence or that [its] essence was fabricated in a piecemeal 
fashion from alien forms.” To capture this level of production found in biopolitical 
power, as well as its illustration of the indistinction between zoe and bios I have argued 
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that Foucault’s understanding of biopolitical power as the power to “foster life or 
disallow it to the point of death” must be coordinated with Agamben’s concept of the 
exception as the power to “make survive.” This reading redresses Foucault’s inattention 
to contemporary mutations of sovereignty that underwrite rather than re-function 
biopolitical power. Understood as a tactic that activates contingency within the field of 
governmentality as the conduct of conduct, the exception is deactivated from Agamben’s 
own hidden ontologies. As a picture of a normalizing order in which empty laws also 
circulate fierce tyranny, the Kristevan text echoes my assessment of the “demonic 
combination” of regulatory mechanisms and exceptional tactics.  
The flexible resources accomplished in this coordination and combination help 
theorize how figures come to differently occupy the indistinction of “living death.” In the 
case of Terri Schiavo, the existence of advanced comatose states reflects the power to 
foster life via advancements in biotechnology and the expansion of the jurisdiction of 
medicine from the treatment of illness to the management of chronic illness and death. In 
this development women’s lives are differentially supported and the health conditions of 
subordinated populations suffer the increased risk, in more and less subtle ways, of 
illness, death and even living death. Here, Helen and Isabel’s self-description as suffering 
a “living death” marks the psychic impoverishment borne of normalization, the kind of 
destruction that might have attended Terri Schiavo’s bulimia. Seemingly extraordinary, 
death-bed scenarios reflect everyday normalizing mechanisms that produce eating 
disordered (or melancholic) women. At Schiavo’s bedside, the tactic of the exception 
operates in an un-subtle way, removing and reinserting her PEG feeding tube but this 
tactic need not only be spectacular. Although Terri Schiavo’s name seems permanently 
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lodged in American consciousness, the Muselmann is distinguished, among these figures, 
in not having a proper name because his living-death is “submerged” instead of 
spectacular.   
As figures of “muteness,” Terri Schiavo, the Muselmann, and Helen and Isabel 
mark the productive depths of biopower with respect to speaking-being. Another intrinsic 
feature open to the movements and transformations of biopolitical power, speech is 
revealed to be a precarious and fragile event, one that marks the contingency of the 
conditions of entering language, on Agamben’s account, or the vulnerability of that same 
process, on Kristeva’s. For Agamben, language is fabricated in a process by which 
muteness is “placed outside oneself” and, in that movement, included within the self as 
well. In his critique of the fabrication of language within the history of philosophy, 
Agamben describes this power-laden procedure as the structure of Voice that presupposes 
voice as removed. With respect to the Muselmann as a “mute” figure—the true witness of 
the camps that, paradoxically, cannot witness— Levi’s paradox resituates the production 
of speaking-being within his attempt to include excluded testimony. To not testify for the 
Muselmann is to repeat the violence of his original (inclusive) exclusion, to testify for the 
Muselmann is to ventriloquize experiences “seen from close by,” “by proxy,” to not 
genuinely include the excluded.  
If Agamben’s account of the biopolitical production of language highlights how 
the tactic of the exception produces speech by placing muteness outside (and within) 
language, it also suggests a particularly violent form of including excluded voices—that 
of “giving voice” in ventriloquy. This possibility is a particularly wrenching thought for 
Primo Levi, but it is undertaken eagerly at Terri Schiavo’s bedside. As I have argued, the 
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debate over the fate of Terri Schiavo’s life made use of perceptions of her body as a 
speaking body to direct and redirect its regulation. Ventriloquizing “body doubles” like 
Kate Adamson, survivor of “locked in syndrome,” were particularly salient forces in 
molding public perception of Schiavo as a speaking-being and also particularly violent 
modes of advancing political objectives through or on behalf of Schiavo’s political will.  
To be clear, the case of Schiavo and the Muselmann raise the threat of ventriloquy 
while also confirming the ambiguity of its occurrence. Many advocates that mobilized 
body doubles also understood events of Schiavo’s body—vocalizations, the movement of 
her eyes—as communicative events. This understanding of Schiavo’s body as itself a site 
of testimony should be held in contrast with the withdrawal of this interpretation in the 
case of the Muselmann. Discussed in reference to Robert Antelme’s account of the 
“flush” of the Muselmann called forward to his execution, it was noted that Agamben 
found this flushing affect to be ”like an apostrophe” but not itself testimony. Alongside 
one another, the unread flush of the Muselmann and the over-read symptoms of Schiavo’s 
body remind us that, given the biopolitical production of language, what is taken to 
constitute language shifts and mutates depending on context. The too secure 
understanding of a figure as mute loses sight of the ambiguity that attends the production 
of that muteness; the too secure understanding of testimony as testimony, indeed the 
thought of “testimony itself,” loses sight of its own conditions of production. The notion 
of ventriloquy is still instructive for attempts to resist and redress the biopolitical 
marginalization of voices: to avoid the violence of “giving voice” or “removing voice” by 
remaining attentive to that ambiguity of what constitutes voice. 
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In contrast with Agamben, Kristeva connects the production of language with 
vulnerability in a manner that is perhaps more attentive to ambiguity. For Kristeva, one 
does not enter language by inclusively excluding muteness. Instead the infans assimilates 
language by sacrificing the maternal thing and compensating for that loss with signs. This 
is a wrought relational process in which the infans is wounded, by loss and its incomplete 
support by the sign, and wounding, in a movement of sacrificial violence against the 
maternal body. To be sure, language involves a sacred cut, an abjection from which the 
infans does not part. But it would be inapt to describe this cut as an inclusive exclusion 
because the borders it forms are more ambiguous than inside-outside, outside-inside. The 
sacred cut marks the in-betweenness of speaking-being, the vulnerability and ambiguity 
of occupying the passage between body and word. As I have argued, Kristeva’s account 
of psychic revolt provides a compelling model for how to re-constitute language in ways 
that support marginalized voices. In psychic revolt one returns to the past to question and 
displace old laws in a manner that revitalizes and refigures the connection of life and 
meaning. This is not a movement of articulating or “giving voice” to drives and affects 
but an indefinite and incomplete process of supporting and fostering a space for them in 
language. For marginalized individuals like Helen and Isabel, for whom the regulatory 
mechanisms and empty laws of the power vacuum lead to symbolic collapse, the activity 
of psychic revolt can be one of reconnecting life and meaning. One can imagine how this 
practice might have played a beneficial role in Terri Schiavo’s struggle to overcome with 
bulimia. Kristeva envisions the work of psychic revolt in a context where, retreating from 
or abandoned to the symbolic, many turn or collapse into flimsy sadomasochistic 
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defenses like melancholia or eating disorders. For these suffering individuals, psychic 
revolt is an activity that strives to support the connection between life and meaning.   
It goes without saying that Kristeva’s thought of “another politics” that takes 
place in psychic space is not the prescription of psychic revolt for a comatose Terri 
Schiavo or the Muselmann to revitalize their symbolic ties. But insofar as she suggests 
that psychic revolt helps mend the wounded-wounding constitution of speaking-being, 
Kristeva offers a vision of social symbolic life in which healing is possible and 
witnessing need not remain trapped in a violent cycle of giving and removing voice. As I 
have argued, Kristeva’s account of an infans to be worked-through can be understood as 
a contrast to Agamben’s in-vulnerable a-relational notion of infancy. For Agamben, 
infancy marks an experience of pure potentiality or sayability that conditions, and 
remains carried within, every event of speech. The notion of infancy informs Agamben’s 
attempt to develop an account of witnessing for the Muselmann that resolves Levi’s 
paradox. For Agamben, to witness the Muselmann beyond the logic of ventriloquy is to 
bear witness to the infancy that survives in his muteness. Given my demonstration that 
infancy is an abstract and a-relational concept, Agamben’s account of witnessing seems 
to bear witness to the most anonymous part of the Muselmann. By contrast Kristeva’s 
notion of a vulnerable and ambiguous infans suggests a more compelling mode of 
witnessing for the Muselmann one that finds in his destitution not the remaining surge of 
an abstract potentiality but an ambiguous woundedness—a vulnerability traversed by 
relations with others and exposed to the most violent declensions of biopolitical power—
that might be supported and given space in testimony.   
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As figures of “living and speaking being in question” in the form of “living 
death” it is appropriate that tarrying with Terri Schiavo, the Muselmann and Helen and 
Isabel brings this project to the other border of life, infancy and childhood, and its 
biopolitical production. Kristeva’s infans might be understood as another figure in this 
series, caught up in the movements of power that variously foster and disallow parts of its 
being. Given representations of infancy like that of Agamben—totipotent, in-vulnerable, 
potentiality— it is important to observe how childhood is entangled in relations of power 
and dependence. When the child stands in excess of these movements, the support and 
influence of its early relationships, especially with the mother, is covered over. 
Understood here as a deepening registration of power in subjectivation, Kristeva’s long-
standing project of developing the role of the maternal function in primary narcissism 
responds to just this form of erasure and its regulatory effects. Yet Kristeva bears 
slippages and excesses of her own.  
Throughout this dissertation, my account of biopower holds that its productions 
“go all the way down” and move also through strategies of resistance. The question of 
resistance is not that of an excess to power, to be found in abstracted potentiality or a 
vaginal interior, which seem only to redistribute violent regulation and to obscure the 
vulnerable entanglement. Instead, resistance can only be found within power relations in 
the (critical but non-masterful) repetition and refiguration of their movement. With 
respect to resisting voices—those that work-through rather than act out the wounded and 
wounding production of language—this means reconciling oneself with one’s own 
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